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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
Essays in Entrepreneurship, Innovation and Labor
by
Andrés Gonzalo Hincapié Noreña
Doctor of Philosophy in Economics
Washington University in St. Louis, 2017
Professor Barton Hamilton, Chair
I explore the role of experimentation on the career choices of individuals deciding whether
to be paid employees or entrepreneurs, and on the decisions of consumers deciding what
medical treatment to buy. In the labor market, experimentation entails the accumulation
of information that allows individuals to improve their occupational choices. In the product
market, experimentation entails discovering the quality of new products and it may have an
effect on the evolution of technology: less experimentation by individuals may slow down
the process of innovation.
I start in Chapter 2 with the observation that most individuals do not start a business
and, if they do, tend to do so well into their thirties. While policies encouraging young,
would-be entrepreneurs are popular, little is known about whether they are effective. Us-
ing data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, I estimate a dynamic Roy model with
imperfect information about ability to evaluate the relative importance of various economic
determinants of entrepreneurial participation. Risk-averse, forward-looking individuals se-
quentially select entrepreneurial and paid-employment occupations based on their returns to
experience, information value, non-pecuniary benefits, and entry costs. Results show that
the main barriers faced by young entrepreneurs are entry costs and information frictions. I
consider two policy counterfactuals: a subsidy targeting entry costs and entrepreneurship
x
education targeting information frictions. I extend previous literature providing a mapping
from the information quality of entrepreneurship education into career choices and long-
term outcomes. A subsidy for young entrepreneurs increases participation but has small
long-term effects. Entrepreneurship education can have sizable effects on participation and
present value of income flows, even for low information quality. Nevertheless, the value of any
particular entrepreneurship education program will depend on its cost and its information
quality.
In Chapter 3 we develop and estimate a dynamic structural model of demand for a
product line whose spectrum of characteristics evolves over time because innovation is en-
dogenous to consumer demand. To achieve this goal, we provide a new approach to the
econometric challenge of estimating the process of technological change where innovation
under uncertainty includes both frequent and incremental modifications along with sporadic
major breakthroughs. Quality in our model is a multidimensional object: new products that
are superior in some dimensions might be inferior in others. For example, new medicines
more effective in combating disease than existing products sometimes have harsher side ef-
fects. In our model, consumer choices determine both the speed and the direction of product
innovation. Demand externalities arise because the aggregate choices of atomistic individuals
drive innovation. We apply our framework to analyze consumer choice and the realized path
of innovations over a long time horizon in a maturing product market: HIV drugs. In this
market, we observe the introduction of hundreds of new products, marking mostly modest,
but sometimes major innovations over existing technologies. Our estimates are obtained
through simulations of alternative hypothetical worlds that might have arisen if the innova-
tions had taken different paths to the ones we observe. We use our estimates to assess the
effects of policies that internalize the externalities affecting innovation and consumer welfare
by modifying consumer choices. We find that experimentation in clinical trials is one of the
mechanisms through which the externality operates.
xi
Chapter 1
Introduction
In the labor market, as well as in the market for consumption goods, individuals face un-
certainty. New workers are uncertain about how good they would be as managers or as
entrepreneurs. Consumers are uncertain about the characteristics of new products. This
lack of information drives the decisions of individuals who choose safer alternatives in an
attempt to avoid uncertainty. In the labor market, this means that individuals may engage
less in entrepreneurship. In the market for consumption goods, it means that individuals
may stick to older products even as new ones become available.
In environments with imperfect information, experimentation is characterized as the pro-
cess of gathering information that can be used to reduce uncertainty and adjust future
choices. In entrepreneurship, experimentation can be undertaken by investors trying to re-
duce uncertainty about the potential demand for a specific product or it can be undertaken
by entrepreneurs themselves trying to reveal whether their entrepreneurial potential is high
enough to make them successful. In product markets with innovation, experimentation by
consumers can determine the speed at which new products are adopted in the market thereby
also affecting the frequency with which new products are introduced. An example is the mar-
ket for medical treatments, where experimentation in clinical trials is fundamental to unveil
1
the safety and efficacy of treatments before they are made available in the market.
My dissertation explores the role of experimentation as a mechanism driving choices in
the labor market and in the market for medical treatments. In Chapter 2, experimentation
is part of an individual’s career and it partially determines why individuals choose between
more risky occupations (entrepreneurship) and less risky occupations (paid employment). In
Chapter 3 experimentation by potential consumers of medical treatments shapes the process
of product innovation.
Chapter 2 introduces two stylized facts: most individuals do not attempt entrepreneur-
ship during their careers and if they do, tend to do so when they are older and have accumu-
lated some paid-employment experience. I aim to explain these facts asking what determines
whether somebody attempts entrepreneurship during their life cycle and what determines
the gap in first entry ages between paid employment and self-employment.
The idea of experimentation in a labor market setting has been discussed by Jovanovic
(1979) and Miller (1984). In their models, individuals have incomplete information about
their ability and must discover how productive they are in every occupation. Recent papers
by Sanders (2010), James (2011), and Antonovics and Golan (2012) have expanded on those
ideas. In particular, James (2011) introduces an estimation method that captures the extent
to which learning about ability can happen across paid employment occupations.1
Experimentation to gather information is also a mechanism explaining participation in
entrepreneurship and it has consequences for the estimation of entrepreneurship returns.
Manso (2014) discusses the “experimentation” bias when estimating the life-time returns of
entrepreneurship out of a cross-section. This bias is caused by the fact that the value of
experimenting and finding out whether or not an idea is to be successful is not accounted for
in the cross-section, which will then underestimate the returns to entrepreneurship. Dillon
and Stanton (2016) extend on the ideas of Manso (2014) and study the option value of en-
1In the multi-armed bandit literature in statistics this phenomenon is called correlated learning.
2
trepreneurship using a dynamic occupational choice model in which individuals must discover
their entrepreneurial ability by experimenting with entrepreneurship. Because individuals
only learn about entrepreneurial ability from attempting entrepreneurship, their framework
does not capture James (2011) suggestion that learning may happen across occupations.
Experimentation in entrepreneurship has also been discussed in Kerr et al. (2014) who fo-
cus on the costs and constraints to experimentation by investors trying to reduce uncertainty
about potential consumer demand. Those constraints may take the form of inflexibilities in
the labor market, sunk technology costs, or inefficient failure policies. Gottlieb et al. (2016)
use a Canadian reform that extended job-protected maternity leave to show that reluctance
to experiment increases if failure is penalized. In their setting, the penalty for new mothers
who engage in entrepreneurship and fail, before the extension was granted, is the absence of
the option to return to the old job.
Chapter 2 extends the literature by evaluating the role of the information friction on
explaining entrepreneurship, relative to the roles of other forces suggested in the literature
such as learning by doing, risk aversion, entry costs associated with wealth, and non pecu-
niary benefits. In particular, Chapter 2 is one of the first attempts at quantifying the role of
risk aversion on preventing individuals from trying entrepreneurship in a dynamic setting.
Additionally, Chapter 2 extends our knowledge of cross-occupation learning between paid
employment and self-employment.
Various mechanisms determining occupational choices are analyzed using the structural
dynamic model of occupational choice in Chapter 2. In the model, individuals’ careers
unravel as they experiment trying to find their position in the distribution of ability. The
model is estimated with data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics and the estimated
structure is used to quantify the roles of various mechanism. Using the framework developed,
Chapter 2 also provides an evaluation of short-term and long-term effects of policies that
attempt to promote young entrepreneurship by targeting the main barriers they face. These
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barriers are obtained as the main mechanisms explaining the gap in first entry ages between
paid employment and self-employment.
In order to analyze the various mechanisms determining occupational choices, Chapter
2 provides a structural dynamic model of occupational choice in which individuals’ careers
unravel as they experiment trying to find their position in the distribution of ability. The
model is estimated with data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics and the estimated
structure is used to quantify the role of each mechanism. Using the framework developed,
Chapter 2 also provides an evaluation of short-term and long-term effects of policies that
attempt to promote young entrepreneurs by targeting the main barriers they face. These
barriers are obtained as the main mechanisms explaining the gap in first entry ages between
paid employment and self-employment.
Chapter 3 explores the interaction between aggregate consumer choices and the process
of innovation in the market for medical treatments. We ask whether innovation and diffusion
depend upon consumers’ dynamic optimization or whether these processes are independent
of consumer demand. Furthermore, we ask whether there is a demand externality through
experimentation in the innovation and diffusion processes and we analyze the consequences
of the externality.2
Dynamic demand under uncertainty, a fundamental component of the study in Chapter 3,
is usually linked to the idea of experience goods—goods whose characteristics are difficult to
assess before a purchase is made and consumption is exercised. Empirical studies of dynamic
demand of experience goods include Erdem and Keane (1996) and Crawford and Shum
(2005). Erdem and Keane (1996) use data on detergents to model the decisions of consumers
and how they depend on previous consumption experience. In their framework consumer,
experimentation influences future choices because it represents a process of accumulation
2This chapter is part of a joint project with Barton Hamilton (Olin Business School), Robert Miller
(Tepper School of Business), and Nicholas Papageorge (Johns Hopkins University).
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of information about product characteristics. Highlighting the cost of experimentation, one
of their findings is that risk aversion discourages consumers from trying brands they have
not yet collected information about. In a paper that focuses on a market closer to the one
we explore in Chapter 3, Crawford and Shum (2005) analyze demand under uncertainty
using data of anti-ulcer prescriptions. Their model allows for consumers to experiment
with products that have multiples characteristics (symptomatic and curative effects), and
incorporates the effects of these characteristics on consumers’ state variables that determine
patient behavior in a dynamic way.
In terms of product markets with innovation, papers by Goettler and Gordon (2011) and
Gowrisankaran and Rysman (2012) have made important contributions studying dynamic
demand for durables. Using data from the personal computer microprocessor industry, Goet-
tler and Gordon (2011) explore the role of market structure on the process of innovation.
They built and estimate a structural model in which firms compete in an oligopoly over time,
and innovation is endogenous to their investment decisions. They find that the presence of
a second firm can slow innovation. However, they also find that consumer surplus would
fall in a monopolistic market because the losses from increases in price outweigh the gains
from higher innovation. Gowrisankaran and Rysman (2012) focus on the dynamic demand
for new durables in the digital camcorder industry. Their model allows for consumer hetero-
geneity and a changing number of models. In specifying the expectations of consumers over
the characteristics of future products, Gowrisankaran and Rysman (2012) make a simplify-
ing assumption: “consumers expect that the evolution of the value of purchase will follow a
simple one dimensional Markov process.” The authors make this major assumption to gain
tractability when computing expectations over future choice sets, a problem that any model
of dynamic demand with unanticipated innovation is bound to face.
In Chapter 3 we introduce an empirical framework to capture how aggregate consumer
demand and experimentation affect innovation in markets for medical treatments along mul-
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tiple dimensions of quality. Using our framework we estimate a distribution that describes
the size and direction of innovations, and embed this distribution into a structural model
of dynamic demand. In the model, forward-looking consumers make choices after forming
expectations about the characteristics of future products. In particular, consumers can ex-
periment with new products that are not yet available in the market by participating in a
clinical trial. Externalities arise because aggregate consumer behavior changes the path of
innovation, thereby changing dynamic payoffs. We depart from existing work on dynamic
demand in how we model consumer expectations over the path of innovation. Most papers
take the existing set of products as given or exogenous to the model and focus on demand re-
sponses to new products. In contrast, we explicitly model how consumers form expectations
about future innovations, allowing them to take into account that aggregate market shares
can shift the direction of innovation. We apply this framework to data from the Multicenter
AIDS Cohort Study, analyzing consumer choices and the realized path of innovations in the
market for HIV treatments.
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Chapter 2
Entrepreneurship over the Life Cycle
2.1 Introduction
Entrepreneurship has long been considered an engine of innovation, growth, and develop-
ment. These connections, already suggested by Schumpeter (1911) and more recently de-
scribed by Baumol (2002), have found empirical support in the literature (Guiso et al., 2004;
Chatterji et al., 2013). In particular, young entrepreneurship is routinely celebrated by the
popular press, as seen in the 30 under 30 collection by Forbes magazine, and by policy mak-
ers, who highlight the economic potential gains from fostering young entrepreneurs (OECD,
2013). However, most people do not start a business during their careers and, if they do, tend
to do so well into their thirties.1 Although there are many policies attempting to stimulate
entrepreneurship among individuals entering the labor market, it is not clear to what extent
they induce young people to start businesses, what types of entrepreneurs they attract (e.g.,
high or low ability), and what the long term consequences of these policies are.2
1According to data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics.
2Examples of such initiatives include the Thiel Fellowship (http://thielfellowship.org), the Na-
tional Young Entrepreneurship Challenge (https://www.nfte.com), the Veale Young Entrepreneurship
Forum (http://vealeentrepreneurs.org), and the Small Business Administration’s Learning Center
(https://www.sba.gov/tools/sba-learning-center/training/young-entrepreneurs).
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In this chapter, I develop a life-cycle framework analyzing entrepreneurial entry and exit
based on the Roy (1951) model of occupational choice, and focusing on the self-employment
decisions of young labor market entrants. In the model, risk-averse individuals sequentially
choose salaried and entrepreneurial occupations based on their returns to experience, infor-
mation value, uncertainty, non-pecuniary benefits, and entry costs. In particular, individuals
decide to become entrepreneurs based on their beliefs about their own abilities. This chap-
ter adds to the literature by quantifying the relative importance of economic forces that
determine whether and when people become entrepreneurs. Three elements are particularly
novel to the empirical literature on entrepreneurship: first, an analysis of the timing of the
choice; second, an assessment of the relative importance of risk aversion in a dynamic setting;
and finally, an evaluation of the role of cross-occupation learning between salaried and en-
trepreneurial occupations.3 In this framework, cross-occupation learning refers to the ability
to transfer skills learned in one occupation to another, as well as the ability to learn about
one’s entrepreneurial ability from paid-employment success.4
A number of economic forces have been suggested in the literature to explain why indi-
viduals, both young and old, attempt entrepreneurship. Learning-by-doing, commonly char-
acterized as experience accumulation that increases productivity, is one such force (Lazear,
2005; Lafontaine and Shaw, 2016).5 Learning-by-doing predicts that individuals are more
inclined to try entrepreneurship if they do not have to climb the productivity ladder first.
Learning about one’s entrepreneurial ability also determines entry.6 If individuals are un-
certain about their entrepreneurial ability, but the performance of their business helps them
3Munk (2015) approaches the timing of the entrepreneurial choice in a reduced-form setting revisiting
the question of whether self-employment pays.
4For instance, cross-occupation learning by doing is behind the “rank” mechanism in Liang et al. (2014),
which suggests that individuals in certain types of occupations are more likely to develop entrepreneurial
skills.
5A well known example in the occupational choice literature is Keane and Wolpin (1997).
6Models of occupational choice with incomplete information include Jovanovic (1979), Sanders (2010),
and Antonovics and Golan (2012).
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learn about it, they attempt entrepreneurship as long as their prior variance is high—they
will want to learn whether they are in the “right” part of the distribution.7 The option value
of entrepreneurship, which intersects both learning-by-doing and learning about ability, also
affects entry. Individuals attempt entrepreneurship because they can always switch back
to paid employment if they discover that entrepreneurship is not the best option for them
(Manso, 2014; Dillon and Stanton, 2016). However, reluctance to experiment increases if
failure is penalized (Gottlieb et al., 2016).
Risk aversion, credit constraints, and non-pecuniary benefits also affect the entry margin.
Risk aversion pushes individuals away from entrepreneurship because it is a more uncertain
occupation (Iyigun and Owen, 1998). Credit constraints in starting a business or in reach-
ing optimal scale prevent less affluent individuals from trying their luck as entrepreneurs
(Evans and Jovanovic, 1989; Hurst and Lusardi, 2004; Buera, 2009). Finally, non-pecuniary
motivations such as “being one’s own boss” and “wanting flexibility over schedule” could also
provide incentives for entry (Hamilton, 2000; Hurst and Pugsley, 2011, 2015).8
More importantly, some of the forces explaining entry have predictions for whether en-
trepreneurs will be young. For instance, learning-by-doing implies that individuals who
want to become highly productive entrepreneurs should start at an early age. Learning
about ability gives the same prediction. High ability variance in entrepreneurship encour-
ages individuals to seek to discover their place in the distribution as early as possible (Miller,
1984). Credit constraints preclude young individuals with weaker credit histories and less
disposable wealth from entering. Risk aversion has a less clear effect on the timing of entry.
Overall, risk aversion will prevent entry at any stage in an individual’s career. However, if
learning about ability reduces uncertainty over time (e.g. if learning is Bayesian), then the
effect of risk aversion on entry can be attenuated as individuals acquire more experience.
7The high variation observed in entrepreneurial income suggests this could be the case.
8Other determinants explored in the literature include peer-effects (Nanda and Sørensen, 2010) and
personality traits (Hamilton et al., 2016; Humphries, 2016).
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If success in paid employment correlates with higher entrepreneurial ability, favorable out-
comes in paid employment may be associated with switching into self-employment. However,
if paid-employment outcomes are uninformative of one’s entrepreneurial ability, successful
workers would be more willing to stay in paid employment not only because they seem better
at it, but also because there is less uncertainty about the fact that they are.
There are several econometric challenges for estimation of the framework developed here.
Given that individuals select occupations based on their beliefs, selection bias cannot be
accounted for by using first-differences estimators of occupation-specific income equations
and panel data (Gibbons et al., 2005).9 Therefore, this chapter accounts for selection bias
by using the likelihood function implied by the model. However, this econometric decision
can come at the cost of multidimensional integration over unobserved ability vectors. To
get around the computational burden, estimation of the parameters of the model follows a
two-stage procedure using a combination of an Expectation-Maximization (EM) algorithm
and a conditional choice probabilities (ccp) estimator (Hotz and Miller, 1993; Arcidiacono
and Miller, 2011; James, 2011). The EM algorithm in the first stage bypasses the need
for multidimensional integration. The ccp estimator in the second stage allows for a flex-
ible treatment of the large state space of the problem, which includes continuous beliefs
and experience for each occupation. The ccp estimator delivers such flexibility because the
structural parameters can be estimated without solving the dynamic optimization problem
at every candidate parameter vector in the search algorithm.
In the empirical analysis, this chapter uses data from the Panel Study of Income Dy-
namics (PSID). The sample is restricted to white and black men between the years 1968
and 1996. Moreover, following suggestive evidence in Levine and Rubinstein (Forthcoming),
entrepreneurship is disaggregated by incorporation status. Entrepreneurs with promising
9Since individual’s beliefs change over time as they acquire more information, their ability “does not
translate into a fixed effect” in an income equation (Gibbons et al., 2005). Cross-section data are even more
problematic as they provide no historic information to model the process of belief formation.
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abilities benefit more from the incorporated organizational form because it encourages en-
trepreneurial risk taking by offering limited liability and by facilitating fund raising through
the issuance of stock. Less promising entrepreneurs, on the other hand, benefit more from
the less complex unincorporated form that offers lower administrative costs and regulatory
burden. Results using the PSID suggest that incorporated entrepreneurs are more similar
to white collar workers than they are to unincorporated entrepreneurs.
The framework is used to quantify the importance of the economic forces at play by com-
paring the baseline model against counterfactual regimes that shut down each economic force.
Results indicate that learning-by-doing and entry costs have the largest effects preventing
individuals from attempting entrepreneurship. The role of learning-by-doing is evaluated by
turning the profile of returns to experience into a flat average return. Given that the profile
of returns to experience in entrepreneurship is steep, the flat average in the counterfactual is
high, making individuals more willing to experiment. Risk aversion and information frictions
also play important roles. For instance, shutting down risk aversion increases the percentage
of individuals who attempt incorporated entrepreneurship by 40%, and eliminating informa-
tion frictions increases this number by 35%. Eliminating cross-occupation learning reduces
the proportion of individuals attempting entrepreneurship by 10%. Although these effects
seem small, in the long term they are stronger: eliminating cross-occupation learning de-
creases the present value of income (PVI) of incorporated entrepreneurs by about a quarter.
Results also show that the two main barriers to young entrepreneurship are entry costs
and information frictions. In the model, entry costs capture barriers to entrepreneurship not
explicitly modeled, such as credit constraints.10 In order to make the link between entry cost
and credit constraints, these costs are interacted with age and a permanent wealth component
(estimated as a fixed effect outside of the model). Estimates show that younger individuals
as well as individuals with lower permanent wealth face higher barriers to entry. Flattening
10Unfortunately, the PSID lacks wealth data for most years during the period studied.
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the profile of entry costs, allowing individuals of all ages to face the same average entry cost,
closes the gap in average first-entry age between white collar work and entrepreneurship
by about 70%. Eliminating information frictions, providing full information about ability,
induces individuals to enter entrepreneurship earlier, closing the first-entry age gap by 20%.
Focusing on the main barriers to young entrepreneurship, the chapter undertakes two
policy counterfactuals: a subsidy that targets entry costs and entrepreneurship education
that targets information frictions.11 Previous literature has shown that entrepreneurship ed-
ucation can shift beliefs (von Graevenitz et al., 2010; Oosterbeek et al., 2010). The chapter
takes this result as given and extends the literature by providing a mapping from movements
in beliefs, generated by entrepreneurial education of a given quality, into career choices and
long-term outcomes. Results suggest that a blanket subsidy for young incorporated en-
trepreneurship increases participation and has a small positive effect on the average PVI net
of the subsidy.12 Additionally, incorporated entrepreneurship education can generate sizable
increases in young incorporated entrepreneurship and PVI even at low levels of information
quality. Nevertheless, caution must be taken when reading these results. The information
quality of any specific policy may be different, and its cost may well exceed the additional
income it generates.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents the data and de-
scribes the main regularities motivating the research question and modeling choices. Section
2.3 describes the characteristics of the model and its implications. Section 2.4 describes the
estimation method. Section 2.5 discusses the estimated parameters and presents the decom-
position exercise. Section 2.6 introduces the policy counterfactuals. Section ?? concludes
the chapter.
11Young entrepreneurs are defined as those who attempt entrepreneurship during the first five years of
their labor market careers.
12Assuming that the incorporated self-employed are closer than their unincorporated peers to what is
commonly thought of as “the entrepreneur,” these counterfactuals focus on incorporated entrepreneurship.
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2.2 Data
The Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) is used in the empirical application.13 There
are three main reasons that motivate this choice. First, many individuals in the PSID are
observed at the onset of their labor market careers and yearly from that point forward. This
allows for the construction of measures of accumulated occupation-specific experience and
occupational income at any point in a respondent’s career. Second, whenever an individual
declares himself to be self-employed, the survey’s questions on self-employment allow for
disaggregation into incorporated and unincorporated self-employment. Multiple differences
between these self-employment options have been previously identified by Levine and Ru-
binstein (Forthcoming). Finally, although not available for most periods, the PSID collects
data on wealth that will prove useful in the analysis of entry costs.
The sample is restricted to white and black men between years the 1968 and 1996. It
contains survey information on occupation, self-employment status, business ownership, in-
corporation status, labor income, business income, working hours, completed education,
age, race, marital status, and wealth.14 Individuals’ labor market careers are set to start
at the beginning of their potential experience.15 Both types of occupations, salaried and
entrepreneurial, are disaggregated to exploit differences in returns to experience as well as
differences in terms of the information they provide. For paid employment, the three-digit
occupation code is used to generate two categories: blue collar and white collar.16 This
aggregation has been used previously in occupational choice models studying paid employ-
13The study started in 1968 with a representative sample of about 18,000 individuals in 5,000 families
in the United States. Information about these individuals and their descendants was collected yearly until
1996, after which the study became biennial.
14Biennial data collected after 1996 was not used, since it would require making assumptions about occu-
pational choices and income in years where no data were collected.
15Potential experience starts at the end of their completed education. All individuals are assumed to start
school at age 6. Appendix A.1 contains a detailed description of how each variable is constructed.
16The PSID provides three-digit occupation codes from the 1970 Census of Population, constructed using
the Alphabetical Index of Industries and Occupations issued June 1971 by the U.S. Department of Commerce
and the U.S. Census Bureau.
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ment (Keane and Wolpin, 1997). For self-employment, which is interchangeably referred to
as entrepreneurship in this study, the incorporation status questions in the survey are used
to create two categories: unincorporated and incorporated.
The income measure for paid employment corresponds to the individual’s reported annual
labor income. For self-employment, measuring income is less transparent. Since incorporated
individuals are not asked about their business income in the survey, their reported labor
income is used as their income measure.17 For unincorporated individuals, who are not
sheltered from the losses of their ventures through limited liability, the measure corresponds
to the sum of the quantity reported as labor income plus the quantity reported as business
income. Income measures are converted to hourly rates by dividing annual income figures
by reported annual working hours.
The PSID includes a measure of wealth for selected years starting in 1984. It is con-
structed as the sum of six types of assets (farm business, checking or savings accounts, real
estate other than main home, stocks, vehicles, and other assets) net of debt value plus value
of home equity. The survey does not include data on wealth at every period. Therefore,
in the current analysis a measure of permanent wealth will be considered instead of the
separate wealth observations. The measure of permanent wealth, denoted ωi, is obtained as
the constant plus the fixed effect of a regression of wealth on a second degree polynomial on
age. In estimation, only individuals with at least three wealth data points are considered.
The variable ωi is meant to capture long-run differences in access to resources.
After dropping observations of individuals who lack data on relevant variables, the an-
alytic sample contains 1,506 individuals and 21,334 individual-year observations. Table 2.1
shows that about one-fifth of the sample is African American and 42% of the individuals
have college education or more.18 The average entry age to the labor market is about 22
17This measure corresponds to what Hamilton (2000) terms “the draw” or the difference between net profit
and retained earnings. The characteristics of corporations as separate legal entities from the business owners
justify the use of this measure.
18Notably, for the period of study, the proportion of individuals with college education in the sample is
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics: Individuals
Individuals 1506
Black 0.22
College or more 0.42
Age at entry 21.88
[1.96]
Permanent Wealth 400
[674]
Notes: Permanent wealth is in thousands of dollars of 2000. Standard deviation is in square brackets.
years. Finally, the average permanent wealth is $400,000 (measured in year 2000 USD) with
a large standard deviation of $674,000.19 In addition, consistent with the higher complexity
of the incorporated organizational structure, Table 2.2 shows that incorporated individuals
tend to be more educated than their unincorporated counterparts. Finally, self-employed
individuals, especially incorporated entrepreneurs, are more likely to be married than paid
employees.
2.2.1 Incorporated and Unincorporated Entrepreneurs
Using the individual’s incorporated status, this chapter distinguishes between two types of
self-employment. This disaggregation follows Levine and Rubinstein (Forthcoming), who in-
troduce the differences between the organizational forms of unincorporated and incorporated
businesses and the differences between the individuals they attract. They highlight how the
organizational form of corporations facilitates growth and risk-taking behavior. Individuals
seeking to establish businesses with high potential for development tend to be more attracted
higher than what it was for the U.S. adult population, 22% (Ryan and Siebens, 2012). The disparity arises
when the selection criteria requires that individuals must be observed from the beginning of their labor
market careers and widens more once observations without enough wealth data points are dropped. The
lower the education the earlier they would enter the job market and the less likely the PSID is to observe
them from the beginning of their careers.
19As mentioned above, the measure of individual permanent wealth corresponds to the constant plus the
individual fixed effect of a regression of wealth on an age profile. Hence, the level of this measure depends
on the shape of the polynomial implemented. The estimated value of the constant is about $418,000 (see
Appendix A.1).
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics: Individual-Years
All Blue Collar White Collar Unincorporated Incorporated Unemployed
Observations 21334 8902 9957 1403 602 470
% 100.00 41.73 46.67 6.58 2.82 2.20
Marital Status 0.76 0.74 0.77 0.79 0.86 0.50
High School 0.28 0.50 0.10 0.22 0.13 0.52
Some College 0.28 0.35 0.22 0.29 0.24 0.23
College 0.21 0.10 0.30 0.21 0.29 0.08
Some Grad 0.23 0.05 0.39 0.27 0.34 0.17
Age 31.04 28.92 32.21 33.93 36.94 30.45
[7.27] [6.65] [7.18] [7.35] [7.00] [8.06]
Wrkhrs 2147 2096 2234 2329 2703
[693] [617] [559] [819] [724]
Hr Labor Income 18.71 14.16 21.24 21.30 37.91
[16.12] [7.97] [14.26] [23.08] [51.69]
Residual
Hr Labor Income [6.99] [12.32] [20.41] [44.29]
Notes: White collar occupations are: professional, technical, and kindred workers; managers and administrators, except farm
related; sales workers; clerical and kindred workers. Blue collar occupations are: craftsmen and kindred workers; operatives,
except transport (including armed forces); transport equipment operatives; laborers, except farm related; service workers,
except private household. Farm related occupations and military personnel dropped. Individuals are classified as unemployed
if they reported to be not working or working for less than 2.5% the total amount of available hours in a year. Monetary
quantities are in real dollars of 2000. Standard deviation is in square brackets. Residual income computed from
occupation-specific OLS regressions on race, education and second degree polynomials on occupation-specific experience. One
unit of hourly income represents 10$ per hour.
to this organizational form.
There are three distinctive characteristics of incorporated businesses. First, they are sep-
arate legal entities from their owners. This allows the corporation to own property, carry
on business after the death of its owners, incur liabilities, and sue or be sued. Importantly,
it also means that corporations can operate isolated from sudden shocks in an owner’s per-
sonal finances. Second, corporations have limited liability against creditors. In other words,
creditors seeking debt repayment can go after a shareholder’s assets only to the extent of her
investment in the business. This is precisely one of the reasons that motivates investors and
venture capitalists to invest. Instead, unincorporated businesses owners have their personal
assets exposed to the losses of their business. Third, corporations can issue shares of stock.
This makes it easier for them to raise money in order to develop the business. It also makes
transferability of ownership simpler than for sole proprietors or general partners.
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But the advantages of incorporating a business come at the costs of more complex admin-
istrative activities, higher administrative costs, and potentially higher taxes.20 Consequently,
non-employer self-employed individuals and other small business owners will find incorpora-
tion unattractive (e.g. individual construction contractors, car repair shop owners). They
are less likely to develop the business much further, so they have less incentive to incor-
porate. In contrast, incorporated self-employed individuals seek to take advantage of the
organizational structure of the corporation to grow and develop their businesses.
The organizational forms of these two types of businesses also suggest that the abilities
required from individuals trying to sort into them and the skills developed while working
in each of them may be different. This observation, which further motivates the separation
made in this chapter, finds empirical support in the data. Table 2.3 shows that entrepreneurs
moving into paid employment differ in terms of the occupations they switch to. Unincor-
porated entrepreneurs are just as likely to switch to either blue collar or white collar work,
while incorporated entrepreneurs tend to transition to white collar work. Further differences
between these two types of self-employment will be introduced in the preliminary analysis of
the data below. Notably, it will be shown that successful white-collar workers, characterized
by higher residual income, are more likely to switch into incorporated entrepreneurial activ-
ities.21 In general, the data suggest that incorporated entrepreneurs look more like white
collar workers than unincorporated entrepreneurs.22
20These activities include holding annual meetings, recording meeting minutes, and keeping up at all
times corporate documents such as the register of directors, the share register and the transfer register.
Additionally, corporations are taxed and their shareholders are also taxed on their dividends.
21Residual income in occupation-specific regressions after controlling for demographics and a quadratic in
occupation-specific experience.
22In the PSID, self-employed individuals, as well as paid employees, report occupation and industry. In
computations not shown here, incorporated individuals are about 20 percent points more likely to report
working in white collar occupations than unincorporated individuals. On the other hand, unincorporated
entrepreneurs are about 20 percent points more likely to report belonging to the construction and repair
industry than incorporated entrepreneurs.
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Table 2.3: Transition Matrix
Blue Collar White Collar Unincorporated Incorporated Unemployed
Blue Collar 0.87 0.09 0.02 0.00 0.02
White Collar 0.07 0.89 0.02 0.01 0.01
Unincorporated 0.10 0.10 0.74 0.04 0.01
Incorporated 0.03 0.14 0.07 0.76 0.01
Unemployed 0.37 0.16 0.04 0.00 0.43
Notes: Matrix entry i, j represents the proportion of people in occupation in row i who move into occupation in column j
between t and t+ 1.
2.2.2 Preliminary Analysis of the Data
Several stylized facts in the data motivate this research and the dynamic model of occupa-
tional choice with learning used for analysis. Most individuals do not attempt entrepreneur-
ship during their careers and they are even less likely to start their careers as entrepreneurs—
individuals entering entrepreneurship tend to be older and have accumulated some paid em-
ployment experience prior to entry. Besides, those who attempt entrepreneurship tend to
transition out of it faster than those who enter paid employment. In terms of hourly income,
entrepreneurial occupations display higher variation than paid employment occupations, even
after controlling for observables. Finally, successful white collar workers, characterized by
higher residual income, are more likely to switch into incorporated entrepreneurial activities
than their less successful peers.
Entrepreneurship is less common in an individual’s career than paid employment. Table
2.4 shows that the proportion of individuals who attempt entrepreneurial occupations is less
than half the proportion of individuals who attempt salaried occupations.23 Furthermore,
most of the 4,294 occupational spells in the sample occur in paid employment occupations and
they are more than 60 percent longer than spells in entrepreneurial occupations (see Table
2.5). This is consistent with the transition patterns in Table 2.3, as salaried occupations
tend to be more absorbing than entrepreneurial occupations.
23In separate calculations, the percentage of individuals who try at least one type of entrepreneurship by
age 50 is about 34%. Virtually everybody in the sample tries paid employment
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Table 2.4: First Entry
Blue Collar White Collar Unincorporated Incorporated
Ever 0.65 0.87 0.28 0.15
At First Entry
Age 23.16 25.60 32.23 35.50
expbc - 2.81 3.88 2.42
expwc 1.30 - 5.13 8.44
expeu 0.11 0.14 - 1.38
expei 0.02 0.04 0.52 -
Notes: Statistics computed using individuals that are observed from the beginning of their careers until at least age 40. This
leaves 486 unique individuals. No observations are used beyond age 50.
Table 2.5: Occupation Spells
All Blue Collar White Collar Unincorporated Incorporated Unemployed
Total 4294 1707 1652 453 194 288
Percent 39.75 38.47 10.55 4.52 6.71
Duration 4.97 5.21 6.03 3.10 3.10 1.63
First 52.06 42.56 2.19 0.27 2.92
Notes: Duration is the average duration of spells in years. First is the percentage of first spells that belong to a particular
occupation.
Table 2.4 introduces the puzzle of young entrepreneurship. It shows that those who at-
tempt entrepreneurial occupations tend to do so later in their careers, after accumulating
more than 8 years of paid-employment experience on average. This translates into a gap of
more than 7 years in average entry age between entrepreneurial occupations and salaried oc-
cupations. This gap runs opposite to the prediction of a parsimonious model of uncorrelated
learning about ability (Miller, 1984) and does not seem suggestive of individuals having to
climb the productivity ladder early on to become highly productive entrepreneurs. Notably,
although few individuals start their careers as entrepreneurs (see Table 2.5), Figure 2.1 shows
that participation increases as individuals age.
In terms of hourly income, entrepreneurial occupations display higher variation across ob-
servations than paid employment occupations. This is shown in Table 2.2, where individual-
year observations are summarized by occupation. In particular, the variance of hourly income
in incorporated entrepreneurship is more than three times as large as the variance in white
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Figure 2.1: Occupational Choice: Age Profile
Notes: Participation rates into each occupation by age.
collar work. This difference remains even after controlling for demographics and occupation-
specific experience. Interestingly, even though unincorporated entrepreneurship has a higher
hourly income variance than white collar work, they share a similar average hourly income.
Incorporated entrepreneurship, however, has a mean hourly income that is 75% higher.
Finally, successful white-collar workers, characterized by higher residual income, are more
likely to transition into incorporated entrepreneurship than their less successful counterparts.
This is shown in Figure 2.2. On the x-axis is the quintile of average residual income at
t. On the y-axis is the probability of switching into the two types of entrepreneurship
at t + 1. Higher residual income in either white collar or blue collar work is generally
associated with a smaller probability of switching into unincorporated entrepreneurship.
This is consistent with uncorrelated learning, where unexplained success is only informative
of ability in the current occupation. However, successful white-collar workers, as measured
by higher residual income, are more likely to switch into incorporated entrepreneurship
than their less successful peers. This is consistent with correlated learning about ability
between white collar work and incorporated entrepreneurship, and is also consistent with
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the similarities between incorporated entrepreneurs and white collar workers mentioned in
the previous section.
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Figure 2.2: Probability of Switching into Entrepreneurial Occupations
Notes: Probability of switching into entrepreneurial occupations in t+ 1 by decile of residual income in t. Residual income is
computed from occupation-specific regressions of hourly income on occupation-specific experience, general experience squared,
race, education and marital status.
These facts are interpreted through the lens of a dynamic model of occupational choice
with accumulation of experience (learning-by-doing) and learning about ability. Learning
about ability is often modeled using Bayesian decision makers that draw information from
their labor market outcomes and combine it with potentially heterogeneous priors in order
to update their beliefs about their aptitude at various firms or occupations (Jovanovic, 1979;
Miller, 1984). A prediction of these models, that the separation probability of a worker is
decreasing in her tenure on the job, is found in Figure 2.3 at the occupation level.24 Notably,
the probability of switching from entrepreneurship decreases at a much higher rate than the
probability of switching from salaried occupations during the first five years of accumulated
occupation-specific experience.
The stylized facts also motivate the introduction of cross-occupation learning. Cross-
24This relation partially results from workers being less uncertain of their competence, which ameliorates
the effect of new information.
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occupation learning-by-doing aims to capture the nature of the mix of salaried experience
that individuals acquire before entering each entrepreneurial occupation (see Table 2.4).
Moreover, cross-occupation learning about ability (correlated learning) aims to capture the
relationship between unexplained success in white collar work and entry into incorporated
entrepreneurship.
.0
5
.1
.1
5
.2
.2
5
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y
0 2 4 6 8 10
years of occupation-specific experience
blue collar white collar
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y
0 2 4 6 8 10
years of occupation-specific experience
unincorporated incorporated
Figure 2.3: Probability of Switching by Occupation-Specific Experience
Notes: Probability of switching from occupation k next period conditional on years of experience in occupation k. Figure
considers only individuals who are observed for at least 10 years in the sample.
2.3 Model
In the model, forward-looking, risk-averse individuals face dynamic incentives that reflect two
processes: accumulation of experience (learning-by-doing) and accumulation of information
(learning about unobserved ability). The model captures the transferability of acquired skills
as well as spillovers of information. For instance, a financial manager who decides to become
an entrepreneur later in his career may transfer the managerial skills he has acquired into
his business. Additionally, his success or failure as a manager may reveal his entrepreneurial
ability as well.
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Individuals enter the labor market immediately after finishing their education. Their
productivity in each occupation is determined by their experience, their unobserved ability,
and idiosyncratic shocks that prevent them from learning their ability immediately after the
first period. Therefore, they receive noisy income signals that they use to update beliefs
about their own ability. Individuals maximize their expected utility using their updated
beliefs to compute expectations. They have differential preferences for occupations and are
able to smooth consumption over time.
2.3.1 Occupations and Individual Characteristics
Immediately after finishing his education, individual i of age ti0 enters the labor market.25
He then decides which occupation to join and how much to consume. If he decides to
work, he can be a white collar or blue collar paid employee, or he can be unincorporated
or incorporated self-employed. Denote dkit ∈ {0, 1} as an indicator of whether or not he
chooses alternative k at age t.
Every individual has a vector of observable characteristics, hit, that partly determines
his productivity in each occupation. hit includes his race (white or black), his education
level (high school or less, some college, college, and more than college), as well as observable
characteristics that change over time (age, marital status, and accumulated experience). He
has perfect foresight over his marital status. His experience is collected in a 4-dimensional
vector, xit, that contains his accumulated experience in every occupation. He starts his career
with no experience in any occupation, and from that point forward the kth component of
his experience vector evolves as a function of his choices as follows
xkit+1 = xkit + dkit (2.1)
25The empirical analysis uses data for males only. Therefore, masculine pronouns are used to describe the
model.
23
2.3.2 Preferences
The individual is infinitely-lived and discounts next period’s utility by the factor β. He
works until age T and begins his retirement at age T + 1.26 After reaching retirement age,
he only decides how to smooth his remaining savings. In order to capture the effects of
more uncertain entrepreneurial outcomes on occupational choices, while retaining tractabil-
ity, the individual’s flow utility is characterized by a CARA function of consumption, cit,
with absolute risk aversion parameter ρ. His lifetime utility at period t ≤ T is given by
−
T∑
s=t
4∑
k=0
βs−tdkitαkit(hit) exp{−ρcit − εkit} −
∞∑
s=T+1
βs−t exp{−ρcit} (2.2)
The marginal contribution of consumption to his utility is occupation-specific and is de-
termined by the non-pecuniary cost of each occupation, αkit, which is allowed to vary by
education level. Given an education level, the non-pecuniary cost is a function of his vector
of observables
αkit(hit) = exp{αk0 + αk1blacki + αk2marriedit + 1{xkit = 0}(αk3 + αk4t+ αk5ωi + αk6tωi)}
(2.3)
Notably, αkit includes a first-time entry cost which is a function of permanent wealth (ωi)
and age. This is a reduced-form way of capturing barriers to entry that are not explicitly
modeled. For entrepreneurship, the age profile of the entry costs is meant to capture the
difficulties that young individuals with weaker credit histories and less savings may face.
Additionally, the introduction of the permanent wealth measure is meant to capture whether
more affluent individuals, in a long-term sense, face smaller entry costs to entrepreneurship.
For identification reasons, the non-pecuniary cost of not working, α0it, is normalized to one.
Finally, εkit is the kth component of a 5-dimensional vector of choice-specific taste shocks
26Retirement age is set at T + 1 = 51 for data availability reasons.
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that he observes before choosing an alternative. The taste shocks are unobserved to the
econometrician and are assumed to be drawn from a Type-I Extreme Value distribution,
independent across individuals, periods, and options.
2.3.3 Income and Learning
Individual i of education level s starts his labor market career endowed with a vector of
occupation-specific abilities Mi = {µ1i, . . . , µ4i} drawn from a multivariate normal distri-
bution with mean zero and covariance matrix ∆s.27 His ability partially determines his
productivity in each occupation. His hourly income at the beginning of period t + 1, from
choosing occupation k at period t, is given by
ykit+1 = fk(hit; θk) + µki + ηkit+1 (2.4)
His hourly income is the sum of an idiosyncratic productivity shock ηkit+1, his unobserved
occupation-specific ability µki, and a function of his observable characteristics fk(·), which
is characterized by a vector of parameters θk.28 Productivity shocks ηkit+1 are distributed
N(0, σ2ηk) and are independent over time and across individuals and occupations.
The individual does not observe µki and ηkit+1 separately, which prevents him from learn-
ing his ability immediately. Instead, he observes their sum, ζkit+1 = ykit+1 − fk(hit; θk) after
choosing occupation k.29 He follows Bayes’ Rule and uses the information he has acquired,
i.e. his residual income signal ζkit+1, to form beliefs Bit+1 about his ability. At the beginning
of his career, he believes he is no different from any of his peers, and his prior beliefs corre-
spond to the population distribution of ability for people with his education level. Therefore,
27The distribution is set around zero because it is not possible to identify the education level effect in the
income equation as well as the mean of the distribution, as it depends on education.
28In particular, fk(·) captures the returns to experience using step-functions of the experience vector xit.
29In this sense, he is paid his actual productivity as opposed to his expected productivity. This assumption,
although less compelling for paid employment, is a natural assumption for entrepreneurial income, which is
not contracted upon.
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by virtue of the joint normality of the distribution of ability, his initial beliefs can be char-
acterized by the mean and variance of the population distribution: Biti0 = 〈0,∆s〉. The
normality of the prior and the idiosyncratic shocks yields a posterior which is also multi-
variate normal. Therefore, his beliefs at any period follow a normal distribution and can be
characterized by a mean vector Eit and a covariance matrix Vit.
Updating rules for similar problems have been previously obtained in the literature (DeG-
root, 1970; James, 2011). Define the 4-dimensional vector ζit with characteristic component
ζ{k}it and the 4× 4 diagonal matrix Σit with characteristic component Σ{k,k}it as follows
ζ{k}it =
 ζkit if dkit−1 = 10 otherwise Σ{k,k}it =
 1/σ
2
ηk
if dkit−1 = 1
0 otherwise
(2.5)
After receiving his income signal from last period’s work, he updates his beliefs to
Eit =
[
V−1it−1 + Σit
]−1 [V−1it−1Eit−1 + Σitζit] (2.6)
Vit =
[
V−1it−1 + Σit
]−1 (2.7)
These updating rules reflect how his beliefs change as a function of his experience and
information received. Equation (2.6) implies that the effect of a very noisy signal on the
prior mean is minor.30 Moreover, equation (2.6) determines the extent to which learning
about ability can happen across occupations. For instance, the direction and magnitude
of the adjustment in beliefs of a white collar worker regarding his entrepreneurial ability is
determined by the off-diagonal terms in the variance matrix Vit. The larger these covariances
are, the larger the adjustment will be.31 Equation (2.7) implies that the prior variance at t is
30A noisy signal is characterized by high idiosyncratic variance σ2ηk .
31The marginal effect of a signal from occupation k on the next period’s prior mean of occupation k′ equals
(1/ηk)V{k,k′}it.
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a deterministic map of the vector of accumulated experience xit and the covariance matrix of
the ability distribution (see Appendix A.2). Hence, conditional on xit, the order in which the
individual samples occupations prior to t is irrelevant to determining the posterior variance.
More importantly, provided experience is already included in the individual’s state, equation
(2.7) implies that Vit is redundant information.
2.3.4 Optimal Choices
At the beginning of any period before retirement, the individual receives his income from
last period’s occupation and observes his vector of taste shifters εit. Using his income signal,
he updates his beliefs. Given that he can smooth consumption over time, he simultaneously
chooses his consumption and asset portfolio, as well as whether to work and which occupation
to join.32 The set up for the consumption smoothing problem follows Margiotta and Miller
(2000) and Gayle et al. (2015) whose main result will hold here: the indirect utility from
optimal consumption has closed form, and the occupational choice will be independent of
disposable wealth. This result will substantially facilitate estimation, and its adoption is
also data-driven given the lack of wealth data in the PSID for most years in the period
studied. Therefore, credit constraints are not explicitly modeled, and occupational choices
will depend on relative differences in non-pecuniary benefits, expected flow payoffs given
experience and beliefs, and continuation values from future experience and beliefs induced
by each alternative.
Consumption
The set up of the consumption smoothing problem aims to relax the hand-to-mouth assump-
tion that would force individuals to absorb the entire variation in income every period. The
32Upon retirement, he simply decides on his consumption and assets portfolio in order to smooth his
remaining wealth.
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individual has access to a contingent-claims market for consumption goods to smooth his
consumption using his wealth. However, income is assumed uninsurable to capture “unob-
servable insurance risk or unobserved levels of effort in labor supply” (Green, 1987).
Let λτ denote the derivative of the price measure for claims to consumption at date τ .33
If he decides to work in occupation k, individual i supplies L¯k hours inelastically.34 Dropping
the occupation indicator, working at age t yields him annual income L¯yit+1 at the beginning
of t+ 1. Hence, the law of motion for his disposable wealth is:
Et[λt+1ξit+1|dit, hit,Eit] + λtcit ≤ λtξit + Et[λt+1L¯yit+1|dit, hit,Eit]
where the expectation is conditional on his choice at period t, dit. His budget constraint
reflects his financial resources, which are allocated to current period consumption and next
period savings.
Similar to results in Margiotta and Miller (2000), the assumptions on the market for
consumption claims and the CARA nature of the flow utility yield an expression for the value
function that can be separated into two factors: an indirect utility function for wealth and an
index that captures the value of human capital and information. This expression, presented
below, satisfies a portfolio separation property (Altuğ and Labadie, 1994): consumers will
hold only a few securities. The first one is a bond bτ that, contingent on the history through
calendar date τ , pays a unit of consumption from period τ in perpetuity in date-τ prices.
The second one is a security aτ that pays the random quantity (lnλs−s ln β) of consumption
33The commodity space for consumption goods is formed by consumption units at date 0 and claims to
consumption at calendar date τ contingent on how history unfolds. λτ denotes the derivative of the price
measure for claims to consumption at date τ , Λτ . Therefore, the price of a unit of consumption to be
delivered with certainty at date τ in terms of date 0 consumption units is E[λτ ].
34L¯k is specified as as the average number of hours worked by individuals in occupation k in the sample.
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units from period τ in perpetuity, in date-τ prices. The prices of these assets are given by
bτ ≡ Eτ
[∑∞
s=τ
λs
λτ
]
aτ ≡ Eτ
[∑∞
s=τ
λs
λτ
(lnλs − s ln β)
]
(2.8)
Individuals in the model can accurately forecast the price of both assets. The state space
of the individual’s dynamic problem is then formed by his vector of observable characteristics,
his beliefs, his wealth, and the prices of these assets. Let τ(t) be the calendar date when the
individual is of age t and let ξit denote his disposable wealth at t. Following Margiotta and
Miller (2000), and dropping the index i for simplicity, the value function solving his savings
problem at retirement age T + 1, in present value terms is
VT+1(hT+1,ET+1, ξT+1, aτ(T+1), bτ(T+1)) = −λτ(T+1)bτ(T+1) exp
(−(ρξT+1 + aτ(T+1))
bτ(T+1)
)
(2.9)
His occupational ability and his experience become irrelevant once he retires.35 In fact, as he
receives no retirement flow income, his present value only depends on his remaining wealth
and the price of the assets aτ(T+1) and bτ(T+1). At any age before retirement, he chooses an
occupation in addition to his consumption and asset portfolio. Proposition 2.1 provides the
ex-ante value function of an individual at any age before retirement.36
Proposition 2.1. At any age t before retirement, t ≤ T , the value function of an individual
who has not yet observed his taste shocks, εt, can be written as
Vt(ht,Et, ξt, aτ(t), bτ(t)) = −λτ(t)bτ(t) exp
(−(ρξt + aτ(t))
bτ(t)
)
At(ht,Et) (2.10)
where At(ht,Et) is defined recursively as
35More realistic models would have ability as well as accumulated human capital generating an income
stream after retirement. This chapter abstracts from such considerations, but acknowledging that retirement
considerations would play a stronger role in such models as various occupational paths summarized by their
experience vector would generate alternative retirement income flows.
36The ex-ante value function is defined as the value function before knowing the realization of the vector
of taste shocks, εit
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At(ht,Et) =
4∑
k=0
pkt(ht,Et)αkt(ht)1/bτ(t)Eε[e−ε
∗
kt/bτ(t) ]Et[At+1(H¯kt+1(ht),Ekt+1)vkt+1|Et, ht]1−1/bτ(t) (2.11)
with AT+1(hT+1,ET+1) ≡ 1 and vkt+1 ≡ exp
(
−ρL¯kykt+1(ht)
bτ(t+1)
)
.
The probability of choosing k at age t conditional on characteristics and beliefs is denoted
pkt(ht,Et). ε∗kt is the value of the taste shock εkt conditional on alternative k being chosen
at t. The deterministic transition from ht into ht+1 is denoted H¯kt+1(ht), and the stochastic
transition from yesterday’s beliefs into today’s is denoted Ekt+1; both are conditional on
choosing k at t.
Proof: See Appendix A.2.
The ex-ante value function in (2.10) can be separated into two factors: the indirect utility
from wealth and an index that represents the value of accumulated experience and informa-
tion. The index At(ht,Et) is a strictly positive average of expected outcomes weighted by
the conditional choice probability of each alternative. The function vkt+1 in the recursive
formulation of At(ht,Et) is a utility measure of income from occupation k received at the
beginning of period t + 1, adjusted for consumption smoothing. Higher values of the prior
mean or higher values of human capital are associated with lower values of the index via the
term vkt+1. Additionally, the value of human capital and beliefs in occupation k decreases
with the size of the non-pecuniary costs, αkt.
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Occupation
Using equations (2.10) and (2.11), and applying logs to transform the problem, it can be
shown that at any age t before retirement the individual chooses an occupation to solve
max
k
4∑
k=0
dkt{εkt − lnαkt(ht)− (bτ(t) − 1) lnEt[At+1(H¯kt+1(ht),Ekt+1)vkt+1|Et, ht]} (2.12)
His occupational choice is independent of his current level of wealth. This is a consequence
of the multiplicative separability of the ex-ante value function obtained in Proposition 2.1.37
Trade-offs between occupations are characterized by differences in non-pecuniary utility
components, εkt and αkt(ht), and differences in the expected utility from income, vkt+1,
scaled by the index capturing the value of human capital accumulation and beliefs evolution,
At+1(H¯kt+1(ht),Ekt+1). Since the taste shocks are assumed to be distributed Type-I Extreme
Value, the expression in equation (2.12) becomes a standard logit. Following Hotz and Miller
(1993), Proposition 2.2 uses the recursive nature of the index At+1(ht,Et) and yields a repre-
sentation of the logarithm of the odds ratio in terms of future choice probabilities and utility
parameters.
Proposition 2.2. For any choice k > 0, the logarithm of the likelihood ratio between choosing
occupation k and choosing not to work is given by
ln
(
pkt(ht,Et)
p0t(ht,Et)
)
= − lnαkt(ht)− (bτ(t) − 1) lnEt
vkt+1 T−t∏
s=1
(
p0t+s(h
(s)
kt ,E
(s)
kt )
p0t+s(h
(s)
0t ,E
(s)
0t )
)φt(s)∣∣∣∣∣∣Et, ht
 (2.13)
where
φt(s) =
1
bτ(t)+s
s−1∏
r=1
(1− 1/bτ(t)+r) (2.14)
and where h(s)kt and E
(s)
kt indicate the value of the state variables at future age t+s, conditional
37In fact, relaxing the model to allow the use of savings as collateral would break this separability property
as low levels of wealth will not allow the individual to obtain the optimal scale of his business, rendering the
occupational choice dependent on wealth.
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on the decision path described by making d = 1 for all d ∈ {dkt, d0t+1, d0t+2, . . . , d0T}.
Proof: See Appendix A.2.
Equation (2.13) shows that the logarithm of the likelihood ratio between working in any
occupation k > 0 and the decision not to work is a function of the trade-offs described in
equation (2.12).38 Higher non-pecuniary costs and lower expected utility from compensation
make alternative k less likely. Moreover, if choosing alternative k makes the individual
less likely to work in the future, thereby reducing the value of his human capital or his
information, then alternative k is also less likely to be chosen today.
2.4 Estimation
Estimation of the parameters of the model is done in two stages using a combination of
an Expectation-Maximization (EM) algorithm and a conditional choice probabilities (ccp)
estimator (Hotz and Miller, 1993; Arcidiacono and Miller, 2011; James, 2011). The EM
algorithm in the first stage permits fast estimation of income and ability parameters, by-
passing the need for multidimensional integration over unobserved ability vectors. The ccp
estimator in the second stage follows naturally from the expression derived in Proposition
2.2. It allows for a flexible treatment of the large state space of the problem, which includes
continuous beliefs and experience. It yields consistent estimates of the utility parameters
without having to solve the dynamic optimization problem at every candidate parameter
vector in the search algorithm. The flexibility provided by the ccp estimator facilitates the
disaggregation of occupations used in this chapter.
38The derivation of equation (2.13) relies on the assumption that the decision not to work changes neither
the beliefs nor the vector of accumulated human capital. In general, an expression similar to that in Propo-
sition 2.2 can be obtained in terms of any path of future choices. Such alternative representation, however,
will not be as tractable because expectations over functions of future income signals will be necessary.
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Individuals in the model select on beliefs about their ability rather than selecting on
their actual ability. In other words, conditional on the history of income signals up to t,
mapped into beliefs Eit, choices at t are independent of ability. Let Λ be the collection of
parameters of the utility function, let Θ be the collection of income parameters, including the
variance parameters of the productivity shocks, σηk , and let ∆s be the covariance matrix of
the population ability distribution conditional on education level s. Therefore, the likelihood
of the data—hourly income and choices—for a person with education level s can be written
as:
Li =
Ti∏
t=ti0
4∏
k=0
Pr [dkit = 1|hit,Eit; Λ,Θ]dkit ×
∫
M˜
{
Ti∏
t=ti0
4∏
j=1
Pr [yjit+1|hit, µ˜j; Θ]djit
}
dF
(
M˜; ∆s
)
(2.15)
Equation (2.15) reflects two characteristics of the model. First, individuals are heterogeneous
in their unobserved ability,Mi. Second, rather than their unobserved ability, a function of
the history of their income signals—their belief Eit—shapes their occupational decisions.
This has the convenient effect of taking the choices part of the likelihood out of the multi-
dimensional integral.39 The log likelihood of (2.15) is then additively separable:
lnLi = lnLdi + lnLyi
The first stage of the estimation procedure utilizes the income term of the log likelihood to
obtain estimates of Θ and ∆s. These estimates are used in the second stage to estimate
Λ. The scale of Θ, ∆s, and ρ depends on the units in which income and consumption
are measured. Hourly income is expressed in $10 units and consumption in $1,000 units.
39No measurement error is assumed in the hourly income data, which allows for people’s beliefs to be backed
out using income data. Allowing for measurement error would render the two-stage procedure non-viable as
integration over the error terms would be necessary over the entire expression in equation (2.15).
33
Therefore, converting hourly income into annual income for occupation k in the model entails
dividing L¯kykt+1 by 100. The standard errors provided in the chapter are uncorrected for
the two-stage estimation.40
2.4.1 First Stage: Income Parameters and Learning Structure
The first stage uses an Expectation-Maximization (EM) algorithm, an iterative method that
yields maximum likelihood estimates when a portion of the data is unobserved. In the model,
the unobserved part of the data is the individual’s ability, Mi. In order to implement the
EM algorithm, assumeMi is observed for all i. Hence, the income term of the log likelihood
for individual i becomes
lnLyi (Mi) =
Ti∑
t=ti0
4∑
j=0
djit ln Pr [yjit+1|hit, µj; Θ]
Starting from a guess of parameters 〈Θ0,∆0〉, implementation of the EM algorithm entails
iteration over the following two steps to obtain maximum likelihood estimates:
1. Expectation Step: compute the expected value of lnLyi (Mi), conditional on the data
actually observed and the parameters at the mth iteration
Em[lnLyi (Mi)|·]
2. Maximization Step: find the new iterated value of the vector of parameters by maxi-
mizing the expression obtained in the expectation step:
〈Θm+1,∆m+1〉 = max
〈Θ,∆〉
∑
i
Em[lnLyi (Mi)|·]
40For the parameters in the first stage, which uses an EM algorithm, computation of the standard errors
follows the NDS procedure described in Jamshidian and Jennrich (2000).
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For use in the second stage, consistent estimates of individual beliefs are obtained. This
computation uses the point estimates for Θ and ∆s, the history of signals received by every
individual, Bayes’ Rule, and the rational expectations assumption regarding the individual’s
prior. The first stage of the estimation algorithm is detailed in Appendix A.3.
2.4.2 Second Stage: Utility Parameters
In order to estimate Λ, the second stage follows Hotz and Miller (1993) and takes advantage
of the expression derived in Proposition 2.2 mapping future choice probabilities and utility
parameters into current choice probabilities. The Type-I Extreme Value assumption regard-
ing the distribution of preference shocks implies that the choice probabilities can be written
as
pkit(hit,Eit) =
exp(Vk(hit,Eit))
1 +
∑
k′>0 exp(Vk′(hit,Eit))
(2.16)
where V0 = 0 and for any k > 0
Vk(hit,Eit) = − lnαkit(hit)− (bτ(t) − 1) lnEt
vkit+1 T−t∏
s=1
(
p0it+s(h
(s)
kit,E
(s)
kit)
p0it+s(h
(s)
0it,E
(s)
0it)
)φt(s)∣∣∣∣∣∣Eit, hit
 (2.17)
An iterative algorithm is implemented that maximizes the log likelihood of the data while
searching over the space of parameters and ccps. This procedure is akin to the swapping of
the nested fixed point algorithm described in Aguirregabiria and Mira (2002). The procedure
is initialized with flexible parametric versions of the future conditional choice probabilities
estimated from the data.41 It entails the following two steps:
1. Maximization Step: plug the estimated ccps in equation (2.16) and maximize the log
likelihood of the observed choices. Notably, forming Vk(ht,Et) requires knowledge of
the bond prices bτ(t). Following Gayle and Miller (2009), obtain bond prices using
41When computing the ccps, beliefs, estimated in the first stage, are also treated as data.
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series from the Federal Reserve Economic Data (see Appendix A.1).
2. CCP Step: use the estimated parameters at the current iteration to solve the model
backwards and obtain new ccps implied by the model.
The parameter vector that yields the minimum log likelihood is chosen. The second stage of
the estimation method is further explained in Appendix A.3.
2.4.3 Identification
The sources of variation that identify the parameters of the model are observed income and
occupational choices over time, as well as variation in observed experience and demographics.
There are three sets of parameters to be identified: returns to experience and education,
parameters of the Bayesian learning structure including the distribution of abilities, and
parameters of the utility function. Identification of each set of parameters is discussed
below.
The main challenge for causal estimation of the returns to occupation-specific experience
in the income equation is that individuals select on beliefs (Gibbons et al., 2005). This is
accounted for in estimation using the likelihood induced by the model.42 Provided that se-
lection is accounted for, income variation for different levels of occupation-specific experience
identifies the returns to experience. This is the learning-by-doing piece of the model. The
returns to cross-occupation experience are identified from the variation in income of switch-
ers. Notably, since education indicators are introduced linearly in the income equations, the
mean of the distribution of ability is not identified.43
Identification of the latent distribution of ability under normality assumptions using
income data and occupation choices has been shown in Heckman and Honoré (1990). In-
42Instrumental variables have also been used to account for selection on beliefs (see Altonji and Williams
(2005), Dillon and Stanton (2016)).
43The distribution of ability is also conditional on education and its mean enters linearly in the income
equation.
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dividuals with different education levels are likely to have different distributions of abil-
ity. Therefore, given that education is not endogenized, the distribution of ability is made
education-specific. The parameters of the covariance matrix of the ability distribution are
then identified from variation in residual income. In particular, the off-diagonal terms of
the variance matrix are identified from the covariation in residuals of switchers. Finally, the
variance of the idiosyncratic shocks, which is not made education-specific, is identified from
the excess variation in residual income per occupation.44
Following results in Arcidiacono and Miller (2015), given that the distribution of the
choice-specific taste shocks, the subjective discount factor, and the transition function of
beliefs—estimated in the first stage—are known, the flow payoffs are identified up to the
normalization that the flow payoffs from unemployment are zero in each state and time
period.45 Hence, the functional form assumptions regarding the utility function provide over-
identifying restrictions. Notably, separate identification of the risk aversion parameter from
prior beliefs may be difficult. This is because similar choice patterns would be generated by
overconfident low-variance priors and high risk aversion, or by under confident high-variance
priors with low risk aversion. The panel dimension of the data helps separate the variation
in choices due to risk aversion. Over time and regardless of priors, Bayesian learning implies
that individuals’ beliefs will get arbitrarily close to their true ability, and the remaining
idiosyncratic variation would help identify the risk aversion parameter.
2.5 Parameter Estimates and Economic Forces at Play
In this section, the estimates of the structural model are discussed, and the economic forces
at play in the decision to become an entrepreneur are evaluated. Especial attention is paid
44These points can be seen more clearly in the updating rules of the EM algorithm in Appendix A.3.
45Identification in models of dynamic discrete choice is also discussed in Magnac and Thesmar (2002) and
Rust (1994).
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to the role that these forces play in the timing of the entrepreneurial choice. Section 2.5.1
presents estimated parameters of the income equation and the distribution of ability. Section
2.5.2 discusses utility parameter estimates and Section 2.5.3 discusses model fit. Finally, the
role of the forces at play is quantified using a decomposition exercise in Section 2.5.4.
2.5.1 Income Parameters and the Distribution of Ability
Two key economic forces in the model are learning-by-doing and learning about ability. In
this section the estimated results for these processes are described. Beginning with learning-
by-doing, Table 2.6 presents the estimated returns to experience as well as other parameters
of the income equation in (2.4). The returns to experience are specified using step-functions
that capture the marginal increase in productivity for an extra year of experience.46
The estimated increments in productivity from Table 2.6 are illustrated in Figure 2.4.
As an example, one year of blue collar experience adds .81 dollars to the hourly income
from blue collar work. A second year of blue collar experience adds another .74 dollars
and so forth. Figure 2.4 shows that the returns to blue collar experience are the flattest
while the returns to incorporated experience are the steepest. Individuals trying to reach
the high productivity levels available in incorporated entrepreneurship should start climbing
the ladder when they are young.
Learning-by-doing can also happen across-occupations. That is, experience accumulated
in one occupation may have non-zero returns in another. Figure 2.5 illustrates the estimated
returns to cross-occupation experience. As an example, one year of white collar experience
adds 1.33 dollars to the hourly income from blue collar work, and any extra year of white
collar experience up to five does not add anything. The most striking result coming out of
46The choice of representing the returns profile using a step-function is data driven. It is difficult to obtain
smooth profiles for entrepreneurial experience given that the number of individuals with high numbers of
entrepreneurial experience is low. The location of the steps was chosen from preliminary OLS regressions.
No steps beyond the 10th year of experience were significant in the OLS exercise, so it is assumed that
individuals reach the top of the productivity ladder by the 10th year in the occupation.
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Table 2.6: Income Parameters
Blue Collar White Collar Unincorporated Incorporated
coeff se coeff se coeff se coeff se
Constant 0.927∗∗ 0.008 0.847∗∗ 0.015 1.304∗∗ 0.059 0.730∗∗ 0.244
Black -0.204∗∗ 0.008 -0.122∗∗ 0.014 -0.180∗∗ 0.052 -0.097 0.278
Some College 0.222∗∗ 0.009 0.129∗∗ 0.014 -0.095∗∗ 0.041 0.597∗∗ 0.237
College 0.323∗∗ 0.017 0.456∗∗ 0.018 0.537∗∗ 0.083 0.411∗ 0.216
More than College 0.251∗∗ 0.021 0.624∗∗ 0.020 0.934∗∗ 0.080 1.842∗∗ 0.366
Married 0.053∗∗ 0.005 0.213∗∗ 0.008 0.019 0.039 0.718∗∗ 0.114
1{expbc ≥ 1} 0.081∗∗ 0.006 -0.077∗∗ 0.011 -0.233∗∗ 0.053
1{expbc ≥ 2} 0.074∗∗ 0.007 -0.268 0.179
1{expbc ≥ 3} 0.041∗∗ 0.007
1{expbc ≥ 4} 0.056∗∗ 0.008
1{expbc ≥ 5} 0.067∗∗ 0.008 -0.508 0.319
1{expbc ≥ 6} 0.142∗∗ 0.007
1{expbc ≥ 7} 0.119∗∗ 0.015
1{expwc ≥ 1} 0.133∗∗ 0.006 0.126∗∗ 0.012
1{expwc ≥ 2} 0.127∗∗ 0.013 0.019 0.063 -0.765∗∗ 0.182
1{expwc ≥ 3} 0.192∗∗ 0.012 0.044 0.072 0.824∗∗ 0.228
1{expwc ≥ 5} 0.140∗∗ 0.011
1{expwc ≥ 6} 0.209∗∗ 0.013 0.480∗∗ 0.061
1{expwc ≥ 7} 0.178∗∗ 0.014
1{expwc ≥ 8} 0.410∗∗ 0.013 0.627∗∗ 0.124
1{expeu ≥ 1} -0.177∗∗ 0.016 0.219∗∗ 0.033
1{expeu ≥ 3} 0.229 0.241
1{expeu ≥ 4} 0.743∗∗ 0.032 0.407∗∗ 0.034
1{expeu ≥ 7} 0.280∗∗ 0.038
1{expei ≥ 1} -0.451∗∗ 0.060 0.433∗∗ 0.086
1{expei ≥ 2} 1.004∗∗ 0.028
1{expei ≥ 3} 1.867∗∗ 0.109
1{expei ≥ 5} 1.078∗∗ 0.085
1{expe ≥ 1} -0.022∗ 0.011
1{expe ≥ 2} -0.156∗∗ 0.017
1{expe ≥ 5} 0.365∗∗ 0.026
Obs 8902 9957 1403 602
Notes: Hourly income measured in $10s. ∗, ∗∗ indicate statistical significance at the .10 and .05 levels, respectively. Standard
errors have not been corrected for 2-stage estimation yet. Estimated parameters of equation (2.4). Returns to experience are
estimated as step functions. As an example, 1{expeu ≥ 3} indicates that the individual has three years or more of
unincorporated experience. In blue collar work, experience from both entrepreneurial occupations is pooled:
expe = expeu + expei. Steps functions were chosen to avoid out of sample return estimates especially on entrepreneurial
occupations. The steps were chosen using statistical significance in a preliminary OLS.
Figure 2.5 is that, while expertise in entrepreneurial activities always increases productivity
in paid employment, low levels of entrepreneurial experience reduce it. This finding is similar
to some of the results in Jovanovic and Nyarko (1996), where switching technologies can
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Figure 2.4: Returns to Own-Occupation Experience
Notes: Returns implied by the marginal step estimates in Table 2.6.
reduce productivity by reducing expertise.47 These results suggest that, unless mastered,
skills learned in entrepreneurship may harm paid-employment productivity.48
Another form of learning allowed in the model is learning about ability. In the model,
individuals start their careers with a common prior that corresponds to the population
distribution of ability for their education level. Over time, their success or failure in each
occupation allows them to update their beliefs. The estimated covariance matrices for the
47Manso (2014) finds that entrepreneurial experience generates a premium for salaried workers whenever
it is more than two years.
48Some skills commonly considered entrepreneurial are the ability to sell, innovative thinking, initiative,
and self-reliance.
40
ability distribution, which constitute the initial priors, are presented in Table 2.7.49 Recall
that the ability vector is measured in $10s/hr. Therefore, an individual with more than
college education and ability that is one standard deviation above the population mean
would have an incorporated ability of 10 × √10.88 ≈ $33/hr. The same individual, would
have white collar ability of 10 × √0.87 ≈ $9/hr. This comparison highlights the most
important results from Table 2.7: there is higher variation in entrepreneurial ability than
in paid-employment ability. In addition, more education tends to be associated with higher
variation in ability. In light of the model, learning about ability implies that individuals
should enter entrepreneurship as early as possible in order to find out their position in the
high-variance ability distribution.
Learning about ability can also happen across-occupations because occupational abilities
are correlated. This can be seen in the off-diagonal terms of the covariance matrix in Table
2.7. To better understand this relationship, the correlations between abilities are computed
and presented in Figure 2.6. Individuals with high ability in white collar work tend to have
high ability in entrepreneurial activities. Moreover, consistent with the discussion in Section
2.2, the correlation between white collar ability and incorporated ability is higher than the
correlation between both entrepreneurial abilities at any education level. These results are
also consistent with the differences between entrepreneurial occupations presented in Levine
and Rubinstein (Forthcoming).
Estimates indicate that there is an incentive for young individuals to attempt entrepreneur-
ship in order to learn whether they are high-ability. Alternatively, they can use white collar
success as an indicator of their entrepreneurial ability. However, these learning possibili-
ties depend on how noisy the signals are in each occupation. As Table 2.8 shows, the high
idiosyncratic variation of entrepreneurial occupations threatens their informational value.
49As mentioned above, the mean of the ability distribution is normalized to zero because it is not separately
identified from the linear returns to education in equation (2.4) (see Table 2.6).
41
0 5 10
Occupation-Specific Experience
-10
0
10
$/H
r
blue collar
wc ue + ie
0 5 10
Occupation-Specific Experience
-10
0
10
$/H
rs
white collar
bc ue ie
0 5 10
Occupation-Specific Experience
-10
0
10
$/H
r
unincorporated
bc wc ie
0 5 10
Occupation-Specific Experience
-10
0
10
$/H
r
incorporated
bc wc ue
Figure 2.5: Returns to Cross-Occupation Experience
Notes: Returns implied by the marginal step estimates in Table 2.6. Occupations are: white collar (wc), blue collar (bc),
unincorporated entrepreneurship (ue), and incorporated entrepreneurship (ie). In blue collar work, experience from both
entrepreneurial occupations is pooled.
To get a sense of how fast own- and cross-occupation learning about ability can actually
happen, Figure 2.7 presents the percent of prior uncertainty about entrepreneurial ability
that is eliminated after working for 5 years in each occupation. Consider the right panel and
individuals with more than college education—the rightmost set of 4 bars in the figure. On
the one hand, own-occupation learning indicates that initial uncertainty about incorporated
ability is reduced by almost 90 percent, after 5 years of incorporated experience. On the
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Table 2.7: Population Ability Covariance Matrices
High School
blue collar white collar unincorporated incorporated
coeff se coeff se coeff se coeff se
blue collar 0.15∗∗ 0.003
white collar 0.13∗∗ 0.007 0.11∗∗ 0.008
unincorporated 0.20∗∗ 0.020 0.17∗∗ 0.029 0.27∗∗ 0.040
incorporated 0.04 0.479 0.03 0.313 0.05 0.920 0.04 0.293
Some College
blue collar white collar unincorporated incorporated
coeff se coeff se coeff se coeff se
blue collar 0.23∗∗ 0.006
white collar 0.26∗∗ 0.009 0.32∗∗ 0.009
unincorporated 0.16∗∗ 0.032 0.14∗∗ 0.032 0.28∗∗ 0.033
incorporated 0.45∗∗ 0.128 0.77∗∗ 0.071 0.35∗ 0.179 4.60∗∗ 0.395
College
blue collar white collar unincorporated incorporated
coeff se coeff se coeff se coeff se
blue collar 0.45∗∗ 0.021
white collar 0.33∗∗ 0.026 0.57∗∗ 0.016
unincorporated 0.29∗∗ 0.099 0.38∗∗ 0.059 3.52∗∗ 0.249
incorporated 0.71∗∗ 0.079 0.85∗∗ 0.038 -0.11 0.528 1.66∗∗ 0.179
More than College
blue collar white collar unincorporated incorporated
coeff se coeff se coeff se coeff se
blue collar 0.37∗∗ 0.020
white collar 0.22∗∗ 0.035 0.87∗∗ 0.022
unincorporated -0.41∗∗ 0.110 0.66∗∗ 0.075 3.03∗∗ 0.175
incorporated -0.29 0.685 1.82∗∗ 0.149 2.35∗∗ 0.706 10.88∗∗ 0.665
Notes: ∗, ∗∗ indicate statistical significance at the .10 and .05 levels, respectively. Standard errors have not been corrected for
2-stage estimation yet. Covariance matrix of the joint distribution of unobserved ability conditional on education, denoted ∆s.
Table 2.8: Idiosyncratic Variance
blue collar white collar unincorporated incorporated
coeff se coeff se coeff se coeff se
0.30∗∗ 0.001 0.96∗∗ 0.004 2.47∗∗ 0.03 8.00∗∗ 0.134
Notes: ∗, ∗∗ indicate statistical significance at the .10 and .05 levels, respectively. Standard errors have not been corrected for
2-stage estimation yet. Idiosyncratic hourly income variance in every occupation, denoted σ2ηk .
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Figure 2.6: Implied Correlation Between Abilities
Notes: Correlation between abilities per education level implied by the estimates in Table 2.7. Education levels are: high
school (HS), some college (SC), college (C), and more than college (MC). Top figures show the implied correlations of
unobserved ability between salaried occupations and each of the entrepreneurial occupations. Bottom left figure shows the
implied correlation of abilities between unincorporated and incorporated entrepreneurship. Bottom right figure shows the
implied correlation of abilities between blue and white collar.
other, cross-occupation learning indicates that initial uncertainty about incorporated ability
is reduced by about 30 percent, after 5 years of white collar experience. Surprisingly, Figure
2.7 shows that for college educated individuals, paid employment can be a better source for
learning about incorporated ability than incorporated entrepreneurship itself. Correlated
learning about ability provides incentives for young college educated individuals to attempt
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entrepreneurship later in life.
Figure 2.7: Prior Variance Eliminated After 5 Years of Occupation-Specific Experience
Notes: Figure shows how much prior variance remains in occupation k after accumulating five years of experience in
occupation k′ and zero years in any other occupation. On the y-axis of the panel devoted to occupation k is the percent
quantity (1− V{k,k},5(k′)/V{k,k},0) ∗ 100. The numerator is the belief variance of occupation k after accumulating five years
of experience in occupation k′ and zero in any other occupation. The denominator is the prior variance of occupation k.
Education levels are: high school (HS), some college (SC), college (C), and more than college (MC). Quantities are obtained
using the estimates in Table 2.7.
2.5.2 Utility Parameters
Estimates of the utility function parameters are presented in Table 2.9. First, individuals are
risk-averse—the point estimate for ρ is greater than zero. To better assess the importance
of risk aversion, Figure 2.8 depicts static and dynamic measures of certainty equivalence.
On the y-axis of both panels is the proportion of expected annual income that would be
necessary to make individuals indifferent between accepting the income variation in the
occupation and receiving the certainty equivalent for sure.50 The static certainty equivalent,
50By construction, provided individuals are risk-averse, this measure is always bounded above by 1 in the
static case. The measure is further explained in Appendix A.4.
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on the left panel in Figure 2.8, highlights the role of risk aversion as it does not account for
the future value of experience and beliefs. Not surprisingly, incorporated entrepreneurship
has the lowest static certainty equivalent as it offers the highest income variation. However,
dynamic considerations about future human capital and beliefs mitigate the effects of risk
aversion (right panel of Figure 2.8).
Besides risk aversion, first-time entry costs are a barrier to young entrepreneurship.
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Figure 2.8: Certainty Equivalent
Notes: On the y-axis of both figures is the average of a scale free measure of risk aversion computed across individuals of a
given age with positive expected income, E[ykt+1|ht,Et] > 0. The measure can be understood as the proportion of expected
annual income that would be necessary to let a static/dynamic individual indifferent between taking the gamble of going into
the occupation and receiving the certainty equivalent for sure without entering the occupation. In the numerator is the
certainty equivalent, yckt+1, static and dynamic, obtained in equations (A.29) and (A.30) in Appendix A.4. In the
denominator is the expected hourly income conditional on beliefs, E[ykt+1|ht,Et].
Table 2.9 suggests that entry costs for entrepreneurship are higher for young individuals as
well as individuals with low permanent wealth. Figure 2.9 introduces monetary equivalents
for entry cost estimates.51 On the x-axis of each panel is the education level and on the
y-axis is the monetary equivalent in thousands of dollars (year, 2000). Entry costs are more
responsive to age than to permanent wealth. On the one hand, the monetary equivalent of
51In the specification of the model, entry costs and non-pecuniary benefits can be treated as the indirect
utility representation of terms in the budget constraints (see Appendix A.4).
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Table 2.9: Utility Parameters
ρ coeff se
0.040∗∗ 0.0005
High School
blue collar white collar unincorporated incorporated
α coeff se coeff se coeff se coeff se
Non Peuniary
constant -1.804∗∗ 0.042 -0.939∗∗ 0.048 -0.549∗∗ 0.061 -1.459∗∗ 0.104
black 0.738∗∗ 0.041 1.173∗∗ 0.047 0.895∗∗ 0.061 1.724∗∗ 0.135
married -0.684∗∗ 0.040 -0.364∗∗ 0.047 -0.544∗∗ 0.060 -0.051 0.112
Entry Cost
constant -4.723∗∗ 0.338 2.975∗∗ 0.143 5.298∗∗ 0.154 12.645∗∗ 0.251
age/10 2.837∗∗ 0.151 -0.132∗ 0.053 -0.536∗∗ 0.054 -2.090∗∗ 0.084
ωi/10
3 2.681∗∗ 0.705 -1.529∗∗ 0.377 0.465∗ 0.231 -0.258 0.196
(age/10) · (ωi/103) -1.108∗∗ 0.287 0.421∗∗ 0.143 -0.234∗∗ 0.080 0.083 0.067
Some College
blue collar white collar unincorporated incorporated
α coeff se coeff se coeff se coeff se
Non Peuniary
constant -1.986∗∗ 0.052 -1.920∗∗ 0.053 -1.717∗∗ 0.066 -1.361∗∗ 0.090
black 0.466∗∗ 0.058 0.857∗∗ 0.061 1.069∗∗ 0.081 1.248∗∗ 0.109
married -0.933∗∗ 0.058 -0.784∗∗ 0.060 -0.686∗∗ 0.071 -0.874∗∗ 0.099
Entry Cost
constant -3.838∗∗ 0.213 3.807∗∗ 0.171 4.974∗∗ 0.148 11.559∗∗ 0.200
age/10 2.061∗∗ 0.087 -0.109 0.067 -0.331∗∗ 0.050 -1.649∗∗ 0.060
ωi/10
3 -0.515 0.413 -2.989∗∗ 0.456 0.024 0.077 -0.526∗∗ 0.069
(age/10) · (ωi/103) 0.236 0.168 1.085∗∗ 0.188 -0.029 0.023 0.158∗∗ 0.017
College
blue collar white collar unincorporated incorporated
α coeff se coeff se coeff se coeff se
Non Peuniary
constant -2.667∗∗ 0.101 -3.596∗∗ 0.100 -2.987∗∗ 0.113 -4.394∗∗ 0.142
black 0.216∗ 0.104 1.465∗∗ 0.104 1.755∗∗ 0.169 16.547 319.588
married -0.208 0.107 0.381∗∗ 0.106 0.067 0.119 1.002∗∗ 0.146
Entry Cost
constant -3.117∗∗ 0.390 1.199∗∗ 0.291 5.810∗∗ 0.215 7.482∗∗ 0.288
age/10 1.887∗∗ 0.149 0.771∗∗ 0.110 -0.534∗∗ 0.068 -0.700∗∗ 0.085
ωi/10
3 -1.243 0.957 -1.912∗∗ 0.729 -3.583∗∗ 0.341 -2.451∗∗ 0.297
(age/10) · (ωi/103) 0.800∗ 0.372 0.375 0.287 1.106∗∗ 0.127 0.610∗∗ 0.102
More than College
blue collar white collar unincorporated incorporated
α coeff se coeff se coeff se coeff se
Non Peuniary
constant -1.038∗∗ 0.066 -1.902∗∗ 0.063 -1.287∗∗ 0.077 -0.457∗∗ 0.109
black -0.637∗∗ 0.116 -0.298∗∗ 0.114 0.423∗ 0.166 -0.809∗∗ 0.144
married -0.436∗∗ 0.076 -0.336∗∗ 0.072 -0.740∗∗ 0.085 -0.966∗∗ 0.117
Entry Cost
constant -5.888∗∗ 0.442 -3.414∗∗ 0.479 5.186∗∗ 0.238 9.253∗∗ 0.301
age/10 2.689∗∗ 0.166 2.481∗∗ 0.187 -0.200∗∗ 0.072 -0.875∗∗ 0.086
ωi/10
3 1.951∗ 0.809 1.712 0.897 -0.531 0.284 -3.499∗∗ 0.241
(age/10) · (ωi/103) -0.459 0.301 -0.921∗∗ 0.357 0.070 0.088 0.897∗∗ 0.074
Notes: ∗, ∗∗ indicate statistical significance at the .10 and .05 levels, respectively. Standard errors have not been corrected for
2-stage estimation yet. ωi is defined as the individual’s permanent wealth in Section 2.2 and it is measured in thousands of
dollars of 2000. Estimated parameters of equations (2.2) and (2.3).
47
entry costs into incorporated entrepreneurship decreases from about $200,000, for individuals
age 20, to less than $150,000, for individuals age 40. On the other, entrepreneurial entry
costs decrease $20,000 or less when permanent wealth goes from the 10th percentile to the
90th. The negative sign of the relation between entry costs and permanent wealth suggests,
in a reduced form sense, that individuals are able to ease their barriers to entrepreneurship
using their life-time potential. However, the steeper profile of entry costs associated with
age captures barriers to entry not explicitly modeled, such as tighter credit constraints for
young individuals with weaker credit histories or less capital.52
Non-pecuniary motivations such as “being one’s own boss” and “wanting flexibility over
schedule” (Hamilton, 2000; Hurst and Pugsley, 2011, 2015) have also been suggested in
the literature. This association would be even stronger for risk-averse individuals trying to
avoid the higher variation of entrepreneurial outcomes. However, the dynamic treatment
of the entrepreneurial choice, as well as the integration of its information value, suggests
a more nuanced story. Estimates of the non-pecuniary benefits not associated with first
entry are presented in Table 2.9 and are converted to their monetary equivalent in Figure
2.10. Overall dominance of entrepreneurial non-pecuniary benefits does not emerge once
dynamic considerations are introduced.53 On the one hand, entrepreneurial activities are
always ranked below blue collar work for low educated individuals. In monetary terms,
this difference is equivalent to at least $20,000 per year. On the other, entrepreneurial
occupations become more attractive in non-pecuniary benefits for individuals with college
or more. In particular, the non-pecuniary benefits of incorporated entrepreneurship for
the college educated are higher that those from any other occupation at any education
52One more pattern emerges from the figure. The dispersion in entry costs across-occupations decreases
with age as entrepreneurial entry costs decline, but salaried entry costs increase. This phenomenon may
result from older individuals finding it harder to start careers in paid employment due to difficulties in
obtaining or regaining skills at old ages.
53These results are in line with those in Dillon and Stanton (2016), who account for dynamics highlighting
the option value of the entrepreneurial choice.
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Figure 2.9: Monetary Equivalent of Entry Costs
Notes: On the x-axis of each panel is the education level. Education levels are: high school (HS), some college (SC), college
(C), and more than college (MC). On the y-axis is the monetary equivalent of entry costs, obtained using the estimates in
Table 2.9 and equation (A.31) in Appendix A.4. The top two panels correspond to individuals 20 years old, while the bottom
two correspond to individuals 40 years old. The left panels correspond to individuals in the 10th percentile of permanent
wealth ωi, while the right panels correspond to individuals in the 90th percentile.
level. Hence, it is possible that the importance of non-pecuniary benefits explaining the
entrepreneurial choice has an education gradient not explored in previous literature.
Finally, even though the treatment of the entrepreneurial choice in this chapter attempts
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Figure 2.10: Monetary Equivalent of non-pecuniary Benefits
Notes: On the x-axis are levels education: high school (HS), some college (SC), college (C), and more than college (MC).
Occupations are: white collar (wc), blue collar (bc), unincorporated entrepreneurship (ue), and incorporated entrepreneurship
(ie). On the y-axis is the monetary equivalent of the non-pecuniary benefits not related to entry. They are obtained using the
estimates in Table 2.9 and a similar derivation as in equation (A.31) in Appendix A.4. The benefits are computed for a white,
married man.
to capture many of its economic determinants, there are at least two caveats of this analy-
sis. First, credit constraints are not modeled explicitly. Data limitations as well as model
tractability kept this project away from incorporating the role of savings in entrepreneurship.
Credit constraints remain as a common explanation for the lack of higher entrepreneurial
participation (Evans and Jovanovic, 1989; Hurst and Lusardi, 2004; Buera, 2009). In reduced
form, the age profile of entry costs in the model tries to get at this issue. Consistent with
the credit constraints hypothesis, results show young individuals face higher entry costs to
entrepreneurship. Second, the decision of hours worked is not modeled. Hence, the non-
pecuniary benefits from working in a given occupation are net of the disutility from working.
Given that entrepreneurs work more hours, it is possible that accounting for the disutility
from working would yield non-pecuniary benefits that are higher for entrepreneurial occupa-
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tions, at least for the highly educated.
2.5.3 Model Fit
Goodness of fit is assessed by solving the model and comparing simulated data against the
sample.54 Although white collar and blue collar participation rates are predicted less pre-
cisely, Figure 2.11 shows that the model successfully generates the incorporated and unincor-
porated participation rates over the life cycle.55 Additionally, first-entry statistics presented
in Table 2.10 show that the model replicates the absence of young entrepreneurs. The model
captures well the proportion of individuals who attempt entrepreneurial occupations by age
40, and it captures reasonably well the average age at first entry into all occupations. More
interestingly, the model captures the nature of the experience obtained before first entry.
Consistent with the similarities between white collar work and incorporated entrepreneur-
ship highlighted in Section 2.2, simulated individuals attempting entrepreneurship tend to
have more prior experience. In particular, first-time unincorporated entrepreneurs tend to
have more blue collar experience, whereas the opposite is true for first-time incorporated
entrepreneurs. Further measures of model fit in terms of transitions, spells, and realized
income are presented in Appendix A.4.
2.5.4 Decomposition Exercises
In this section, the effects of the economic forces at play are quantified by comparing sim-
ulated data from the estimated model (baseline) against simulated data from a number of
counterfactual regimes that disable parts of the structure. The quantification is done in four
dimensions: entry, timing, ability, and present value of income. Given that incorporated
54Appendix A.4 illustrates how the model is solved.
55In a separate exercise, not shown here for space considerations, choice rates are simulated at any age t
taking the state observed in the data as given. This exercise shows a much better fit for salaried occupations
suggesting that the model has a harder time capturing transitions.
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Figure 2.11: Simulated versus Observed Choice Rates
Notes: Actual and simulated choices by age.
entrepreneurs seem most comparable to what is commonly considered as “the entrepreneur”
(see Section 2.2 as well as Levine and Rubinstein (Forthcoming)), the discussion will in-
clude both types but will center on incorporated entrepreneurs. Comparisons reveal that
the two main barriers to young entrepreneurship are entry costs and lack of information.
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Table 2.10: First Entry: Observed and Simulated
Data
blue collar white collar unincorporated incorporated
Tried by age 40 0.65 0.83 0.23 0.11
At first entry
Age 22.84 24.81 29.57 32.82
expbc - 1.99 3.48 2.05
expwc 1.08 - 3.37 6.58
expeu 0.03 0.15 - 0.96
expei 0.01 0.02 0.22 -
Model
blue collar white collar unincorporated incorporated
Tried by age 40 0.77 0.73 0.23 0.09
At first entry
Age 22.23 25.84 29.98 32.40
expbc - 3.32 4.51 3.73
expwc 0.58 - 3.17 5.53
expeu 0.08 0.25 - 0.48
expei 0.00 0.04 0.11 -
Notes: Statistics computed using individuals that are observed from the beginning of their careers until at least age 40. Only
data when individuals are 40 years old or below are used.
Moreover, information frictions have a large long-term effect: fully-informed incorporated
entrepreneurs have a present value of income (PVI) that is about 50% higher than in the
baseline. Additionally, the decomposition points to a considerable long-term effect from
using paid-employment outcomes to predict incorporated entrepreneurial success.
The counterfactual regimes used for decomposition are:56
• No leaning-by-doing : productivity does not increase with own or cross-occupation ex-
perience. Instead, occupational skill is constant and pays an average return.57
• No learning about ability : individuals know their ability vectorMi but the initial level
56The counterfactual regimes are further explained in Appendix A.4. The initial state is fixed across
counterfactual regimes. Extended results from these comparisons are also presented in Appendix A.4.
57Let Rk(x) be the return to experience in occupation k for somebody who has worked x years in occupation
k and zero years in any other occupation (see Figure 2.4). The fixed hourly return to observed skill for
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of uncertainty remains unchanged.58
• No X (cross-occupation) leaning-by-doing : productivity in one occupation is invariant
to experience in another. The cross-occupation returns to experience (see Figure 2.5)
are set to zero.
• No X (correlated) learning about ability : individuals believe that their success in one
occupation is uninformative of their ability in another. Their initial prior variance is
∆s diagonalized.
• No uncertainty : individuals know their ability vectorMi and there is no idiosyncratic
variation around their hourly income.
• Uniform entry cost : entry cost does not vary with age. Instead, individuals pay the
cost faced by a 35-year old individual with their same education level.
Why are there not more entrepreneurs? Having to climb the productivity ladder has the
strongest effect discouraging incorporated entry. Close behind are the effects of uncertainty
(in ability and idiosyncratic variation) and entry costs. Figure 2.12 displays the ratio of
the share of individuals who attempt entrepreneurship during their careers in each of the
counterfactuals relative to the baseline. It shows that shutting down learning-by-doing has
the strongest effect on incorporated entry: if people did not have to learn-by-doing their
way up through the steep incorporated productivity ladder (see Figure 2.4), they would
be almost twice as likely to attempt incorporated entrepreneurship. In isolation, shutting
down learning about ability (i.e. sorting on ability) only increases the rate of incorporated
individuals in occupation k under this counterfactual regime is
y¯k =
20∑
x=0
Rk(x)
58In terms of equation (2.4), this amounts to changing the value of the idiosyncratic income variance in
occupation k from just σηk to σηk + ∆s,{k,k}.
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entrepreneurship by about 35% over the baseline.59 However, once all uncertainty is elimi-
nated, the effect on entry is similar to the effect from flattening the entry cost: individuals
would be 75% more likely to attempt incorporated entrepreneurship.60 Shutting down either
type of cross-occupation learning decreases incorporated participation. This latter result
makes sense because white collar workers, who are set to gain the most from switching,
cannot increase their productivity or improve their beliefs using their experience and paid-
employment success.
Figure 2.12: Decomposition: Entry
What about young entrepreneurship? The two main barriers to young entrepreneurs
59Arcidiacono et al. (2016) study the role of information frictions in a correlated learning framework with
schooling and labor market participation decisions.
60Given the results in Table 2.9, flattening the entry costs with respect to age amounts to young people
facing a lower entry cost than in the baseline.
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are entry costs and lack of information. Table 2.4, introduced in Section 2.2, showed the
gap in first-entry ages between entrepreneurial occupations and salaried occupations. Figure
2.13 shows the percentage of the gap, relative to white collar, that is closed under each of
the counterfactual regimes. Flattening the entry costs closes 70% of the gap, and sorting
on ability closes 20%. If individuals knew their ability, more of them would enter early.
Risk aversion and correlated learning do indeed induce young individuals to bypass some
of the risk of attempting entrepreneurship by acquiring some paid-employment experience
first. Figure 2.13 shows that eliminating all uncertainty reduces the gap by an extra 5% on
top of the reduction attained from providing full information about ability. Interestingly,
eliminating correlated learning on its own widens the gap by about 3%. In the uncorrelated
learning case, this happens because young individuals who avoid starting their careers as
entrepreneurs must first find out that they really are not good at paid employment in order
to switch into entrepreneurship.
However, individual participation is not all that matters. The ability of those attempting
entrepreneurship can have strong effects for the economy as a whole. Figure 2.14 displays
the ratio of ability at first entry in the counterfactual regime relative to the baseline. Not
surprisingly, the ability of fully informed individuals entering incorporated entrepreneurship
for the first time is higher—about three times as large as in the baseline. Perhaps more
surprising is the fact that the ability of fully informed individuals entering unincorporated
entrepreneurship is twelve times as large as in the baseline. This suggests that under full
information the returns from unincorporated entrepreneurship are relatively less attractive.
Hence, individuals choosing to enter must be of very high unincorporated ability. Shutting
down learning-by-doing and flattening entry costs reduce incorporated ability at first entry
relative to the baseline because they ease the threshold to enter. Interestingly, shutting
down correlated learning not only reduces ability at first entry but makes it negative. The
reason for this is the mismatch between prior variance and population variance. In the
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Figure 2.13: Decomposition: Timing
counterfactual regime, although individuals only learn about ability if they attempt the
occupation, the true ability distributions are still characterized by the covariance matrices
in Table 2.7. Provided abilities are mostly positively correlated (see Figure 2.6), this means
that those who switch to entrepreneurship are likely to be low ability entrepreneurs. After
all, they switch after discovering their low paid-employment ability.
Finally, the economic forces in the model have long-term effects on the outcomes of
entrepreneurs. Figure 2.15 shows the present value of the entrepreneurs’ realized stream of
income relative to the baseline. Results indicate that the effect of the information frictions is
large: fully informed incorporated entrepreneurs have a present value of income (PVI) that
is about 50% higher than in the baseline. Flattening entry costs also increases the PVI of the
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Figure 2.14: Decomposition: Ability
incorporated, although only by about 10%, because successful young entrepreneurs will enjoy
the returns for longer. Shutting down learning-by-doing or shutting down cross-occupation
learning-by-doing both reduce the PVI by about 20%. Since the former is an extension
of the latter, what really decreases the incorporated PVI is the lack of transferability of
skills learned. Notably, shutting down correlated learning decreases the incorporated PVI by
about 25%. The long-term effect of using paid-employment outcomes to predict incorporated
entrepreneurial success is certainly not negligible.61
61Simulations in Appendix A.4 show that a model with uncorrelated learning does not reproduce the
trends observed in Figure 2.2. The baseline model with correlated learning does reproduce the trends.
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Figure 2.15: Decomposition: PVI
2.6 Policy Counterfactuals
According to the decomposition exercises in Section 2.5, the two main barriers to young
entrepreneurship are entry costs and information frictions. In this section, policies focusing
on incorporated entrepreneurship target these barriers. This section extends the literature
by providing a mapping from entrepreneurial education that shifts beliefs, into career choices
and long-term outcomes. Results suggest that a blanket subsidy increases entrepreneurship
but has a small long-term effect as measured by the PVI. Additionally, results show that
entrepreneurial education that provides information can have a sizable effect on participation
and present value of income flows, even for low information quality.
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2.6.1 Subsidies
The previous section showed that entry costs are a strong barrier to young entrepreneur-
ship. Consequently, the intervention considered here is a subsidy for young incorporated
entrepreneurs. The policy consists of giving either $25,000 or $50,000 to any individual
who decides to start his career as a young incorporated entrepreneur. This is, the sub-
sidy is granted only if the individual becomes an entrepreneur immediately after finishing
his education.62 Table 2.11 summarizes the effects of the intervention in terms of young
incorporated entrepreneurs and in terms of the overall pool of incorporated entrepreneurs
(long-term effects).
The results reflect the effects of lowering the threshold of entry when information is im-
perfect. There is more participation but less entrepreneurial quality. The $50,000 subsidy
more than doubles young incorporated entrepreneurship as measured by the number of in-
dividuals who attempt entrepreneurship during their first five years in the labor market.
However, the average ability at first entry decreases by about 60%.
Regardless of this adverse effect on the quality of young incorporated entrepreneurs, the
subsidy may be justified. For instance, the subsidy may attract high-ability individuals who
were not entering due to high entry costs associated to their age or lower permanent wealth.
However, as measured by the 95th percentile of the ability of young entrepreneurs, this is
not the case. The subsidy could also have long-term effects. As a consequence of the $50,000
subsidy, the number of people who attempt incorporated entrepreneurship in their careers
increases by 50%. Besides, the average net present value of income of all individuals in the
economy (those who experiment with entrepreneurship and those who do not) increases by
about 3%. These results suggest that the marginal individuals induced to experiment by the
subsidy turn out to be more productive as entrepreneurs than what they would have been
62One such example of interventions providing funds for young entrepreneurs is the Thiel Fellowship
(http://thielfellowship.org). However, this intervention relies on a tournament that may reveal infor-
mation about the participant’s quality.
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Table 2.11: Young Incorporated Entrepreneurship Subsidy
Subsidy in $1000s
0 25 50
Young Entrepreneurs
Tried in first 5 years 0.02 0.03 0.05
Mean belief ($ per hour) at 1st entry 3.7 2.5 1.2
Mean ability ($ per hour) at 1st entry 5.0 3.6 2.1
Bias (belief-abiliity) -1.3 -1.1 -0.9
95th pctile ability ($ per hour) at 1st entry 46.5 44.0 37.8
All entrepreneurs
Tried 0.15 0.17 0.22
Participation rate at age 40 0.04 0.05 0.06
PVI net of subsidy ($1000s) 757 770 770
Mean belief ($ per hour) at 1st entry 6.4 6.2 5.2
Mean ability ($ per hour) at 1st entry 5.5 5.4 4.6
Bias (belief-abiliity) 0.9 0.8 0.6
All individuals
PVI net of subsidy ($1000s) 508 513 526
Notes: Subsidy given only to individuals who decide to attempt incorporated entrepreneurship immediately after finishing
their education. Young entrepreneurs are those who tried incorporated entrepreneurship for the first time within their first
five years in the labor market. Rows: Summary statistics are computed separately for young incorporated entrepreneurs and
for all incorporated entrepreneurs. PVI stands for the present value of income. Columns: The no-subsidy column corresponds
to the baseline model.
as paid employees.
Looking at the average entrepreneurial ability of new entrants, the results here seem
consistent with those in Hamilton et al. (2016) and underscore the arguments presented
in Shane (2009) against blindly subsidizing entrepreneurship. However, once the long-term
effects are evaluated, it appears that policies that relax entry costs and attract marginal
entrepreneurs may be effective. Although small, there are gains in terms of PVI from young
successful entrepreneurs attracted early on by the subsidy.
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2.6.2 Entrepreneurship Education
Many policies trying to foster young entrepreneurship focus on entrepreneurship education.63
To the extent that these policies help reveal entrepreneurial potential, the emphasis on en-
trepreneurial education is consistent with the decomposition exercises in Section 2.5 showing
that information frictions are a main barrier to young entrepreneurs. The empirical litera-
ture has provided evidence that entrepreneurship education programs can shift individuals’
elicited beliefs and intentions (von Graevenitz et al., 2010; Oosterbeek et al., 2010; Souitaris
et al., 2007; Peterman and Kennedy, 2003)), but the value of these policies will critically
depend on the quality of the information they provide. Results here extend the literature
providing a mapping from entrepreneurship education of a given quality, through shifts in
beliefs, into career choices and long-term outcomes. In other words, the chapter provides a
dynamic framework to assess the value of any given policy that provides information.64
The counterfactuals operate as follows: all individuals draw noisy information—regarding
their ability as incorporated entrepreneurs—from their outcomes in an entrepreneurship
education program. Individuals use this information to update their beliefs before beginning
their careers. This policy effectively induces initial heterogeneity in entrepreneurial beliefs
that will depend on ability as well as on luck. Additionally, because abilities are correlated,
the policy will induce heterogeneity in beliefs across all occupations. In the language of the
model, the entrepreneurship education program yields every individual a signal about his
incorporated ability (µ4,i ∈Mi) given by
ζpi = µ4,i + νi (2.18)
63Examples of such programs are the BizCamps or the Regional Young Entrepreneurship Challenge by
the Network for Teaching Entrepreneurship and the Junior Achievement Young Enterprise Student Mini-
Company (SMC) program.
64The chapter remains silent as to what the information quality of entrepreneurship education is. Eval-
uation of the information quality of a specific policy could be attained from observing the information
signal generated through the program (for instance, rankings, scores, simulated profits) to randomly selected
individuals.
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where νi are iid N(0, σ2ν). Individuals use the information contained in ζ
p
i to update their
beliefs before entering the labor market. It is assumed that no entrepreneurship education
program can provide better information than actually becoming an entrepreneur in the job
market for one period. In other words, the noise variance from this intervention is bounded
below by the idiosyncratic variance (σ2η4) estimated in Section 2.5 (see Table 2.8). Therefore,
the noise variance from the entrepreneurship education program can be written as
σ2ν = s · σ2η4 , with s ≥ 1 (2.19)
Four counterfactuals are considered here that differ in terms of how noisy their signals are:
s ∈ {1, 2, 5, 10}. For instance, when s equals 10 the quality of information from the en-
trepreneurship education program is 10% the quality of information from actually becoming
an incorporated entrepreneur for one period. Results from these interventions are presented
in Table 2.12.
For the range of information quality considered (s ∈ {1, 2, 5, 10}), results suggest that
the lower the quality, the higher the percentage of young entrepreneurs and the bias in
their beliefs. Table 2.12 also shows a decline in average ability of young entrepreneurs for
information quality below 50% (s = 2). This reflects the number of young entrepreneurs
who are attracted by lucky signals in programs with lower information quality. Providing
noisy information magnifies the role of overestimation of ability in fostering experimentation.
Young incorporated entrepreneurs go from having an hourly-income negative bias of -$1.3/hr
in the baseline to a positive bias of $81/hr from entrepreneurial education providing 10%
information quality (s = 10). These results are consistent with previous literature suggest-
ing that overconfidence influences entrepreneurial entry (Roll, 1986; Camerer and Lovallo,
1999). However, in the framework of this chapter, overestimation of ability is not a different
psychological trait of entrepreneurs or the result of differential analysis of the information
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Table 2.12: Young Incorporated Entrepreneurship Education
Noise Variance Scale, s
inf 10 5 2 1
Young Entrepreneurs
Tried in first 5 years 0.02 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.08
Mean belief ($ per hour) at 1st entry 3.7 82.4 75.1 61.3 48.4
Mean ability ($ per hour) at 1st entry 5.0 1.3 2.1 5.5 10.7
Bias (belief-abiliity) -1.3 81.1 73.0 55.8 37.7
95th pctile ability ($ per hour) at 1st entry 46.5 47.0 47.5 49.9 59.1
Overall
Tried 0.15 0.26 0.26 0.25 0.24
Participation rate at age 40 0.04 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.11
PVI ($1000s) 757 944 941 961 983
Mean belief ($ per hour) at 1st entry 6.4 45.9 41.8 33.8 26.5
Mean ability ($ per hour) at 1st entry 5.5 2.0 2.3 4.0 6.6
Bias (belief-abiliity) 0.9 43.9 39.5 29.8 19.9
All individuals
PVI ($1000s) 508 573 575 578 581
Notes: Individual-specific signal about incorporated ability given to everybody immediately after finishing their education.
Interventions are characterized by the noise variance of their signals (σν), expressed in terms of the noise variance of trying
incorporated entrepreneurship in reality (ση4 in Table 2.8): σν = s · ση4 . Young entrepreneurs are those who tried
incorporated entrepreneurship for the first time within their first five years in the labor market. Rows: Summary statistics are
computed separately for young incorporated entrepreneurs and for all incorporated entrepreneurs. PVI stands for the present
value of income. Columns: The inf column corresponds to the baseline model where no signal is received. This column is
identical to the no-subsidy column in Table 2.11.
received (March and Shapira, 1987; Busenitz, 1999). Instead, overestimation at first entry
emerges endogenously from uninformed rational individuals who are fortunate to receive
large positive signals.
Entrepreneurial education can also provide long-term gains even when the quality of in-
formation is as low as 10%. Table 2.12 shows that the share of incorporated entrepreneurship
at age 40 triples, the percentage of individuals who attempt incorporated entrepreneurship
increases by about 70%, and the PVI of incorporated entrepreneurs increases by 25%. Ad-
ditionally, entrepreneurial education could benefit all individuals, not only those who even-
tually become entrepreneurs. A first approximation to the benefits from entrepreneurial
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education to the average individual is given by the difference in average PVI relative to the
baseline. According to the last row in Table 2.12, this number varies from $65,000 when
s = 10 to $73,000 when s = 1.65
The results in this section extend the literature providing a mapping from movements
in beliefs, generated by entrepreneurial education of a given quality, into career choices and
long-term outcomes. Nevertheless, caution must be taken when reading these results. The
information quality of any specific policy may be different, and its cost may well exceed the
additional income it generates. At the limit, as s goes to infinity, entrepreneurship education
loses all its information value.66
2.7 Conclusion
On the basis of their potential economic benefits, entrepreneurship, and in particular young
entrepreneurship, is the target of many policy interventions. These interventions are a re-
sponse to the fact that most individuals do not start a business and, if they do, tend to
do so well into their thirties after they have accumulated some salaried experience. While
interventions aiming to foster young entrepreneurship spread, their effectiveness is still an
open question.
This chapter explores the reasons why individuals attempt entrepreneurship in their ca-
reers as well as the reasons explaining the gap in first-entry ages between paid employment
and self-employment. The chapter extends the literature by quantifying the relative im-
65To reflect the differences in entrepreneurial potential at every education level, these quantities can also
be computed by education level. Results imply that the difference in expected PVI from entrepreneurial
education of 10% of quality goes from $700 for high schoolers to about $200,000 for individuals with more
than college education.
66A more general characterization of the information value of entrepreneurship education programs could
be to write
ζpi = κ · µ4,i + νi
for κ ∈ [0, 1]. An uninformative entrepreneurial education program could also be one in which entrepreneurial
ability is only weakly related to outcomes, i.e. where κ approaches zero.
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portance of various determinants of entrepreneurial choice studied separately in previous
research, namely, accumulation of experience (learning-by-doing), accumulation of informa-
tion (learning about ability), risk aversion, and entry costs. In addition to the quantification,
three elements are particularly novel to the empirical literature on entrepreneurship: an anal-
ysis of the gap in first-entry ages, an assessment of the relative importance of risk aversion in
a dynamic setting, and an evaluation of the role of cross-occupation learning between paid
employment and entrepreneurship.
Using the structure of the model to quantify effects, a decomposition exercise indicates
that learning-by-doing and entry costs have the largest effects preventing individuals from
attempting entrepreneurship. Risk aversion and information frictions also play important
roles. For instance, shutting down risk aversion increases the percentage of individuals
who attempt incorporated entrepreneurship by 40%, and eliminating information frictions
increases this number by 35%. Eliminating cross-occupation learning reduces by 10% the
percentage of individuals attempting entrepreneurship. Although these effects may seem
small, in the long term the effects become stronger: eliminating cross-occupation learning
decreases the present value of income of incorporated entrepreneurs by about 25%.
Results also indicate that the main determinants of the gap in first entry ages are entry
costs and information frictions. The chapter evaluates the effects of policies that target these
barriers. Previous literature has shown that entrepreneurship education can shift beliefs (von
Graevenitz et al., 2010; Oosterbeek et al., 2010). This chapter extends the literature by pro-
viding a mapping from the information quality of entrepreneurship education into career
choices and outcomes. Results show that a blanket subsidy increases young entrepreneur-
ship by lowering the threshold of entry but has a limited long-term effect. Additionally,
results indicate that entrepreneurship education can have a large effect on the rate of young
entrepreneurship, and on the present value of income for all individuals. Nevertheless, the
information content of any specific policy must be assessed separately. It is possible for some
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policies to be very uninformative, compromising the benefits from implementing them.
Finally, the motivation for many entrepreneurship policies goes beyond a simple desire to
attract more entrepreneurs. Many policies seeking to foster entrepreneurship are motivated
by the jobs entrepreneurs create. However, beyond attracting new entrants, entrepreneurship
policies may or may not affect the decision to hire employees (Fairlie and Miranda, Forth-
coming). Therefore, more work is needed to evaluate these policies, taking into account not
only the number of new entrepreneurs but also their quality and their propensity to generate
jobs. The framework introduced here is the first step towards that goal. Future research
could account for the effects of entrepreneurship policies on job creation by extending the
model and acquiring data on the number of employees hired.
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Chapter 3
Innovation and Diffusion of Medical
Treatment
3.1 Introduction
In many product markets, innovation can lead to substantial quality changes from one point
in time to the next. Research on product innovation tends to emphasize demand responses
and consumer surplus. Going back to Hicks (1932) economists have recognized that market
demand not only responds to, but also drives innovation. Sometimes knows as “demand
pull”, the idea is that firms respond to consumer preferences by shifting resources towards
the development of products that meet potential demand (Schmookler, 1966; Scherer, 1982).
Demand pull implies a possible externality if the market fails to price the impact of consumer
choices on innovation (Jovanovic and MacDonald, 1994; Waldfogel, 2003; Finkelstein, 2004;
Goettler and Gordon, 2011). A potential implication is that innovation does not progress as
quickly as it would if the externality were priced.
Several features of the market for pharmaceuticals make it an interesting context to study
demand pull. First, medical products have two dimensions of quality (efficacy and side
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effects) and consumer preferences are heterogeneous. Thus, it is not generally meaningful
to see one product as strictly better than another, and many differentiated products can
coexist in a given market. Moreover, innovations can be better on one dimension and worse
along another, a leading example being new medicines that are more effective at curing
illness, but have harsher side effects. Second, in medical markets product quality is often
uncertain, especially when products are new. Experimentation is therefore common among
consumers and helps to drive both the speed and the direction of future innovation (Bolton
and Harris, 1999; Dranove et al., 2014). Though experimentation occurs in many markets,
a unique feature of the market for pharmaceuticals is that patients often resort to trying
possibly dangerous new medical compounds (for example through participation in clinical
trials) only when they are sick and lack access to better options. It is therefore the most
desperate among consumers who drive medical innovation, which benefits healthier patients
along with generations of potential future patients.1 An implication for medical markets is
that correctly pricing the externality may improve both efficiency and equity. The reasoning
is that incentivizing experimentation among all consumers (rather than relying solely upon
the sickest) not only speeds innovation as in other markets, but also distributes the burden
of innovating more evenly across patient groups.
In this paper, we introduce an empirical framework to capture how innovation along mul-
tiple dimensions of quality is endogenous to aggregate consumer demand. Our framework
centers on estimating a multi-dimensional distribution of innovations, which is then embed-
ded into a structural model of dynamic demand. In the model, forward-looking consumers
make choices after forming expectations over potential future innovations. Optimal consumer
choices are then aggregated into market shares, which help to drive both the speed and the
direction of innovation by determining how new products are drawn from the distribution of
1This point is linked to the model of endogenous growth in Romer (1986) where producer innovations
may generate profits for potential future producers.
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innovations. In this sense, the model takes explicit account of demand externalities, which
arise since the aggregate behavior of atomistic consumers affects dynamic payoffs through
its impact on innovation. We match our model to data on the realized path of innovations,
product quality and consumer choices over a long time horizon in a maturing product market:
HIV drugs.2
We highlight three features of our framework, which depart from earlier literature. First,
we allow consumers to experiment with products in several ways. Consumers form expec-
tations over the qualities of the products available to them and become fully aware of their
qualities only after they have used a product at least once. Alternatively, consumers may
experiment with new technologies that are not yet on the market. In software, this is known
as beta-testing; in medicine, this is done through participation in clinical trials. Experi-
mental products may be superior to products already on the market, but they may also be
of dangerously low quality. Second, consumers are neither fully aware of how the product
market will evolve, nor are they fully unaware, in which case technology change amounts
to unexpected regime change. Rather, we use the full history of product introductions to
estimate a stochastic process of product innovation and assume that agents use this process
to form expectations about future innovations. Third, atomistic consumers in our model
are fully aware that aggregate demand ultimately drives the path of innovation. In forming
expectations, each consumer takes account of this.
We apply our framework to the market for HIV drugs. HIV is a medical condition that
reduces the ability of the immune system to fight off routine infections (a condition known
as AIDS).3 It reached epidemic proportions in several countries, including the U.S., starting
in 1984. In developed countries, where access to medication is widespread and subsidized,
HIV has reached a point where the condition is manageable and side effects of medications
2HIV stands for human immunodeficiency virus.
3AIDS stands for acquired immunodeficiency syndrome.
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are fairly mild. However, this was not always the case. In the early years of the epidemic,
available treatments were not only largely ineffective, but also had uncomfortable, painful
and even deadly side effects. Each year brought innovations that were incremental at best.
Indeed, as we will show, some new products were worse since they were more toxic without
being more effective. In the mid-nineties, a new set of treatments (collectively known as
HAART) was introduced, which effectively transformed HIV from a virtual death sentence
to a chronic condition.4 Within two years, the introduction of HAART reduced mortality
rates by over 80% among HIV+ men (Bhaskaran et al., 2008). HAART therefore marked a
clear departure from existing products in the market for HIV treatments. However, HAART
involved drugs that were highly toxic, leading to side effects that were often intolerable and
drove some people to avoid using them. In other words, HAART comprised treatments that
were better on some dimensions, but worse on others. Thereafter, a series of new drugs were
introduced, which were effective and had fewer side effects.
We use data on HIV+ men’s treatment decisions and health outcomes over approximately
20 years. The benefit of observing a long panel in the market for HIV drugs is that we can
watch the path of innovation unfold. Since, we observe the same individuals over time, the
evolving market allows us to identify both the stochastic process of innovation and consumer
preferences. We exploit observed consumer decisions over time and the realized path of
innovation to better understand how expectations were formed. Ex post, we observe that the
realized path of technological innovation occurred in fits and spurts. The path includes fairly
incremental changes to drug qualities along with massive innovations that drastically altered
the lives of consumers with HIV. An example of the latter is the introduction of HAART,
which constitutes a key source of variation in product characteristics that we exploit to help
4HAART stands for highly active anti-retroviral treatment. There is no vaccine or cure for HIV or AIDS,
but HAART is the current standard treatment. In general, 1996 is marked as the year when two crucial
clinical guidelines that comprise HAART came to be commonly acknowledged. First, protease inhibitors
(made widely available towards the end of 1995) would be an effective HIV treatment. Second, several
anti-retroviral drugs taken simultaneously could indefinitely delay the onset of AIDS.
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identify our model. However, in our framework, large and drastic changes in the product
market, such as HAART, are due to less likely draws from the same underlying distribution
that generates more likely, smaller, incremental improvements.
We contribute to three separate literatures. The first studies how consumer behavior af-
fects innovation. Schmookler (1966) formalized the idea, calling it “demand pull”.5 Building
on this idea, several papers have demonstrated that market size affects the speed of inno-
vation. In a seminal contribution, Goettler and Gordon (2011) show that market structure
also drives innovation. They find that in the market for computer processors, the presence
of a second firm can slow innovation (since firms do not expect to capture all profits), but
that consumer surplus falls in the absence of a competing firm due to monopolistic prices. In
another contribution, Finkelstein (2004) shows that policies promoting vaccine use acceler-
ate the development of vaccines. Also in the medical context, Dranove et al. (2014) identify
a “social value” of pharmaceutical innovation, showing that Medicare Part D spurred the
development of some drugs. A common idea in this literature is that if consumer behavior
drives innovation, which benefits other consumers, it follows that a demand externality arises.
Waldfogel (2003) uses the term “preference externalities” to describe the mechanism through
which market shares can influence products, thus benefitting consumers with similar tastes.
He also highlights the individuals with different tastes benefit less.6 More closely related
to us, Bolton and Harris (1999) argue that a free-riding problem emerges if experimenting
accelerates innovation. In our context, if clinical trials provide social benefits by spurring
innovation, individually rational consumers may choose to participate less than is socially
optimal.
5Theoretical models of demand-driven innovation include Jovanovic and Rob (1987) and Miller (1988).
Models of diffusion of products include Bass (1969), Jovanovic and MacDonald (1994).
6Demand externalities have been discussed in a variety of scenarios, including sorting into neighborhoods
(Bayer and McMillan, 2012) and the emergence of food deserts (Allcott et al., 2015). In the context of
obesity, Bhattacharya and Packalen (2012) provide evidence that individual efforts to prevent obesity can
shrink the market size for obesity treatments, which slows technological progress. If so, individuals may
over-invest in preventative care compared to the social optimum.
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A second literature we contribute to studies dynamic demand under uncertainty. Fol-
lowing Petrin (2004), each product in our model is a bundle of characteristics.7 Moreover,
in our framework, characteristics can have dynamic impacts on consumers (Gowrisankaran
and Rysman, 2012). Literature on product choice has considered the idea that consumers
are unaware of product characteristics or match value. Erdem and Keane (1996) study the
value of experimentation with new products to learn about their qualities. Learning has been
incorporated into dynamic models of pharmaceutical demand.8 Examples are Crawford and
Shum (2005) and Chan and Hamilton (2006), where the latter paper explicitly incorporates
consumer distaste for side effects. We incorporate learning and uncertainty into our model
in several ways. First, and similar to existing work, we model consumers as learning about
existing market products that they have never used. Second, consumers can experiment with
new products that are not yet widely available by participating in a clinical trial. Third, we
depart from existing work on dynamic demand in how we model consumer expectations over
the path of innovation. Most papers take the existing set of products as given or exogenous
to the model and focus on demand responses to new products. In contrast, we explicitly
model how consumers form expectations about future innovations, and allow them take into
account that aggregate market shares can shift the direction of innovation.
Methodologically, we build on Hotz and Miller (1993) and Hotz et al. (1994) in using
forward simulation to incorporate how individuals form expectations about future innova-
tions.9 In our context, the choice set that individuals face is non-stationary. We handle
this problem by re-defining the current state of technology using a stationary distribution of
innovations and a non-stationary reference point or centroid for innovation that emerges en-
dogenously from consumer demand. This is similar to what Goettler and Gordon (2011) do
7Studies pioneering the ‘characteristics approach’ include Stigler (1945), Lancaster (1966) and Rosen
(1974).
8Empirical models of learning and experimentation also include Miller (1984) and Hincapié (2016).
9We also build on Altuğ and Miller (1998) in providing an empirical dynamic model with aggregate
shocks.
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in their framework when studying microprocessor speed. However, there are some important
differences to our setting and thus to our modeling choices. In their setting, product quality
is one-dimensional and the innovation distribution is effectively binary (either improving by
a fixed amount or not). They also assume consumer homogeneity, which means that the
choice set in their context is also effectively limited to upgrading to the best technology or
staying with the current one.
While the Goettler and Gordon (2011) model is well-equipped to analyze the market for
microprocessors, in our case, we need to account for demand externalities where product
quality is multi-dimensional. This means that new product qualities can move in many
different directions on a two-dimensional plane. Also, as we show, the empirical distribution
of innovations for HIV drugs is not well-approximated as movements with a fixed distance.
Finally, we must account for a larger choice set since multiple dimensions of product quality
coupled with consumer preference heterogeneity imply that many products can co-exist in
a single market. In light of these features of our setting, when computing lifetime utility
associated with each choice, we use forward simulation to capture how consumers make
decisions after forming expectations about potential future innovations.10
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the data
set we use. In Section 3.3, we specify the structural model and in Section 3.4 we discuss
estimation. In Section 3.5, we present parameter estimates and describe model implications
for the distribution of innovations. In Section 3.6, we study counterfactual technology paths
and the link between consumer choice and innovation. In Section 3.7, we examine the choice
externality and consumer welfare. Section 3.8 concludes.
10It is important to point out that, unlike Goettler and Gordon (2011), we do not explicitly model firm
interaction or dynamic decisions. Therefore, we are unable to conduct policy analysis related to market
structure using our framework. An interesting extension of the current paper would be to merge the two
approaches by integrating firm decision-making into a model where products have multiple qualities.
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3.2 Data
In this section we introduce the data set used in this paper and describe some of the key
empirical patterns we use to identify structural parameters. We use the public data set
from the Multi-Center AIDS cohort Study (MACS). The MACS is an ongoing longitudinal
investigation (beginning in 1984) of HIV infection in men who have sex with men (MSM)
conducted at four sites: Baltimore, Chicago, Pittsburgh and Los Angeles.11 At each semi-
annual visit, survey data are collected on HIV+ men’s treatment decisions, out-of-pocket
treatment expenditures, physical ailments, which can reflect drug side effects, along with
sociodemographic information, such as labor supply, income, race, and education.
In addition, blood tests are administered at each visit to objectively measure health
status. Our main objective measure of immune system health is CD4 count, defined as the
number of white blood cells per cubic millimeter of blood. Absent HIV infection, a normal
range is between 500 and 1500. For HIV+ individuals, a count below 500 indicates that the
immune system has begun to deteriorate due to HIV, but can still fight off infections such
that the individual is not symptomatic. When CD4 count drops below about 300, a patient
is said to suffer from AIDS.12 AIDS means that the immune system becomes unable to fight
off routine infections and survival probability drops.
11Data in this manuscript were collected by the Multi-Center AIDS Cohort Study (MACS) with centers
(Principal Investigators) at The Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health (Joseph B. Margolick,
Lisa P. Jacobson), Howard Brown Health Center, Feinberg School of Medicine, Northwestern University,
and Cook County Bureau of Health Services (John P. Phair, Steven M. Wolinsky), University of California,
Los Angeles (Roger Detels), and University of Pittsburgh (Charles R. Rinaldo). The MACS is funded
by the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, with additional supplemental funding from
the National Cancer Institute. UO1-AI-35042, 5-MO1-RR-00052 (GCRC), UO1-AI-35043, UO1-AI-35039,
UO1-AI-35040, UO1-AI-35041. Website located at http://www.statepi.jhsph.edu/macs/macs.html.
12AIDS stands for acquired immunodeficiency syndrome. The CD4 cutoff below which AIDS occurs varies
between 200 and 350.
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3.2.1 Summary Statistics
The full MACS data set contains information on 6,972 subjects at 49 possible semi-annual
visits for a total of 111,271 observations in the form of subject-visit dyads. We limit our
attention to HIV+ individuals, leaving us with 47,753 observations. Due to lack of data on
gross income and out-of-pocket treatment costs at earlier visits, we drop observations prior
to visit 14 (roughly, late 1990) and for robustness in the reporting of survival we also drop
observations after visit 47 (about 2008). These sample period restrictions leave us with 29,523
observations and 2,420 individuals. Next, we drop observations where data are missing on at
least one of the variables used in subsequent analysis (though we conduct various robustness
checks to insure that our results are not driven by these exclusions). After these exclusions,
the remaining analytic sample consists of 1,719 unique individuals and 16,851 observations.
Summary statistics by individual are reported in Table 3.1. The first column presents
statistics for the analytic sample.13 68% of sample subjects are white, 22% are black and
about 9% are hispanic. Race variation in our sample is important since previous research has
emphasized difficulties in recruiting blacks into clinical trials, which may reflect different costs
associated with treatments or variation in expected health outcomes (Harris et al., 1996).
About 86% of the sample received some secondary education or more and nearly a quarter
(23%) attended graduate school. Consistent with previous research studying medication
choice using the MACS data set, there is evidence of substantial variation in labor supply
(Papageorge, 2016). 74% of the sample is observed working at least once and 68% of the
sample is observed not working at least once.
Underscoring the seriousness of HIV infection, about 40% of the HIV+ subjects we
observe at least once over the sample period die prior to the end of the sample period.
However, product market innovation led to drastic changes for HIV+ men. The most striking
13For comparison, the third column reports statistics for a larger sample of 2,420 individuals, where we
have not dropped observations due to missing data on any particular variable.
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics: Subjects. Visit 14-47 (1990-2007)
Restricted Sample
Subjects 1719
mean std dev
Black 0.22
Hispanic 0.09
White 0.68
High School 0.14
Some College 0.29
College 0.34
More than College 0.23
Died 0.40
Died Conditional 0.20
Ever Take Market Product 0.83
Ever Take Trial Product 0.24
Ever Work 0.74
Ever Not Work 0.68
Age in 1991 36.04 8.72
Notes: Standard deviation in square brackets. Data for unique individuals. Ever Market Product stands for ever consumed a
market product during the period from visit 14 to visit 47. Similar definition holds for Ever Trial Product. Died Conditional
is the proportion of individuals who died conditional on surviving until year 1995.
example is the introduction of HAART in the mid-1990s, which was much more effective at
improving underlying health compared to the treatments that preceded it. Conditional
on surviving until the invention of HAART, 20% of subjects are observed dying. This
understates the impact of HAART since the sample under study is an aging cohort, i.e.,
observed survival rates are much higher even when the cohort is older after HAART becomes
available. Further, according to Table 3.1, about 83% of subjects are observed using a market
product at least once. Moreover, nearly a quarter (24%) opt for early access by participating
in a clinical trial at least once during the sample period, suggesting that patients are willing
to try experimental products where quality is uncertain.
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3.2.2 Consumer Demand
In this section, we study consumer demand in the maturing market for HIV drugs. We
emphasize two key patterns in the data. First, consumers are willing to use drugs with
side effects when drugs are also effective. Otherwise, they often avoid drugs altogether.
Second, consumers participate in clinical trials when they are very sick and when existing
technologies are of low quality. Once good technology comes available, willingness to ex-
periment plunges. Together, these patterns in the data support two ideas that underlie our
theoretical model developed in Section 3.3. First, product quality in the medical context is
multi-dimensional. Second, experimentation is a rational choice to gain access to unavailable
and possibly superior technology.
In conducting our preliminary analysis of consumer demand, we pay close attention to
comparisons of behavior before and after the introduction of HAART. Since HAART marked
a large innovation on earlier treatments, it induced strong and observable consumer responses
that help to identify consumer preferences over medications. Summary statistics for subject-
visit dyads are found in Table 3.2 for the full analytic sample (column [1]) and then separately
for the pre and the post-HAART eras (columns [2] and [3], respectively). We split the sample
by HAART era to illustrate substantial changes to choices and outcomes after HAART was
introduced.
Perhaps the most striking example of the impact of HAART on consumers is through
its effect on survival. In Figure 3.1, we plot the probability of dying between periods t
and t + 1 conditional on survival until t. Death rates are much higher prior to HAART
introduction and despite a multitude of new treatments coming available. After HAART,
death rates plunge, and continue to fall until 2007, as smaller innovations occur that make
drugs incrementally more effective and less toxic. HAART introduction also affected immune
system health, as measured by CD4 count. According to Table 3.2, average CD4 count among
78
Table 3.2: Summary Statistics: Subjects-Visits. Visits 14-47 (1990-2007)
Analytic Sample Pre Haart Post Haart
Obs 16851 6972 9879
Ailments 0.43 0.45 0.41
Market Product 0.65 0.49 0.76
Trial Product 0.07 0.09 0.05
Work 0.63 0.70 0.58
Age 44.48 40.89 47.01
[8.03] [6.99] [7.75]
CD4 475 407 524
[297] [298] [287]
Gross Income 17567 19036 16531
[8787] [8733] [8677]
Out-of-pocket Pay 266 179 327
[706] [598] [767]
Notes: Standard deviation in square brackets. Income and Out-of-pocket are semestral and measured in real dollars of 2000.
Pre HAART era corresponds to visit <= 24 or (roughly) year <= 1995.
HIV+ men in our sample is 407 in the pre-HAART era, rising to 524 in the post-HAART
era. In Figure 3.2(a), we plot average CD4 count over time for people on market drugs and
no treatment for HIV. Over time, health for people taking no drugs remains fairly constant
while health for individuals in a market drug rises.14
Given the impact of HAART on health, it is important to understand why many con-
sumers did not use it. In Figure 3.3(a), we plot the proportion of HIV+ consumers using
an HIV treatment. Notice that treatment consumption is about 50% in 1990 and actually
falls prior to HAART introduction. This reflects that products available on the market are
of fairly low quality. Still, if quality were uni-dimensional, even a low quality drug would
be better than no drug at all. Moreover, even after HAART is invented, though there is a
considerable rise in market product usage, there is a substantial proportion of HIV+ men
not using treatment.
Treatment costs are one possible explanation. In Table 3.2, we see that treatment costs
14Notice that average age rises and labor supply and income decline after HAART, consistent with the
fact that we observe an aging cohort, which is more likely to retire and report lower gross income over time.
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Figure 3.1: Death rate in the sample.
Notes: More than 1500 surveyed individuals died for AIDS-related causes during our analysis period.
rise after HAART introduction, from about $179 to $327 for six months of treatment. In
other words, even in the post-HAART era, costs are fairly low given that individuals earning
on average are about $37,000 per year. It is worth mentioning, moreover, that non-users of
market drugs pay non-zero costs for drugs, perhaps spending more money on medication to
fight opportunistic infections. In other words, the incremental out-of-pocket cost of effective
HIV treatments does not appear sufficient to explain why some people avoid HIV treatments.
Another possibility is that drug quality is multi-dimensional in which case demand reflects
a distaste for another feature of HIV drugs. Given data on physical ailments, we explore
the possibility that consumer demand reveals a distaste for side effects. Interestingly, after
HAART introduction, the proportion of individuals reporting physical ailments declines only
slightly (45% to 41%). The small change reflects the net effect of two countervailing dynamics
(Papageorge, 2016). HAART improved health on average, which lowered reported ailments
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Figure 3.2: Health and side effects summary trends over time.
Notes: Panel 3.2(a) shows the mean CD4 over time by consumption status. Panel 3.2(b) contains mean ailments over time by
consumption status.
attributable to symptoms of HIV. However, HAART also led to side effects among users,
thereby increasing reports of ailments. The increase in side effects also reflects how use of HIV
treatment rose with the introduction of HAART, from 45% to 76%. We also plot physical
ailments over time in Figure 3.2(b). For non-users of HIV medications, ailments remain fairly
steady. For users of HIV medications, ailments drop prior to HAART introduction and then
rise after HAART, which is consistent with HAART being a highly effective drug with side
effects. However, after 2001, ailments decline for individuals using HIV drugs. This reflects
later improvements to medications, which lowered their side effects.
Further evidence in support of the idea two dimensions of quality is market consumption
by CD4 count, plotted in Figure 3.3(a). Sicker people are far more willing to take low
effective medications despite side effects in the years before HAART. After HAART, notice
a striking convergence in the proportion of men using medications, driven largely by healthy
individuals going onto medication. Thus, the rise in consumption of HIV treatments after
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Figure 3.3: Consumer demand over time.
Notes: Panel 3.3(a) shows treatment consumption over time by health status. Panel 3.3(b) shows trial participation over time
by health status.
HAART was introduced suggests that patients are more likely to use drugs despite side
effects if the utility cost of suffering ailments is offset by expected improvements to health.
HAART was more effective than earlier drugs, which encouraged people to use it despite
its side effects. This would explain the rapid rise in use of HIV treatments after HAART is
introduced since individuals would be more willing to use drugs with side effects as long as
drugs are effective at improving underlying health.
Another option for individuals in the product market we study is to join a clinical trial
to gain early access to new products. Studying how individuals experiment with new drugs
by joining a clinical trial further highlights how consumers respond to innovations in the
market for HIV drugs. Trial participation over time and by health status is plotted in Figure
3.3(b). The figure reveals several dynamics. First, early trial participation is driven largely
by individuals with low CD4 counts. This suggests that, as individuals become ill, they also
become more willing to experiment with new products of uncertain qualities. Second, in
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the years just prior to HAART introduction, the drugs that comprise HAART, including
protease inhibitors, marked a substantial improvement over drugs available on the market.
In those years, trial participation gave individuals early access to much better products. This
relates to the idea of beta testing in markets where some consumers are willing to experiment
with new products with high potential quality.
After HAART, notice that trial participation plunges after HAART is introduced as
a market option. After HAART, there is a marked convergence by health status in the
proportion of patients in trials. This means that once effective drugs are available, it is no
longer possible to explain trial participation as an option for people who are very sick and
therefore willing to face uncertainty in exchange for early access to a high-quality product.
The reason is that individuals no longer need to participate in a clinical trial (and face
therefore more uncertainty) to access good drugs. Together, these dynamics suggest that
experimentation is a rational choice to gain access to new technology, especially in a maturing
market where existing technology is not particularly good and patients are desperate for
something better.
3.2.3 Market-Level Innovation
In the previous section, we studied how consumer responses to innovation shed light on
consumer preferences. The patterns we have described until now are consistent with the
idea that patients value their health, but are also concerned with side effects. Moreover, side
effects seem to play a larger role in demand after survival is more or less assured. However,
our preliminary evidence also suggests that preferences are not lexicographic. Patients seem
willing to use toxic (or experimental) medication if the alternative is a large rise in the
probability of dying, but patients will also forgo treatments with harsh side effects if drugs
are not effective and the survival gains are limited.
In this section, we consider market-level innovation. To start, we illustrate innovation
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Figure 3.4: Diffusion of Products Over Time
Notes: HIV treatments from 1984 to 2008. Each id—or row—represents a product. Color indicates the share of the market
that the product captures. Shares are conditional on consuming a product. Early on there are few products with high shares,
as time passes new products strip market share from incumbents and less popular products exit.
and diffusion of new products over time in the market for HIV treatment using a “heat map”
displayed in Figure 3.4. For the approximately 90 drugs that were most used, we compute
market share over our sample period.15 Dark blue corresponds to no market share and
warmer colors mean higher market shares. In the early years of the epidemic, there are only
a few drugs with high market share. Over time, many new drugs emerge, most with lower
market share. The heat map captures two important patterns in the data. First, many new
15Appendix B.1 contains additional information on individual drugs and treatment combinations. Table
B.1 discusses which drugs or combinations are taken in clinical trials. Table B.2 lists the chemical com-
positions of each drug. Table B.3 shows how drugs are combined into treatments. Table B.4 discusses
“core treatments”, which are the main sets of treatments we observe, including the individual drugs they are
composed of, whether or not they count as HAART and their entry and exit visits.
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drugs were invented over time. In other words, the market for HIV drugs was active over
our sample period. Second, most old drugs eventually exit and are replaced by new drugs,
which means that new drugs marked improvements upon older ones. A striking shift occurs
in the mid-1990’s, after which point most earlier drugs exit, replaced by new drugs. This
corresponds to HAART introduction, when protease inhibitors (PI’s) were introduced and
became a standard part of HIV treatment. After HAART, moreover, many drugs became
obsolete.16
Finally, we provide suggestive evidence that the observed innovation path can be seen as
a response to consumer preferences. In other words, we search for evidence of the idea that
demand drives the direction of innovation. In Figure 3.5, we plot drug qualities (effectiveness
and side effects) for different periods of time. The figure illustrates the path of technology
over time. Notice how there is a large innovation in the direction of improved health in the
mid-1990’s. This improvement is the introduction of HAART. Moreover, notice that there
is a rightward shift in later years as innovations reduce side effects without offering much of
an improvement in efficacy. This rightward shift is important as it corresponds to changes
on the relative importance of one dimension of taste over another.
We argued previously that consumer demand patterns, as the market for HIV drugs
matured, seem to show a preference for drugs with fewer side effects, especially when survival
is less of a concern. The path of innovation seems to have followed shifts in market demand
after HAART was introduced. Therefore, preliminary empirical patterns provide support
for the idea that innovation responded to consumer demand.
16An exception is AZT, which remained a standard component of HAART.
85
-5
0
0
50
10
0
He
alt
h
-1.5 -1 -.5 0 .5 1 1.5
No Ailments
Old Products New Products
Withdrawn Centroid(t-1)
Visit 6 (1987)
-5
0
0
50
10
0
He
alt
h
-1.5 -1 -.5 0 .5 1 1.5
No Ailments
Old Products New Products
Withdrawn Centroid(t-1)
Visit 14 (1991)
-5
0
0
50
10
0
He
alt
h
-1.5 -1 -.5 0 .5 1 1.5
No Ailments
Old Products New Products
Withdrawn Centroid(t-1)
Visit 22 (1995)
-5
0
0
50
10
0
He
alt
h
-1.5 -1 -.5 0 .5 1 1.5
No Ailments
Old Products New Products
Withdrawn Centroid(t-1)
Visit 30 (1999)
-5
0
0
50
10
0
He
alt
h
-1.5 -1 -.5 0 .5 1 1.5
No Ailments
Old Products New Products
Withdrawn Centroid(t-1)
Visit 38 (2003)
-5
0
0
50
10
0
He
alt
h
-1.5 -1 -.5 0 .5 1 1.5
No Ailments
Old Products New Products
Withdrawn Centroid(t-1)
Visit 46 (2007)
Figure 3.5: Treatment Evolution
Notes: Figure shows snapshots of the evolution of the state of the product market at the different stages. Products are
two-dimensional. On the x-axis is a measure of a treatments ability to not cause side effects. On the y-axis is a measure of its
contribution to underlying health. Dimensions are measured in different scales. Incumbent products are shown in black. New
products are shown in red. Withdrawn products are shown as x. The green square is a measure of the prevalent technology in
the previous period.
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3.3 Model
This section describes a model of innovation in the market for HIV treatments. Products
are multidimensional: they can improve health and increase lifespan, but have potential side
effects, which affect survival and labor market outcomes. New products are developed in
clinical trials and both the entry of new products and the exit of incumbent products are
determined by an endogenous stochastic processes. Consistent with the nature of our data,
we are more detailed in our treatment of the demand side. Individuals maximize lifetime
utility by choosing an HIV medical treatment. Consumers can choose a product that is
available on the market, opt for no treatment at all or experiment with a new treatment by
participating in a clinical trial. All treatments on the market cost the same to the consumer.
In making decisions, consumers face several sources of uncertainty caused by individual
or aggregate choices. First, they are uncertain about current-period outcomes, including
their income and side effects. Second, consumers are uncertain about the evolution of other
individual-specific state variables, notably health and survival. Finally, they face uncertainty
over the evolution of the product market since new treatments may enter the market and
some incumbent treatments may drop out.
In describing the model, we begin with a summary of the timing within a period (Section
3.3.1). Second, we discuss the supply of treatment, including entry and exit of new products
from the market (Section 3.3.2). Third, we specify consumer demand for treatment, including
choice sets, utility and individual state-to-state transitions (Section 3.3.3).
3.3.1 Summary and Timing within a Period
The timing of the model within a period proceeds as follows, where we begin with the
aggregate state. In period t, the aggregate state is denoted Ξt and consists of current and
previous individual product characteristics Pt, previous market shares St and the distribution
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of current-period consumer characteristics Ft. Together, these factors determine the average
state of technology ωt along with entry (the quantity and qualities of new products) and exit
of products that are withdrawn from the market prior to the start of the following period.
Current period market shares along with the qualities of new products and the distribution
of consumer characteristics constitute the one-period-ahead aggregate state.
Upon entering period t, the consumer observes his state vector Zit, along with his choice
set Ct. His state vector consists of individual-level components zIit (e.g., health) along with
aggregate market components zMit that the consumer uses to forecast the future. When
choosing among products, he takes account of how each choice affects current outcomes
(e.g., side effects, income) and future states (e.g., health, labor participation). He also
forecasts the characteristics of future products, which may affect the relative payoffs to
his current choice. The consumer’s choice of treatment maximizes his expected discounted
lifetime utility.17 Once a consumer makes a choice, outcome variables are realized and he
receives his flow utility yjit. Thereafter, their state variables update and the consumer enters
the next period.
3.3.2 Supply
We specify a reduced-form model of supply that we use to capture the evolution of product
characteristics. We do not model firm behavior, strategic pricing and R&D decisions.18
Entry and exit occur at the end of the period immediately before the next period begins.
We start by describing the aggregate state at the beginning of period t, followed by entry
and exit.
17Given the large number of individual products in the market, consumers are assumed to have limited
information about individual product characteristics. As will be explained below, products are clustered into
categories (using a k-means algorithm) and the consumer knows the weighted average of qualities in each
cluster Wt, where the weights are the probability of being assigned a specific treatment.
18Modeling the supply side in this way obviously limits the sorts of counterfactuals we can perform. For
example, our model would be ill-equipped to evaluate policies affecting, for example, market structure.
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Figure 3.6: Timing
The Aggregate State
The aggregate state is denoted Ξt and summarizes market-level quantities at period t. The
state contains current and previous product qualities and market shares along with the
distribution of consumer characteristics in the market, each described below.
Product Characteristics (Pt): The aggregate state contains a set Pt of characteristics of
current and previous products up to two periods into the past:
Pt = {Pt,Pt−1,Pt−2}
where Pt denotes the characteristics of products available at t.
Market Shares (St): The aggregate state also contains a set of previous shares going back in
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time two periods:
St = {st−1, st−2}
where st−1 denotes a set containing the shares of products available at t− 1.
Consumer Characteristics (Ft): Finally, the current distribution of consumer characteristics
Ft is also contained in the aggregate state. The initial distribution of consumer characteristics
in the test market is denoted F0.19 Thus, the aggregate state is given by:
Ξt = {Pt,St,Ft}
Entry
In each period, entry of new products occurs according to a reference point for innovation
or centroid, denoted ωt−1, a distribution of characteristics of new products Fθ|ωt−1 and a
distribution of number of new products FN .
Centroid (ωt): At any period t, the centroid for innovation is a weighted average among
users of products available last period, given by:
ωt = f
S
1 (St,Pt)
=
∑
k∈Pt−1
skt−1θk (3.1)
where θk are the characteristics of product k and skt−1 is the ratio of individuals who con-
sume treatment k relative to the number of individuals who consume a treatment. If nobody
uses a treatment the base for innovation remains the same, i.e. ωt = ωt−1.
19The taste market is the market based on which innovation is undertaken.
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Characteristics of New Products (Fθ|ωt): Every new product r introduced at t, characterized
by θrt, is an innovation around the centroid of the previous period:
θrt = ωt−1 + νrt (3.2)
where νrt represents a vector of disturbances (innovations) around the current technology,
drawn from Fν , a stationary distribution of innovations. Fν embodies the outcomes of R&D
efforts made by firms and the government. We do not specify a parametric form for Fν .
As will be explained in Section ??, Fν is a non-parametric distribution estimated off of the
history of observed innovations around the centroid. Clearly, Fν and ωt−1 determine Fθ|ωt−1 .
Number of New Products (FN): The number of new products at any period is equivalent to
the number of draws to be taken from Fθ|ωt−1 . In the data, we observe that the number of
new products introduced in the market varies across time. Moreover, the number of products
seems to be related to the size of previous discoveries as well as to the share of individuals
joining a trial. We capture these facts in our specification of FN . At the end of any period, a
number Newt+1 of new products enters the market. This number follows a negative binomial
process that permits dispersion in the mean:
Newt+1|µ∗ ∼ Poisson (µ∗t )
µ∗t+1 ∼ Gamma
(
1/αN , αNµt
)
µt+1 = exp(β
N
0 + β
N
1 Qt + β
N
2 TrialsSharet)
lnαN = αN0 + α
N
1 Qt (3.3)
The binomial model is conditioned on two covariates. First, the quality of previous innova-
tions, denoted Qt, captures the relatively higher number of new products that follow the ap-
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pearance of better innovations. Second, the share of individuals who consume a trial product,
endogenously given by the characteristics of the test market as TrialsSharet = fS2 (Pt,Ft),
captures the fact that more experiments can be conducted if more consumers participate in
clinical trials.
The quality of previous innovations measures the distance between the previous period’s
new products and the previous period’s centroid. The relative change is computed for each
of the two dimensions of product characteristics (health, h, and lack of ailments, x) and is
scaled by the maximum change observed over the sample period.20 It is computed as follows:
Qt = f
S
3 (St,Pt)
=
∑
r∈{h,x}
maxθr new at t
{
θr − ωrt−1
}
maxθrnew at τ,∀τ
{
θr − ωrτ−1
} (3.5)
The specifications of ωt, Fθ|ωt−1 , and FN render the path of innovation endogenous. In-
dividual choices, summarized by market shares, affect the centroid in equation (3.1). By
affecting ωt, market shares affect the characteristics of every new product θ in equation
(3.2). Intuitively, treatments that keep patients alive and those associated with fewer ail-
ments will capture larger shares of the market and firms will innovate on drugs with larger
market shares. Additionally, individuals’ choices affect the path of innovation through their
effect on the distribution of number of new products.
Exit
Incumbent drugs may exit the market. Exit happens at two different levels: exit for switchers
and overall exit. Exit for switchers happens when the product is no longer available for
20Note that in order to compute Qt−1 we need the scaling quantities given by
max
θr new at τ,∀τ
{
θr − ωrτ−1
}
(3.4)
for r ∈ {h, x} which are estimated consistently by their data counterparts.
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individuals who have yet to use it, but is still available for those who were consuming the
product in the prior period. Overall exit happens when the product is no longer available to
any consumer. Exit happens according to the following rules that aim to reconcile empirical
observations and theory—where expected shares must be positive due to model assumptions
on the taste shocks of consumers.21
1. If the ratio of people switching to product k relative to the number of people switching
falls bellow σ˜1 during three consecutive periods, the product is withdrawn from the
market. σ˜1 is chosen as the minimum conditional share observed in the data and the
number 3 is chosen to smooth the market spells of products.
2. If the ratio of people consuming product k, either by staying or switching, relative to the
number of people consuming a market product falls below σ˜2 during two consecutive
periods, the product is withdrawn from the market. σ˜2 is chosen as the minimum
conditional share observed in the data and the number 2 is chosen to smooth the
market spells of products.
The exit criteria can be written in terms of the aggregate state of the problem as
ProductsWithdrawnt+1 = f
S
4 (St,Pt,Ft)
The Evolution of the Aggregate State
Given the current aggregate state Ξt and the exogenous distribution of innovations, aggregate
choices induce a new distribution of consumer characteristics Ft+1. Through the entry and
exit mechanisms, a new set of available products comes available and is denoted Pt+1, which
can be used to form Pt+1. Finally, consumer choices can be summarized into market shares
St, which can be used to form St+1. Thus, we have all the components of one-period-ahead
21These shocks will be discussed in the demand portion of the model.
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aggregate state Ξt+1. We now turn to consumer demand.
3.3.3 Demand
The individual chooses medical treatment to maximize expected discounted lifetime utility.
In making decisions, he observes his current state which includes individual-specific vari-
ables, such as health, along with market-level variables, such as the current state of medical
technology. Individuals use market-level variables to form expectations over the future path
of innovation. In specifying the individual’s problem, we discuss state variables, the choice
set, flow utility and stochastic processes governing outcomes and state-to-state transition
probabilities. Next, we specify the value function.
State Variables
The state for individual i at period t is denoted Zit, where
Zit ≡ 〈zit, εit〉 (3.6)
zit is a set of state variables that is further sub-divided into a set of individual-specific
variables, denoted zIit, and a set of aggregate variables denoted zMt :
zit ≡
〈
zIit, z
M
t
〉
(3.7)
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The individual-specific state variables, zIit, are
bi : a set of race indicators
edui : a set of education indicators
hit−1 ∈ R+ : health at the start of period t
ait−1 ∈ {25, 25.5, . . .} : age at the start of period t
lit ∈ {0, 1} : working during period t
qit−1 =
{
qxit−1, q
h
it−1
} ∈ R2 : characteristics of product consumed last period
ηi : person-specific income characteristic
The individual can be either white, black or Hispanic. He belongs to one of four mutually
exclusive educational categories: high school, some college, college, and more than college.
His health, measured by CD4 count, is a continuous positive number.22 His age is measured
in half-year increments, corresponding to the frequency of MACS data collection. lit indicates
whether he will work during period t.
Each HIV treatment has two characteristics: its effectiveness at raising CD4 count, which
we denote θh, and its propensity to cause side effects, denoted θx. We collect these into a
vector denoted θ ∈ R2. If the individual consumed a market product in the prior period, the
characteristics of that product, denoted qit−1, are part of his current state space. Finally, all
elements of zIit are observed to the econometrician except ηi, which is an exogenous person-
specific characteristic that affects the income process and is described below. Individuals also
observe a vector of choice-specific additive utility disturbances εit, which are unobserved to
the econometrician and assumed independent across time, individuals and choices. Besides
individual-specific variables, zit contains aggregate level components, collected in zMt , which
individuals use to forecast the evolution of the market. zMt will be described below when we
22CD4 ranges from 0 to 2915 in our analytic sample with a median of 448. Healthy CD4 counts are those
above 500 units per mm3 and typically range between 500 and 1,500.
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describe the consumer’s information.
Choices
At each period t the individual chooses whether or not to use medication. If he opts for
medication, he may choose the same product he consumed in the last period or he may choose
from the set of other treatments that are currently available on the market. Alternatively,
he may choose a trial treatment. The individual faces uncertainty about the quality of both
market and trial treatments.
We begin with uncertainty over market treatments. The individual learns about the
quality of a product immediately after using it. Hence, if he chooses the same market treat-
ment he consumed in the prior period, he faces no uncertainty regarding its characteristics.23
Alternatively, if he decides to try a different market drug, his alternative is to choose one
among several groups or clusters of drugs with similar qualities. The agent is then randomly
assigned a drug within the cluster he selected.
Formally, at every period t there is a set of market products Pt clustered in several
groups collected in Gt. Gt denotes both the collection of clusters available at t and the
cardinality of the collection. When individual i decides to consume a market treatment that
is different from the one he consumed in the prior period, he must choose from a cluster
gt ∈ Gt. By selecting group gt he chooses a gamble among all products in group gt. The
distribution of products within the group is given by weights that are a function of the
treatment characteristics and the number of products in the group. The estimation of these
weights is explained below. The moments of the within cluster distribution are generated
by the products in the cluster and their weights. However, for tractability we assume that
agents do not observe the cluster components and instead they only observe the first two
23As discussed above, his state space includes the characteristics of the drug consumed in the prior period
qit−1.
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moments of the within cluster distributions and that these are sufficient to describe the
distribution. These moments form the set of characteristics of groups of products available
at time t, Wt = fD1 (Pt).
Our clustering process is a device to make the model tractable and estimation feasible
by reducing the state space significantly while still allowing individuals to choose among
different options in the market.24 In order to avoid issues emerging from differences in
scales, when using our clustering algorithm, we assume that clustering occurs with respect
to scaled product characteristics denoted θ˜ ∈ [−1, 1] × [−1, 1].25 Then we obtain product
groups at t by solving a k-means algorithm that approximates the solution of the following
objective function26
min
1{k∈g}k∈Pt |Gt
Gt∑
g=1
∑
k∈Pt
1 {k ∈ g}
∥∥∥θ˜k − θ˜ck∥∥∥2
s.t.
∑
g∈Gt
1 {k ∈ g} = 1 for all k ∈ Pt (3.8)
where the centroid of cluster k, θ˜ck, is defined as
θ˜ck =
∑
k∈Pt 1 {k ∈ g} θ˜k∑
k∈Pt 1 {k ∈ g}
(3.9)
The algorithm is explained in detail in Appendix B.2. At any given period we set the
maximum value of Gt at Gmax so that the individual knows how many groups will be available
every period. Gmax is chosen so that there is a non negligible number of consumers choosing
each group in the data. We set Gmax = 3.
We do not model the variation of within cluster assignment endogenously. Instead,
24This approach is close to reality if individuals only observe product labels and do not know their char-
acteristics beyond the fact that groups of product labels are associated to a certain mean and variance of
characteristics.
25The transformation is explained in Appendix B.2
26See Duda and Hart (1973) and Andrew W. Moore’s K-means and Hierarchical Clustering tutorial at
http://www.cs.cmu.edu/∼awm/tutorials.html.
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we develop the concept of within cluster weights as functions of products’s characteristics.
Weights are estimated in the following fashion:
1. We compute a nonlinear regression of within cluster shares on treatment characteristics:
sk|gt = exp
(
Xwk,tβ
w
)
+ wk|gt (3.10)
where Xwk,t includes a constant term, the ranking (within its cluster) of the character-
istics of the product, the number of members in the cluster, whether the product is
new, and several interactions.
2. We obtain predicted within cluster shares sˆk|gt and compute the weight of product k
in cluster gt as
s˜k|gt =
sˆk|gt∑
r∈gt sˆr|gt
(3.11)
If the individual chooses neither to try a cluster nor to stay in his previous treatment, he
may instead join a clinical trial to get an experimental treatment. Trial product character-
istics are unknown. However, he knows that innovation occurs in trials around the centroid
ωt.27 Therefore, he knows that the product characteristic of trial treatments are distributed
according to Fθ|ωt , which was introduced as the distribution of new product characteristics
in the supply section above. A key difference between consuming group gt and the trial
treatment is that once the individual chooses a group and a treatment is assigned to him,
he has the chance of choosing that treatment with certainty the next period.
Having described each option, we now formally specify the choice set. Let djit be the
choice indicator that takes the value of one if agent i in period t chooses medical treatment
27One way to think about this point is that consumers entering a trial see ωt as the quality of a placebo
drug administered in a trial. This would make sense in the context of HIV since new drugs were not tested
against no drug at all, but were instead tested against “current best practices” (see for example Ickovics and
Meisler (1997)).
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j in the choice set Cit. The choice set is time-specific because the characteristics of available
products evolve as new products enter the market and incumbent products exit. The choice
set is also individual specific since individuals who chose a market treatment in the prior
period may choose that treatment again. If the individual did not choose a market treatment
in the prior period his choice set is:
Cit =

0 No Treatment
1 Cluster gt = 1
2 Cluster gt = 2
...
...
Gmax Cluster gt = Gmax
Gmax + 1 Trial
(3.12)
If the individual chose a market treatment in the prior period his choice set Cit is augmented
by one alternative to include the possibility of consuming his previous period treatment with
certainty about its characteristics.
Utility
Next, we specify the flow utility function to capture how the individual’s product choices
are driven by the effects of each treatment choice on health, ailments, income, out-of-pocket
payments, and non pecuniary benefits. For choice j ∈ Cit and state zit, the utility at period
t for individual i is a function of his health, ailments, and net income given by
yjit + εjit = αjit (zit) + αm(mjit − ojit) + αxxjit + αxpxjit(1− d0it) + εjit (3.13)
where mjit is gross income, ojit are out-of-pocket payments, xjit is an indicator for whether
the individual does not suffer ailments, d0it is the indicator of whether he chooses not to
consume a treatment, and εjit are unobserved choice-specific taste shocks. The interaction
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of the no-ailments indicator and the treatment choice indicator is used to capture a distaste
for side effects, which are ailments arising from treatment consumption.
In equation (3.13), αjit (zit) are choice-specific preference parameters that depend on
observables. They are defined as
αjit (zit) ≡ α′jbbi + αjaait−1 + αjhhit−1 (3.14)
We assume that consumer preferences over clusters are fully captured by cluster character-
istics. Therefore, we assume parameters α′jb, αja, and αjh to be constant across clusters.
This is the characteristics approach commonly used in structural models of demand which
explains consumer choices as a function of product qualities. In contrast, participating in
a clinical trial may offer differential benefits related to the psychological costs (or benefits)
from being part of an experiment. We also allow the choice of remaining in the same product
to have differential non pecuniary benefits in order to capture factors, such as switching costs
and a preference for certainty, which explain why consumers may continue using a product
they have used before even as better products enter the market. Finally, for identification
purposes we normalize the non pecuniary benefits from not consuming a treatment to zero
(Magnac and Thesmar, 2002; Arcidiacono and Miller, 2015).
Outcomes and Transitions
In this section, we specify the stochastic processes governing state variables in zit as well as
the outcome variables: income, out-of-pocket payments, ailments, and survival.
Income: Gross income is a function of today’s state, zit, and ailments, xjit. It is given by
mjit = X
m
jitΓ
m + ηi + 
m
it (3.15)
where Xmjit = [1, hit−1, . . . , h7it−1, ait−1, a2it−1, bi, edui, lit, xjit]. Gross income does not include
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product cost, which is accounted for in the payments equation below. Equation (3.15) is
estimated using random effects and individual-specific income characteristics are estimated
consistently as
ηˆi =
∑
t
∑
j
djit
(
mjit −XmjitΓˆm
)
Individuals observe the income iid shocks mit before making their choice.
Payments: Out-of-pocket payments are censored at zero. They are given by the following
tobit specification
ojit = o
(
Xojit, 
o
it; Γ
o
)
(3.16)
where Xojit = [1, hit−1, . . . , h6it−1, ait−1, a2it−1, bi, edui, {djit}5j=0, lit, xjit] and oit is the error term
in the underlying equation. Since we do not directly observe prices, and in order to simplify
the problem, we assume a constant cost of participating in a trial as well as a constant cost
of consuming a market product.28
Labor Supply: We do not model labor supply explicitly as a choice as it is not the main
purpose of this paper. However, labor supply may be affected by treatment choices, e.g.,
through health status and physical aliments. Moreover, labor supply also affects income and
therefore utility. To capture this, we treat labor supply as a state variable that individuals
know at the beginning of the period before making their treatment decision. Individuals
draw their labor market participation from the distribution characterized by
Pr[lit = 1|X lit] =
1
1 + exp(X litΓ
l)
(3.17)
where X lit = [1, lit−1, hit−1, . . . , h4it−1, ait−1, a2it−1, bi, edui].
Physical Ailments: First, define a mapping from the choice to the characteristics of the
28End-users customarily pay a standardized deductible that is a fraction of the brochure price of the drug
paid by the insurance company. Median out-of-pocket drug costs are about $300 every six months for a
regime of drugs that would cost the insurance company between $5,000 and $15,000.
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treatment
θ(djit) = {θx(djit), θh(djit)} (3.18)
where θ(djit) = qit−1 if the individual consumes his prior-period market treatment. θ(djit) is
a stochastic variable is the individual chooses a cluster or if he joins a trial.
A production function transforms drug characteristics and health into aliments. Let xjit
be an indicator that takes the value of 1 if the individual does not suffer ailments in t after
choosing alternative j ∈ Cit. The probability of not having physical ailments for individual
i is modeled as:
Pr [xjit = 1|·] =
exp
(∑5
m=0 γ
x
mh
m
it−1 + θ
x (djit)
)
1 + exp (·) (3.19)
Health: CD4 count is our objective measure of health. Like ailments, health at the beginning
of period t + 1 is a function of previous health and drug characteristics. The production
function of health is specified as:
hjit =
5∑
m=0
γhmh
m
it−1 + θ
h (djit) + 
h
it (3.20)
The distribution of the health disturbance is estimated non-parametrically using the residuals
of the health production function. We assume that E[hit|·] = 0, where the expectation is
conditional on the vector of regressors of the health production function.29
Survival: At the end of any period t individuals may survive into the next, denoted by
Sit+1 = 1, with the following probability
Dit+1 (zit+1) ≡ Pr[Sit+1 = 1|zit+1] = 1
1 + exp(XditΓ
d)
(3.21)
where Xdit = [1, hjit, . . . , h5jit, ait, a2it, bi, edui, xjit].
29Here, it is important to point out that each individual drug in our sample has a set of characteristics
that are observed by the econometrician. The agent only observes cluster attributes. However, these are
constructed from individual-level data.
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Consumer Information and Aggregate State Forecasts
Consumers must form expectations not only about the evolution of their individual-level
state variables, but also about the characteristics of future choice sets. The following ex-
ample underscores the importance of this type of forecast in explaining consumer choices: a
relatively healthy consumer may avoid choosing from a group of effective drugs with strong
side effects in the current period if he expects effective drugs with fewer side effects to emerge
soon; in contrast, a sick consumer may not want to avoid medication despite side effects if
he fears that he may not survive until better drugs are introduced.
We assume that consumers have rational expectations, but they do not observe the entire
aggregate state Ξt. Instead, they observe a reduced aggregate state zMt , which is a mapping
from Ξt, and integrate over what they do not observe—these unobserved objects may be
past, present and future. The aggregate portion of the individual’s state is given by
zMt ≡ 〈ωt,Wt,Ft〉 (3.22)
The individual observes the centroid for innovation ωt, described in Section 3.3.2, which
determines the expected characteristics of trial products. His information set also contains
the characteristics Wt of the clusters of products he observes, described in Section 3.3.3.
Finally, he observes the current distribution of consumer characteristics Ft.
The Value Function
We define the value function conditional on choice j ∈ Cit, net of taste shocks, for individual
i at time t as follows:
vjit(zit) = E
[
yjit + β
[
Dit+1 (zit+1) max
c∈Cit+1
{vcit+1(zit+1) + εcit+1}
]∣∣∣∣ zit, j] (3.23)
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Expectations are taken over product characteristics affecting the flow utility and the evo-
lution of both observed and unobserved state variables. Expectations over the evolution of
unobserved state variables are independent conditional on the current set of state variables.
Therefore, we can rewrite equation (3.23) as
vjit(zit) = Ey[yjit|zit] + βEz
[
Dit+1 (zit+1)E
[
max
c∈Cit+1
{vcit+1(zit+1) + εcit+1}
]∣∣∣∣ zit, j] (3.24)
The first expectations operator, Ey, denotes expectations over outcomes that affect flow util-
ity, including income and physical ailments. The second operator, Ez, denotes expectations
over the evolution of observed state variables zit, including health and the mapping from the
aggregate state that he observes, zMt . The third operator, E, denotes expectations taken
over the joint distribution of unobserved choice-specific taste shifters.
3.4 Estimation
In this section, we describe how we estimate parameters of the model specified in Section 3.3
using a GMM estimator. A more extensive treatment of the estimation procedure, including
a more detailed algorithm, is found in Appendix B.2. In Section 3.4.1, we provide an overview
of the estimation procedure, summarizing the algorithm. The first eight steps can be seen
as a “first stage”, where quantities are computed that do not change as utility parameters
change. These quantities are computed a single time and are then used to construct moments
used in GMM estimation of utility parameters, described in the final step of the algorithm. In
Section 3.4.2, we provide further details on the GMM estimator, describing the theoretical
moment conditions and their sample analogs. We also emphasize unique features of our
forward simulation procedure.
104
3.4.1 Overview
Our estimation procedure can be summarized in the following steps.
1. Products as treatments. Our estimation starts with the definition of products. We
define a product as a combination of single-product components. Examples of products
are AZT or the combination of AZT+3TC+Saquinavir.
2. Outcome equations. We estimate processes for income, out-of-pocket payment, labor
supply and survival. Heath and no-ailments equations will be estimated in the next
step (see equations (3.15), (3.16), (3.17), and (3.21)).
3. Product characteristics. Given products defined in step 1, we estimate product char-
acteristics (see equations (3.19) and (3.20)).30
4. Clusters. Using the estimated product characteristics in step 3, we use a k-means
algorithm to obtain clusters of products for every period (see equation (3.8)). Then,
using the characteristics of the products in each cluster, we obtain within clusters
weights as predictions from non-linear regressions of within cluster shares on covariates
(see equations (3.10) and (3.11)). Finally, using the within cluster weights we compute
cluster characteristics—mean and variance matrix.
5. Centroid. Using product characteristics from step 3, we back out innovation centroids
for every period (see equation (3.1)).
6. Distribution of innovations. Every new product is modeled as a draw around the
centroid (see equation (3.2)). Hence, for every new product at a given period we
30As described in the model, individuals make treatment decisions based on cluster attributes, which are
probabilities of health and side effects associated with each cluster governed by equations (3.19) and (3.20).
However, their realized outcome will depend on the individual drug they are randomly assigned to from the
cluster. Thus, we must also estimate drug-specific characteristics, which are version of equations (3.19) and
(3.20), but for each treatment rather than for each cluster. The treatment specific equations are equations
(B.2) and (B.3) in Appendix ??).
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compute the realized innovation around the centroid as the residual from subtracting
the centroid (step 5) from the product characteristic (step 3). Using the realized
innovations we non-parametrically estimate the stationary distribution of innovations,
Fv.
7. Distribution of number of draws. Using data regarding the amount of new products
per period we estimate the distribution of number of new products (see equations (3.3)
and (3.5)).
8. Conditional choice probabilities (CCPs). Using cluster characteristic from step 4, cen-
troids from step 5 and other aggregate and individual-specific state variables we esti-
mate flexible parametric CCPs (see Appendix B.2).
9. Structural utility parameters. We follow Hotz et al. (1994) and use forward simulation
to generate choice and technology paths as well as future individual states that will
serve as inputs to the simulated continuation value. In our forward simulation we use
the estimated CCPs (step 8), the distribution of number of draws (step 7) and the
distribution of innovations (step 6) as well other estimated processes (step 2 through
step 5). Finally, we implement a GMM estimator using a moment condition which is
a function of the forward simulated data, CCPs, and utility parameters.
3.4.2 Moment Condition
We use GMM to estimate utility parameters. Our moment conditions appeal to well-known
results following from our assumption that the taste shocks εjit are iid Extreme Value Type
I distributed (see for example Hotz and Miller (1993)). The moment conditions rely on
differences between alternative representations of the difference in conditional value functions
vjit(zit)− voit(zit). Let J = 6 be the maximum possible cardinality of the individual’s choice
set, let pjit (zit) be the probability that individual i chooses option j at time t conditional on
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his state zit, and let w (zit) be a vector of instruments orthogonal to the difference between
alternative representations. We can form the following moment conditions:
E
w (zit)⊗

ln
(
poit(zit)
p1it(zit)
)
+ v1it(zit)− voit(zit)
...
ln
(
poit(zit)
pJ−1it(zit)
)
+ vJ−1it(zit)− voit(zit)

 = 0. (3.25)
The first representation of the difference in conditional value functions is the log odds
ratio formed with current-period conditional choice probabilities. The second representation
relies on the results in Proposition 3.1, which yields the conditional value function as a
mapping of future conditional choice probabilities and utility parameters.
Proposition 3.1. Let V (zit, εit) be the value function for individual i at period t who has a
state given by zit and εit. Define P
o(s−1)
j as the probability of surviving until period t+ s− 1
conditional on the state at t, decision j at t, and optimal behavior, denoted doi , up to some
period T ∗ > t.31 Define ψkit (zit) ≡ Eε [εkit|doit = k, zit] as the expected value of the kth taste
shock conditional on alternative k being optimal. Finally, let γ be the Euler constant. Then,
the conditional value function can be written as
vjit(zit) = E [yjit| zit] +
T ∗∑
s=1
βsP
o(s−1)
j (zit)×
Ez
Dit+s (zit+s) ∑
k∈Ct+s
pkit+s (zit+s) [ykit+s (zit+s) + ψkit+s (zit+s)]
∣∣∣∣∣∣ zit, djit = 1, Sit+s−1 = 1, doi

+βT
∗+1P
o(T ∗)
j (zit)Ez [Dit+T ∗+1 (zit+T ∗+1)V (zit+T ∗+1, εit+T ∗+1)| zit, j, Sit+T ∗ = 1, doi ] (3.26)
and
ψkit (zit) = γ − ln (pkit (zit)) (3.27)
31Since any individual present at t has evidently survived until t, P o(0)j (·) ≡ 1. Recall that Sit+s is the
survival indicator and Dit+s is the one-period-ahead probability of survival, defined in Section 3.3.3
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Proof: see Appendix B.2
Sample Analog and Forward Simulation
To form sample analogs of the moments in equation (3.25), we first substitute the theoretical
log odds ratio using the estimated CCPs. Second, we use Proposition 3.1 to obtain differences
in conditional value functions using forward simulation (Hotz et al., 1994). In our forward
simulation procedure, for every individual i at time t facing choice set Cit, we fix choice j
and use the estimated stochastic processes governing outcomes and transition to simulate
his state variables at t+ 1. We then use the estimated parameters of the CCPs to simulate
t + 1 choices conditional on the new simulated state. We continue the same process until
T ∗, whose value is set high enough so that the product βT ∗+1P o(T
∗)
j (zit) approaches zero,
eliminating further differences in conditional value functions beyond T ∗.
Forward simulation is used in a variety of settings to compute conditional value func-
tions. There is one feature of our estimation procedure that distinguishes our approach from
prior literature. As was mentioned in Section 3.3, individuals are not only aware of the
stochastic processes governing their individual state transitions, but also they are aware of
the stochastic process that links aggregate behavior and innovation. Using the information
contained in their state, consumers form expectations about future choice sets. This con-
trasts with setups where agents are either fully aware of future technologies or, alternatively,
where they are fully unaware, in which case an innovation like HAART amounts to a regime
change. Our forward simulation procedure explicitly incorporates how aggregate behavior
affects individual expectations over future innovations.
For each observation (individual i at period t), we first construct an artificial technolog-
ical path by simulating aggregate behavior forward. In other words, we forward simulate
the choices of all individuals in the sample at period t, and collect the technological path
generated by their choices. Then, because individuals are atomistic, for each observation we
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can generate several sequences of future choices and payoffs, taking as given its observation-
specific artificial technological path, to reduce individual simulation error.32 There are two
features from our forward simulation that we underscore. First, our conditional choice prob-
abilities, insofar as they condition on zMt , capture the way in which individuals compute
expectations. This guarantees that our method to obtain individuals’ expectations by simu-
lating future paths of the aggregate state Ξt generated from the simulated choices of individ-
uals with limited information is accurate. Clearly, because we simulate the aggregate future
path of Ξt, we can also obtain the simulated future path of zMt . Second, we simulate separate
artificial technological paths for every observation. This serves two purposes. It maintains
the assumption, needed for consistency of the estimator, that the sample draws from the mo-
ment conditions—the contribution from each observation—are independent from each other.
Additionally, simulating a separate artificial technological path for every observation prevents
simulation errors in the technological paths from propagating across all observations.
The Distribution of Innovations
The forward simulation of future choice sets relies on the distribution of innovations. In our
framework, the characteristics of new products entering the market today determined by
last period’s centroid and a draw from the distribution of innovations, Fν . This distribution,
which we assume is stationary, provides the location of new products relative to the current
centroid. To estimate the distribution of innovations we use all periods in the MACS data
with relevant information on treatment consumed, health, and ailments (1986 to 2008). We
then define centroids for innovation, ωt, given by equation (3.1). For each new product at t,
characterized by θ, we compute a realized innovation vector as
νθ = θ − ωt−1
32We generate 10 sequences per observation.
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We do not impose that innovation vectors cannot be strictly negative. In other words, inferior
products with lower quality in both dimensions (health and ailments) may be introduced if
the non parametric distribution allocates mass to the the south-east quadrant of its domain.
This is not at odds with what we observe in the data, and theoretical reasons why this
may happen have been provided in the literature (Miller, 1988). Over the time span we
observe there are 76 realizations from the innovations distribution which we use to obtain a
nonparametric empirical distribution for ν.
3.5 Parameter Estimates and Choice Dynamics
In this section, we discuss estimates of the structural model. We organize our discussion
around the key factors driving choices. We introduce the distribution of innovations in
Section 3.5.1. We discuss the utility function in Section 3.5.2 and describe outcomes and
transitions in Section 3.5.3. Finally, in Section 3.5.4 we use the model to simulate choices
over time, which allows us to assess model fit.
3.5.1 The Distributions of Innovations and New Products
In our model, every new product is an innovation about the centroid. How far new products
land from the centroid is stochastically given by the distribution of innovations, Fν , that we
estimate non parametrically. Figure 3.7 shows that Fν is bimodal and it does not appear
to be well approximated by a standard parametric distribution. While one of the modes is
located approximately at the status quo point (0, 0), a second mode is located north of the
first one along the health axis. Since the probability distribution is not always decreasing as
we move away from the centroid, the process on innovation is rather jumpy.
As shown in Table 3.3, the distribution of innovations has a positive mean in terms of
health quality, but a mean in terms of no-ailments quality that is not statistically different
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Figure 3.7: The Distribution of Innovations, Fν .
Notes: Distribution estimated non parametrically from the realized innovation vectors of the form νθtr = θtr −ωt−1, where θtr
are the characteristics of the new product r at t and ωt−1 is the centroid for innovation at the time the product was in trials.
from zero. In other words, new products are on average more efficacious but no better in
terms of side effects. These results suggests that, if consumers were to choose products at
random, on average the quality of products would improve over time in terms of health quality
but would remain largely unchanged in terms of no-ailments quality. However, in our model
the centroid is a mapping from consumer demand that does not happen at random. Since
the centroid anchors the distribution of innovations, the characteristics of future products
are more likely to be close to the characteristics of products with larger market shares, which
shapes the path of innovation. In this sense, innovation is endogenous to consumer choices.
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Table 3.3: Moments of the Distribution of Innovations, Fν
mean covariance matrix Ho: mean = 0
(p-value)
Health 8.10 747.57 4.05 0.01
NoAilments -0.02 4.05 0.16 0.62
Notes: Last column tests separately whether the each component of the mean is different than zero.
Table 3.4: Distribution of Number of New Products, FN
coef. se
µ
MaxChanget−1 0.432 0.246
TrialsSharet−1 6.177 2.462
lnα
Constant -0.206 0.451
MaxChanget−1 -1.019 0.626
Notes: Model specified in (3.3). The variable Qt−1 measures the distance between the previous period’s new products and the
previous period’s centroid. It captures the relatively higher number of new products that follow the appearance of better
innovations. The variable TrialsSharet−1 is the share of individuals going into a trial the previous period. According to the
model in (3.3), E[Newt] = µ and V ar[Newt] = µ(1 + αµ).
The process of innovation also depends on the magnitude of previous innovations and
on participation in clinical trials. Estimates for the distribution of number of new products
shown in Table 3.4 show that large positive innovations are likely to be followed by the
appearance of a multitude of products, which is consistent with firms vying for market share
following a breakthrough. The magnitude of previous innovations also reduces the dispersion
around the number of new products that enter. The share of consumers opting for the
trial product in the prior period also increases the likelihood of more products entering the
market. The reason is that, as more consumers select trial products, firms have more room
for experimentations which provides them with valuable information about the viability of
new treatments that they can now introduce into the market more rapidly. The fit of our
distribution of new products is shown in Figure 3.8. It shows that the empirical distribution
is not far from the average (over time periods) of the predicted probabilities generated by
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the model.
3.5.2 Utility Parameter Estimates
Utility parameters are reported in Table 3.5. The utility that individuals obtain from each
choice (drawing from a cluster, joining a trial, staying on their current treatment) depends
on their socio-demographic and health characteristics. These interactions help to explain
heterogeneity in choices across groups that are not attributable to variation in continuation
payoffs or variation in current net income. In interpreting parameter estimates, note that
the non pecuniary utility from no treatment is normalized to zero across groups. Therefore,
parameter estimates govern flow non pecuniary utility for different groups relative to what
they gain from not taking a treatment.
According to parameter estimates, clusters and trials lead to a utility cost and, generally,
these penalties are higher for non-white patients. Black men face a particularly high penalty
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Table 3.5: Utility Parameters, yit
parameter variable coef. se
α4w 1{cluster} · white -1.385 0.206
α4b 1{cluster} · black -1.868 0.210
α4l 1{cluster} · hispanic -1.075 0.835
α4a 1{cluster} · ait−1 0.003 0.005
α4h 1{cluster} · hit−1/103 -3.385 0.134
α5w 1{trial} · white -2.678 0.168
α5b 1{trial} · black -3.755 0.170
α5l 1{trial} · hispanic -2.902 0.354
α5a 1{trial} · ait−1 0.051 0.003
α5h 1{trial} · hit−1/103 -1.702 0.082
α6w 1{stay} · white 0.525 0.157
α6b 1{stay} · black 0.396 0.159
α6l 1{stay} · hispanic 0.480 0.674
α6a 1{stay} · ait−1 0.019 0.003
α6h 1{stay} · hit−1/103 1.048 0.101
αx xit 0.522 0.292
αxp xit · 1{product} -3.575 0.226
αm mit − oit 0.141 0.023
Notes: Estimation of equation (3.13). Discount factor β = .8. 1{cluster} indicates whether the individual chose one of the
three clusters of products available. 1{product} indicates whether the individual consumes a product in t,
1{product} = 1{cluster}+ 1{stay}+ 1{trial}.
of trial participation, a finding that is consistent with a broad literature investigating his-
torical reasons why blacks are reluctant to enter trials to use experimental drugs (Harris et
al., 1996). Moreover, healthier individuals have a lower utility of choices where they face
uncertainty, including clusters or trials. Interestingly, healthier individuals gain utility from
using drugs they have used before. These results suggest that healthier individuals dislike
uncertainty about drugs and, perhaps, switching costs relative to their less healthy counter-
parts. We also find that the utility costs of treatment relative to no treatment are stronger
for younger individuals. This is perhaps reflective of age-dependent tolerance for medication,
especially if older individuals have grown accustomed to using medications for other health
problems.
Finally, individuals dislike ailments regardless of which product they are using. This
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utility parameter is key as it helps explain why individuals eschew medications that have
high dynamic payoffs in the form of better future health. This finding is consistent with
individuals who consider their quality of life in a multidimensional manner. Similar results
have been found in Chan and Hamilton (2006) and Papageorge (2016), who showed that even
in the context of a deadly infection (HIV), individual treatment choices reflect a distaste for
side effects. Finally, our results show that individuals gain positive utility from income,
which reflects consumption utility and is expected.
3.5.3 Transitions and Outcomes
Next, we discuss the processes describing how state variables produce outcomes or transition
to other states. Individuals judge the quality of any product in terms of its ability to raise
their future CD4 count and its ability not to generate ailments. We estimate the processes
for health and ailments, which includes estimating the characteristics of products, using
equations (3.19) and (3.20). To conserve on space, we present the coefficient estimates in
Tables B.5 and B.6 in Appendix B.3 (see Column 5 in both tables). The top panels of Figure
3.9 show how current health transforms into future health and lack of ailments. While the
slight concavity of the production function for health could be well approximated by a linear
function, the production function for ailments is very non linear. The figures suggest that
changes is health below a CD4 count of 250 units generate much larger movements in the
log odds ratio of getting ailments than changes in health above that threshold.
Health also exhibits strongly non-linear relationships with other outcomes. This result
helps to explain differences in optimal choice for individuals with somewhat similar health
profiles (as measured by CD4 count). Figure 3.9, plots the estimated relationship between
health and several outcomes: income, out-of-pocket payments, labor supply and survival.
According to the figure, income increases steeply with CD4 count for very sick individuals
but the effect of health flattens substantially for individuals with CD4 counts above 250.
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Figure 3.9: Health Effect on Outcomes
Notes: CD4 Count measured in hundreds of cells per microliter. LOR stands for log odds ratio. Semestral income measured in
thousands of dollars of 2000.
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The health profile of out-of-pocket payments in Figure 3.9 is the mirror image of the health
profile for income with deeper decreases in payments as health increases for the sickest. This
makes sense as health expenditures due to opportunistic infections, for example, would be
expected to decline precipitously as a result of small health increases at low health levels.
Similarly, the odds of working increases with health until a CD4 count of about 350 units
and then it flattens. Finally, the effect of health increases on survival are more dramatic the
more sick individuals are. Even though the positive impact of health on survival remains
at higher health levels, this relationship diminishes considerably after a CD4 count of about
250 units.
In general, the health profiles in Figure 3.9 tell a very consistent story about CD4 count
and HIV infection. The effect of marginal health increases on outcomes is much stronger
for individuals with low CD4 counts and it seems to flatten after individuals surpass well-
known cutoffs below which AIDS occurs. This is consistent with the idea that low CD4
counts have little discernible impact on symptoms or survival unless the AIDS threshold is
reached. Below that threshold, further reductions have large effects on outcomes since the
body’s immune system becomes increasingly compromised and is therefore unable to fight
off routine infections. These results underscore the importance of modeling the relationship
between health and outcomes in a non linear fashion in the context of HIV.
We also estimate other sources of variation in outcomes. Table 3.6 presents our results
for the income equation. Individuals who do not suffer ailments have higher income as their
productivity is likely to be higher. Income is concave in age and it increases with labor
participation and education. Minorities have lower income. At any period individuals may
incur out-of-pocket costs related to their treatment consumption decision. According to
Table 3.7, conditional on having out-of-pocket expenditures, these payments increase with
age. Minorities spend less and more educated people spend more. Similarly, individuals
that suffer ailments spend more, perhaps because they are managing other health conditions.
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Table 3.6: Gross Income, mit
variable coef. se
hit−1 0.018 0.004
h2it−1/10
3 -0.064 0.019
h3it−1/10
7 1.138 0.381
h4it−1/10
10 -1.030 0.381
h5it−1/10
14 4.854 1.950
h6it−1/10
18 -11.270 4.850
h7it−1/10
20 0.101 0.046
ait−1 0.482 0.114
a2it−1 -0.006 0.001
black -5.534 0.366
hispanic -4.167 0.570
some college 2.497 0.442
college 5.812 0.457
more than college 8.203 0.500
lit 5.738 0.220
xit 0.207 0.084
constant -2.095 2.620
Notes: Estimation of equation (3.15). Random effects regression of gross-income on covariates. mit is measured in thousands
of real dollars of 2000. Health is given by the CD4 count measured in hundreds of cells per microliter.
Even with heavy subsidization in the HIV treatments market, individuals wanting to consume
a product must pay part of the cost and this is reflected in higher expected payments.
Labor market participation increases expected payments, which may reflect different pricing
schemes for public versus private insurance.
Labor participation is stochastic in our model and it is revealed to individuals at the
beginning of the period. Estimates in Table 3.8 show that the log odds ratio of working
versus not working increases with age until about age 40 and then decreases. The odds
of working increase with education and they increases substantially if the individual had
worked the previous period. At the end of every period individuals face the possibility of
death. Estimates in Table 3.9 imply that the log odds ratio of death versus survival decreases
with age until about age 35 and then increases. The likelihood of death is smaller for black
individuals and for individuals who are not suffering ailments.
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Table 3.7: Tobit Model for Out-of-pocket Payments, oit
variable coef. se
hit−1 -0.002 0.000
h2it−1/10
3 0.009 0.002
h3it−1/10
7 -0.133 0.029
h4it−1/10
10 0.090 0.022
h5it−1/10
14 -0.266 0.071
h6it−1/10
18 0.279 0.083
ait−1 0.037 0.007
a2it−1 0.000 0.000
black -0.240 0.021
hispanic -0.119 0.025
some college 0.169 0.026
college 0.318 0.033
more than college 0.336 0.030
market product 0.429 0.026
trial product 0.313 0.043
lit 0.105 0.016
xit -0.122 0.017
constant -1.459 0.182
σo 0.862 0.066
Notes: Estimation of equation (3.16). market product =
∑4
k=1 dkit. oit is measured on thousands of real dollars of 2000.
Health is given by the CD4 count measured in hundreds of cells per microliter.
3.5.4 Simulated Choice Dynamics and Model Fit
In Figure 3.10, we plot observed treatment choices over time along with those generated by
the model.33 In general, we are able to capture basic trends, including the rise in treatment
usage as drugs improve through innovation. We also capture trials participation dynamics
fairly well, but we have a harder time reproducing the spike in participation shortly before
HAART introduction. The reason for this may be that, although our model accounts for
changes in the demand for trials, there was also a shift in the supply of trials as a number of
new drugs were tested that would eventually comprise HAART. Hence, the spike in partici-
33The fit of our parametric ccps is discussed in Appendix B.2
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Table 3.8: Logit Model for Labor Supply, lit
variable coef. se
hit−1 0.009 0.001
h2it−1/10
3 -0.013 0.002
h3it−1/10
7 0.075 0.023
h4it−1/10
10 -0.013 0.007
ait−1 0.102 0.032
a2it−1 -0.001 0.000
black -0.168 0.073
hispanic -0.040 0.125
some college 0.312 0.105
college 0.537 0.103
more than college 0.613 0.108
lit−1 4.458 0.056
constant -5.914 0.742
Notes: Estimation of equation (3.17). Health is given by the CD4 count measured in hundreds of cells per microliter.
Table 3.9: Logit model for Death, 1− Sit+1
variable coef. se
hit−1 -0.028 0.003
h2it−1/10
3 0.079 0.015
h3it−1/10
7 -1.104 0.292
h4it−1/10
10 0.704 0.220
h5it−1/10
14 -1.610 0.561
ait−1 -0.116 0.058
a2it−1 0.002 0.001
black -0.509 0.199
hispanic 0.034 0.235
some college 0.060 0.185
college -0.353 0.185
more than college -0.512 0.207
xit -1.140 0.159
constant 1.682 1.358
Notes: Estimation of equation (3.21). Health is given by the CD4 count measured in hundreds of cells per microliter.
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Figure 3.10: Goodness of Fit Figures
Notes: Simulated and empirical choice rates over time.
pation would not be fully captured by our model as it focuses on patient demand.34 Beyond
this spike, however, our model can capture the main contours of choice dynamics.
34In a companion paper, we model supply of trials more explicitly and demonstrate the the increase in trials
prior to the introduction of HAART in part explains the observed spike in the likelihood of participation.
In the current framework, we could model supply shifts in a reduced-form manner as a temporary decrease
in the utility cost of joining a trial, which would reflect the ease of finding a trial in which to participate.
We abstract from supply here, however, since the focus of our model is on demand shifts and innovation.
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3.6 Alternative Choice and Technology Paths
Conditional on an initial state, our estimated model can generate a distribution of technolog-
ical paths. We start this section by illustrating this feature of our model and by assessing the
likelihood of the observed technological path (Section 3.6.1). Next, we we go on to discuss
how different kinds of choice dynamics would influence the distribution. We demonstrate
that alternative market shares could speed or slow the development of technologies that
potentially increase social welfare (Section 3.6.2). This naturally leads to a discussion of
policies that could raise consumer welfare, which we examine in Section 3.7
3.6.1 The Distribution of Technology Paths
Imbedded in our estimation procedure is the simulation of different innovation paths that are
generated by the same distribution of innovations that yields the realized path. This means
that conditional on an initial aggregate state, we can contrast the realized technological
path against the full distribution of paths. In particular, we take the 1990 distribution of
state variables (before HAART introduction) as given and simulate forward 1000 paths of
technology, choices and state variables for 18 years. We repeat the procedure using the 1997
distribution of state variables, once HAART has been introduced. We plot the mean of the
simulated distributions across time, and contrast it against the realized trends in the data.
First, we consider the path of aggregate health and the path of the health component
of the centroid. Results are plotted in Figure 3.11, where the green line is the realized
path, the black line is the mean simulated path and the dotted lines are bands of one
standard deviation. Considering the plots on the left, where the simulation begins in 1990,
it is clear that HAART introduction was a tail event. The observed path of innovations
follows the simulated paths quite well until 1996. Thereafter, the health centroid, which
summarizes effectiveness of market drugs weighted by their share, and the aggregate health
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Figure 3.11: Distribution of Technology Paths: Health
Notes: statistics computed over 1000 simulated paths conditional on the state of the world at 1991 and 1997.
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of consumers in the market are far above what would have been expected. Between the years
1996 and 2000, the realized path of the centroid is outside of one-standard deviation band.
Interestingly, the expected centroid approaches the realized centroid as time goes on. This
means that the gradual progress of technology was expected to improve drug effectiveness
until eventually something nearly as good as HAART would have come along. However,
the timing was different because products with efficacy similar to HAART treatments were
expected to appear far later than it actually did. Looking at the right side of Figure 3.11,
where the simulation begins in 1997, notice that the realized path underperforms the average
simulated path. This means that technology, measured by effectiveness, was expected to
improve more than it did from the perspective of 1997.
In Figure, 3.12, we perform a similar analysis for the other product quality: lack of side
effects. Here, realized product quality measured by the centroid, as well as aggregate ail-
ments, seems to have underperformed what would have been expected from the distribution
of innovations. In fact, one of the disappointments with regard to early versions of HAART
treatments is that their side effects were quite harsh, which led many HIV+ men to avoid
using them despite their effectiveness (Papageorge, 2016). In Figure 3.13 we consider the
paths of survival and consumption. The results match those on health: HAART introduction
was a tail event, which increased survival and product consumption. Finally, in Figure 3.14,
we compare simulated paths with the realized path in terms of product entry and exit. The
realized path of product entry is often outside the one standard deviation band around the
mean. The realized path of product exit is within the bands but is often below the average
path. In other words, the entry path with several high-entry periods seems unlikely given our
distribution. Given our results in Figure 3.8, we argue that our under-estimation of entry
does not mean that our model fits data poorly. Rather, our model is successful at treating
breakthroughs (and subsequent entry of products) as tail events.
124
1990 1995 2000 2005
Year
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
sh
ar
e
no ailments
data mean simulated 1 std
1990 1995 2000 2005
Year
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
sh
ar
e
no ailments
data mean simulated 1 std
1990 1995 2000 2005
Year
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
!x
centroid (no ailments)
data mean simulated 1 std
1990 1995 2000 2005
Year
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
!x
centroid (no ailments)
data mean simulated 1 std
Figure 3.12: Distribution of Technology Paths: No Ailments
Notes: statistics computed over 1000 simulated paths conditional on the state of the world at 1991 and 1997.
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Figure 3.13: Distribution of Technology Paths: Survival and Product Consumption
Notes: statistics computed over 1000 simulated paths conditional on the state of the world at 1991 and 1997.
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Figure 3.14: Distribution of Technology Paths: Entry and Exit
Notes: statistics computed over 1000 simulated paths conditional on the state of the world at 1991 and 1997.
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3.6.2 Demand Pull: How Consumer Choices Affect Innovation
Findings from this section demonstrate that a policy that changes consumer choices will affect
the path of innovation. We consider the evolution of technology and aggregate outcomes
under two choice regimes taking as initial condition the state of the world in 1991. In
the first, just like in our model, individuals are dynamic optimizers. The distribution of
technological paths under this regime was obtained in Section 3.6.1. In the second regime
consumers choose options at random, which neutralizes the dependence of the technological
path on the preferences and characteristics of consumers that would otherwise determine
their optimal choices.
In Figure 3.15, we consider the mean—over 1000 simulated paths—of average consumer
health and ailments under each regime (left-hand-side plots) and the mean health and ail-
ments components of the centroid (right-hand-side plots). In Figure 3.16, we consider the
mean—over 1000 simulated paths—of survival, share of consumers, entry and exit. Results
in Figure 3.15 show that the random choice regime outperforms dynamic optimal choice in
all but physical ailments technology. This occurs because the random choice regime yields
higher product entry as a consequence of higher experimentation due to the randomization
of choices (see Figure 3.16). As we showed in Table 3.3, new products are on average better
in health terms due mostly to the second mode of the distribution of innovations. Since
efficacy moves faster in the random choice regime, consumer ailments improve through the
health channel instead of being a consequence of improvements in the ailments characteris-
tics of products (see equation (3.19)). Figure 3.16 also shows the dynamic optimal regime
generate lower survival rates. This result underscores how individuals value their quality of
life beyond solely caring about health, and it also shows how individuals’ preferences tilt the
path of technology, in this case towards fewer side effects early on. In general, these results
suggest that dynamic payoffs could rise overtime through technology improvements under
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Figure 3.15: Alternative Choice Regimes: Health and No Ailments
Notes: Alternative choice regimes are: (i) optimal dynamic choice and (ii) random choice. Mean over 1000 simulated paths of
the relevant statistic conditional on the state of the world at 1991.
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Figure 3.16: Alternative Choice Regimes: Survival, Consumption, Entry, and Exit
Notes: Alternative choice regimes are: (i) optimal dynamic choice and (ii) random choice. Mean over 1000 simulated paths of
the relevant statistic conditional on the state of the world at 1991.
choice regimes that are inconsistent with individual dynamic optimization. We explore these
possibilities for welfare improvement in the next section.
3.7 Demand Externalities and a Constrained Planner
Results in the previous section provide evidence suggestive of an externality whereby indi-
vidually rational, optimal choices slow the path of technological progress in the direction
of treatment efficacy. Ultimately, this can translate into welfare loses because individuals
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do not incorporate the impact of their choices in the process of innovation. By definition,
an unrestricted social planner acting at every period can achieve at least the same level of
welfare that atomistic individuals attain: she can let individuals choose whatever they find
individually optimal. In general, an unrestricted planner will do better than that. However,
given the size of the individual’s state space, numerically solving the problem of an unre-
stricted planner quickly becomes intractable. Instead, we hope to explore the nature of the
externality using a one-period planner that is constrained to act only on the basis of a subset
of the information contained in the individual’s state.35 Because the planner is constrained,
she does not necessarily do better. Hence, if she was to do better, this fact would constitute
an initial measure of the size of the externality.
The first constrained one-period planner we consider is one that assigns individuals to
choices on the basis of their health and their previous treatment. In particular, when as-
signing individuals to choices, the planner considers two levels of health (high and low)
and two types of previous treatment choice (market treatment and no treatment/trial treat-
ment). Compared to the amount of information available to the individual in his state Zit,
the amount of information that the constrained planner bases her assignment rules on is
minimal. Nevertheless, the number of assignment rules that we need to evaluate is already
relatively large. For every individual in a 〈health, previous treatment〉 category, the plan-
ner assigns one of the six choices available or she lets the individual act freely.36 This set up
amounts to 72 ∗ 62 = 1764 assignment rules.37 Notice that, because the constrained planner
has less information than the individual, it may be optimal for her to let some groups to
act freely even though those groups will not be internalizing the externality. This set up is
35We consider one-period planners because they constitute an unexpected shock to the individuals. There-
fore, we can still use the same ccps that we estimated in Section 3.4 because individuals do not have time
to adjust to the new regime before it is already gone.
36If the individual did not consume a market treatment last period there are only five options the planner
can assign to him.
37The planner can only impose to stay on treatment to those groups that consumed a market treatment
last period.
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attractive because it nests the dynamic optimal problem of atomistic individuals when the
planner lets every group to act freely. We solve the problem of this one-period planner in
the first semester of 1991.
Table 3.10: Constrained Planner: Assignment Rules
Groups
Group Share 0.50 0.26 0.05 0.19
Average Welfare ($1000) highH, no/trial highH, mk lowH, no/trial lowH, mk
Top ten rules 82.16 6 7 6 7
81.81 6 7 6 4
81.58 6 7 7 4
81.56 6 7 7 6
81.54 6 4 6 7
81.41 6 4 6 4
81.41 6 7 6 6
81.23 6 7 5 7
81.22 6 4 6 6
81.19 6 4 7 7
Atomistic 69.48 7 7 7 7
Bottom ten rules 43.36 1 5 1 2
43.33 3 5 3 2
43.23 1 5 3 2
43.20 1 5 2 2
43.20 3 5 1 2
43.09 2 5 2 5
43.00 2 5 3 2
42.92 2 5 1 5
42.90 2 5 1 2
42.89 2 5 3 5
Notes: The table shows the best and worst assignment rules, and the average welfare they generate. The groups are
determined by health status (high or low) and by previous treatment status (consumed a market treatment or not). The
population shares of each of the groups are shown on top of their labels. Numbers 1 to 3 correspond to the three clusters
available at that period. 4 corresponds to staying in previous market treatment. 5 stands for trial and 6 stands for no
treatment. Finally, 7 stands for individually optimal choice; in other words, the planner renounces to her right to impose a
choice and lets the individual in the group decide based on their richer information.
Results from this exercise, in Table 3.10, suggest that the constrained planner can do bet-
ter than atomistic agents who make individually rational choices. In fact, the constrained
planner can increase welfare by about 20%, which is a first measure of the size of the exter-
nality. The best rules in the planner portfolio have certain characteristics. The constrained
planner sends the healthy individuals who did not consume a market treatment last period,
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to the no treatment option. In most cases she does the same with the sick individuals who
also did not consume a market treatment last period. In general, she uses the richer infor-
mation, in terms of product quality, of those who consumed a market treatment last period,
to either set them free to act or to make them stay in their current treatment. One of the
top ten rules includes trial participation. In this rule the planner sends sick individuals who
did not consumed a treatment last period to trials. The worst rules also contain some infor-
mation. They are characterized by sending healthy individuals who had consumed market
treatments to trials. This imposes a high experimentation cost on those who dislike exper-
imentation the most (the healthy) and disregards the information they had acquired about
the quality of the treatment they consumed last period. In general, the constrained planner
attempts to use the treatment quality information of those who have it, setting them free,
and assigns healthy individuals with no treatment information (who are also the majority)
to the no treatment alternative, which is consistent with the low quality of products in the
early nineties.
In our second exercise we explore to what extent experimentation, in this case, exper-
imentation in clinical trials, is one of the channels through which the externality acts. In
other words, if individuals are not incorporating the future benefits of experimenting, and
they rationally expect a certain level of aggregate experimentation given the distribution
of consumer characteristics, then they may not participate in clinical trials and the level of
experimentation resulting from this process may be suboptimal. We consider another con-
strained planner to get a sense of this problem. This planner’s only tool is to randomly send
individuals to clinical trials. In other words, all she can do is to set a parameter q, which
is the probability that everyone faces of being sent to a clinical trial. If an individual is not
sent to a trial by the planner, he gets to decide freely what to do, which may entail joining
a clinical trial. Therefore, this constrained planner’s problem nests the dynamic optimal
problem of atomistic individuals when the planner sets q = 0. We solve the problem of this
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Figure 3.17: Constrained Planner: Random Assignment to Clinical Trials
Notes: Average welfare generated by a constrained planner that sends individuals to trials randomly. The constrained planner
sets the value of the probability q that any individual is sent to a trial. If an individual is not sent to a trial, he may still
choose to do so freely. This is reflected in the dotted line which represents the total share of trial participation yielding from a
given planner policy. Beyond the value of the probability shown in the figure (q = 0.4) average welfare keeps declining. The
lack of smoothness in the figure is a consequence of the low number of simulations relative to the size of the step from one
value of q to the next.
one-period planner in the first semester of 1991. Figure 3.17 shows that the constrained plan-
ner can increase welfare by increasing experimentation randomly. However, if she imposes
too much experimentation on the population, welfare will start declining because people do
not like to experiment. According to Figure 3.17, the optimal level of q for the constrained
planner is 0.10, which generates a share of trial participation of approximately 0.14.
This section underscores how, even with limited information or scope of action, a con-
strained planner can internalize the externality and substantially increase welfare per capita.
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Moreover, we show that one of the mechanisms through which the externality acts is experi-
mentation in clinical trials. Results in Section 3.5.1 showed that experimentation in clinical
trials increases the expected value of the number of new products to be introduced to the
market. Our one period-planner result shows that individuals may be experimenting sub op-
timally. In fact, one measure of the magnitude of the externality, acting through the channel
of experimentation in clinical trials, is the increase in welfare per capita from a planner that
optimally sets a probability with which to send individuals to trials randomly. The optimal
rule chosen by this constrained planner generates an increase in welfare of about $4,000 per
capita.38
3.8 Conclusion
It is often thought that new products that appear in the market shift consumer demand.
New products with better characteristics obtain higher shares overtime as individuals dis-
cover them and decide to continue consuming them abandoning old products. However, the
direction may also be reversed: how much innovation will happen tomorrow and on what
dimension innovations are more likely to occur may depend on consumer demand.
We explore this idea, usually called “demand pull” in the literature, using data from
the market for HIV treatments, which we observe basically since its beginning. We build
a structural model with which we assess the role of demand pull and some of the mech-
anisms through which it operates. One of those mechanisms is experimentation. In the
context of the market we study, experimentation takes a very specific form as individuals
can join clinical trials. By joining a trial, individuals gain access to experimental products
that may be breakthroughs of great quality, but that may also be less efficacious or un-
expectedly toxic. Trial participation pushes the path of technology allowing new products
38Recall income is measured in six-months periods.
135
to appear. Moreover, the decisions of all consumers, favoring some products over others,
bend the technological path in a certain direction as firms avoid innovating over unpopular
products. Because individuals do not incorporate the consequences of their choices on the
technological path, externalities appear and can be manifested, for instance, in less than
optimal experimentation—individuals find experimenting to be costly.
Our results show that the data are consistent with demand pull and underscores the im-
portance of accounting for the feedback from consumer demand into the innovation process.
Consistent with previous literature, our results also show that consumers have multidimen-
sional preferences when assessing their quality of life and how products can improve it. In
particular, consumers of medical treatments care, not only about how efficacious treatments
are, but also about how much side effects they cause. We show that consumer preferences
along these multiple dimensions of quality can have effects on the direction and the speed of
the technological path: consumer preferences towards less side effects slow down innovation
on the dimension of efficacy which, in the long term, can have welfare consequences.
The reason why alternative technological paths may increase welfare is that individuals do
not incorporate the consequences of their choices on the evolution of technology. We explore
this issue by considering constrained planner problems that keep computation tractable, and
provide initial measures of the size of the externality and to what extent it operates through
experimentation. We find that a constrained planner can increase welfare by around 20
percent. We also find that a constrained planner that randomly sends people to trials would
increase trial participation by about 10 percent points, which yields an increase in welfare
of 5 percent.
As a consequence of the nature of our data, we focus on the demand side and on the
consequences of consumer heterogeneity on the technological path. Other authors have paid
more attention to the supply side of the problem (Carranza, 2010; Goettler and Gordon,
2011; Gowrisankaran and Rysman, 2012). A natural step forward, although by no means a
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simple one, is to model the competition of firms and their decisions to innovate by investing in
R&D, while allowing for an acceptable level of consumer heterogeneity and its corresponding
demand pull.
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 2
A.1 Data Appendix
A.1.1 PSID Data
Chapter 2 uses data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). The PSID started in
1968 with a representative sample of about 18,000 individuals in 5,000 families in the United
States. Information about these individuals and their descendants was collected yearly up to
1996, year after which the study became biennial. The study is restricted to white and black
men between years 1968 and 1996. Survey information used include data on occupation,
self-employment status, business ownership, incorporation status, labor income, business in-
come, working hours, completed education, age, race, and marital status.
Setting the beginning of labor market careers. In order to account for the process of belief
formation individuals must be observed from their entrance into the labor market. Potential
experience is defined as
PotentialExperience = Age− CompletedEducation− 6
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to set the beginning of individuals’ labor market careers. First, the minimum potential
experience for each individual is computed. Only those individuals whose minimum potential
experience is at most 3 are kept. Then, the beginning of the individual’s labor market career
is set whenever
PotentialExperience =
 0 if minPotentialExperience ≤ 0k if minPotentialExperience = k ∈ {1, 2, 3}
Self-employment. At any period, conditional on having declared to be working (or work-
ing for money) or only temporarily laid off, individuals answer the following question (or a
slightly modified version of it):
“On your main job, are you self-employed, are you employed by someone else, or what? ”
The answer options are “Someone else,” “Both someone else and self,” “Self-employed
only,” and “Don’t Know.” Entrepreneurs as defined as those individuals who have positive
working hours and declare to be self-employed only. All other individuals with positive work-
ing hours are catalogued into one of the salaried occupations.
Occupation. The PSID provides the 3-digit occupation code from 1970 Census of Popu-
lation which is build using the Alphabetical Index of Industries and Occupations issued June
1971 by the U.S. Department of Commerce and the Bureau of the Census was used for this
variable. The PSID provides the following categorization of occupations
• Occupation 1: 1 - 195 Professional, Technical, and Kindred Workers
• Occupation 2: 201 - 245 Managers and Administrators, Except Farm
• Occupation 3: 260 - 285 Sales Workers
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• Occupation 4: 301 - 395 Clerical and Kindred Workers
• Occupation 5: 401 - 600 Craftsmen and Kindred Workers
• Occupation 6: 601 - 695 Operatives, Except Transport
• Occupation 7: 701 - 715 Transport Equipment Operatives
• Occupation 8: 740 - 785 Laborers, Except Farm
• Occupation 9: 801 - 802 Farmers and Farm Managers
• Occupation 10: 821 - 824 Farm Laborers and Farm Foremen
• Occupation 11: 901 - 965 Service Workers, Except Private Household
• Occupation 12: 980 - 984 Private Household Workers
Observations corresponding to “members of the armed forces” (coded as 600) are dropped
as well as observations of farm related occupations and observations of private household
workers (occupations 9, 10 and 12). The remaining PSID categories are grouped into
• Blue Collar: Craftsmen and Kindred Workers; Operatives, Except Transport; Trans-
port Equipment Operatives; Laborers, Except Farm; Service Workers, Except Private
Household.
• White Collar: Professional, Technical, and Kindred Workers; Managers and Adminis-
trators, Except Farm; Sales Workers; Clerical and Kindred Workers
Individuals provide their occupation regardless of their self-employment status. However,
provided that in the model entrepreneurship is an occupation on its own, the occupation
data is disregarded whenever an individual is self-employed. Also, occupations were the
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individual reports working for more than 2.5% of the total amount of available hours in the
year (365.25 ∗ 24).
Up to 1980, the occupational data provided by the PSID is coded retroactively in order to
correct for spurious transitions. PSID officials use original PSID reports and the three-digit
1970 Census occupation codes for a selected sample of PSID heads and spouses. Therefore,
only part of the individuals’ careers in the sample have been further corrected for spurious
transitions. To the extent that the categories used in Chapter 2 are broad enough and that
survey officials get more accurate cataloguing occupations over time, this problem should be
minor in the sample. Figure A.1 shows the switching trends among collar occupations, en-
trepreneurship, and unemployment, computed with data before and after 1980; the decrease
in switching corresponds to the fact that individuals in the sample are acquiring more expe-
rience. More importantly, there seems to be no evidence of jumps in the trend of switching
before and after at this level of aggregation.
Labor Income. The PSID labor income variable is computed equally for employed and
self-employed individuals. Up to 1993, it corresponds in general to the sum of wages (before
taxes or other deductions) and “actual amounts of labor part of farm income and business
income, bonuses, overtime, commissions, professional practice, labor part of income from
roomers and boarders, and market gardening” (PSID Codebook). From this variable the fol-
lowing components are subtracted: the labor part of business income, of farm income, and
of income from roomers and boarders when available. Starting from 1994, the labor part
of farm income and that of business income are not included in the variable. Labor income
is bracketed for 1968 and 1969. The midpoint value of the bracket is assigned; however,
less than 1% of the individual-year observations correspond to those years. Also, the PSID
labor income variable is censored at different upper values at different years. Less than 0.2%
percent of the observations correspond to censored observations. The labor part of farm
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Figure A.1: Proportion of Individuals Switching between t and t+1 Over Years in the Labor
Market (Collar)
income is bracketed until 1975. Again, the value of the midpoint of the bracket is assigned.
Business income. Business income is gathered for those individuals that satisfy the
following two conditions:
• 1. They answer “yes” to the following question (or a modified version of it)
“Did you or any other member of your family own a business at any time in year YYYY,
or have a financial interest in any business enterprise? ”
Not all self-employed individuals answer “yes” to this question and not all individuals
who answer yes to this question are self-employed. While about 82 percent of self-employed
answer “yes” to this question less than 8 percent of salaried workers do. Regardless of this
numbers, this may still be a drawback of how Chapter 2 treats the data.
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• 2. They then proceed to say that the business mentioned was not uniquely a corpora-
tion. In other words, they proceed to say that the business was either (i) unincorporated
or (ii) they have an interest in both types or (iii) they do not know.
If those two conditions are satisfied they then answer the question
“How much was (your/his/her/their share of the total income from business in YYYY–
that is, the amount (you/he/she/they) took out plus profit left in? [If zero: did you have a
loss? How much was it? ”
Business income is computed as the sum of the labor and asset part of head’s business
income as reported in the PSID data. The labor part and asset part of business income are
bracketed until 1975. Again, the value of the midpoint of the bracket is assigned. After
computed, business income is added to the labor income measure only for unincorporated
self-employed individuals.
Income. In summary, for salaried workers and incorporated self-employed individuals:
Income = LaborIncome
For self-employed unincorporated individuals:
Income = LaborIncome+BusinessIncome
Individuals who are not working any hours are assigned zero income. All values are in con-
stant dollars of 2000.
Incorporated and unincorporated status. Following an affirmative answer to the business
ownership question (above), individuals are asked about their incorporation status in all
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years in the PSID (denote this question IQ1). Also, in years 1975, 1976 and from 1985
onward, individuals are asked about their incorporated status after the self-employment
question (denote this question IQ2). Even though question IQ2 seems closer to Chapter 2’s
definition of entrepreneurship, not all years are available for this question. An imputation
algorithm is followed in order to determine the incorporated status of entrepreneurs.
In the imputation algorithm more relevance is given to stability and consistency of
the measure across years. The imputation entails the following steps: (i) Initially, the
incorporation status of entrepreneurs is determined from question IQ1; (ii) If incorpo-
rated status for entrepreneurs is missing or ambiguous (individual reported “Both,” “Other,”
or “Do not know”) in IQ1, the value from question IQ2 is assigned insofar as it corre-
sponds to “Incorporated” or “Unincorporated;” (iii) If data is still missing or ambiguous,
the t− 5, . . . , t− 1, t+ 1, . . . , t+ 5 (past and future) answers from IQ1 and IQ2 are used to
assign the incorporated status at t; (iv) all remaining ambiguous observations are imputed
as “unincorporated.” Out of 2201 observations of entrepreneurs, this method imputes 551
observations: 406 from step (ii), 120 from step (iii) and 25 from step (iv).
Working Hours. The study uses the individual level PSID variable for working hours. It
counts the actual hours worked by the individual during year YYYY. Missing data were not
assigned.
Hourly income. Hourly income is computed simply as annual income divided by annual
working hours.
Education. Consistent with the procedure for setting the beginning of individuals’ labor
market careers, the education variable corresponds to the value of completed education. Ed-
ucation data are discretized into: high school (12 years of education or less), some college
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(13 to 15 years of education), college (16 years of education), more than college (more than
16 years of education). Education is censored at 17 years which may affect the potential
experience criteria used above for setting the beginning of individuals’ labor market careers.
Age and marital status. Reported age and marital status of individual.
Experience variables. Experience variables are computed using occupation data over the
individual’s career.
Wealth. The PSID includes a measure of wealth for selected years: 1984, 1989, 1994,
and every two years starting in 1999. The wealth measure in the PSID is constructed as
the sum of six types of assets (farm business, checking or savings accounts, real estate other
than main home, stocks, vehicles, and other assets) net of debt value plus the value of home
equity. Since the survey does not include data on wealth at every period, in the current
analysis a measure of permanent wealth will be considered instead. In order to obtain the
individual measure, the following fixed effects regression is run:
Wealthit = γ0 + γ1ageit + γ2age
2
it + ui + it
The individual measure for permanent wealth is then obtained as
ωi = γˆ0 + uˆi
In estimation only individuals with at least three wealth data points are used. Figure A.2
shows the age profile of wealth accumulation from pooling all available data.
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Figure A.2: Average Wealth
Notes: Average wealth in thousands of dollars of 2000.
Table A.1: Parameters of the Wealth Profile Equation
coeff se
γ0 417.78 85.16
γ1 -23.95 4.40
γ2 0.47 0.06
Notes: wealth in thousands of dollars of 2000.
Full time vs part time workers. There is no differentiation in the treatment of the data
between full-time workers and part time workers. In fact, only about 6% of individual-year
observations for working individuals are part-time observations (less than 20 hours per week).
Part-time individual-year observations are not dropped because they would create gaps in
the careers of 36% of the individuals (See Table A.2 bellow).
Data Gaps. the histories of individuals with data gaps of more than 2 years are dropped.
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Table A.2: Full time and Part Time observations (1968-1996)
Full time Part Time
% of All individual-year worker observations 0.95 0.05
% of unique individuals ever in part time 0.35
Notes: Table shows proportion of individual-year observations with less than 1044 working hours in a year (part time) and
proportion of unique individuals that were ever part time workers by this criterion. Selection rule was defined as not dropping
part time observations since they would create gaps by about 40 percent of all unique individuals’ labor histories.
For those with data in t and t + 2 but not in t + 1, Time is then redefined by making
t+ 1 = t+ 2 and so forth. Similarly, for those with data in t and t+ 3 but not in t+ 1 and
t+ 2, time is redefined by making t+ 1 = t+ 3 and so forth.
Dropping Data Process. Initial number of individuals: 75,260. Individuals remaining
after dropping individuals with no information on age, 75,153 for 3’457,038 individual-year
observations. Individual-year observations remaining after keeping only household heads
and their spouses: 446,242;1 individual-year observations remaining after keeping black or
white individuals: 424,497; individual-year observations remaining after dropping years af-
ter 1996: 326,455; individual-year observations remaining after dropping females: 146,083;
individual-year observations remaining after dropping missing participation info: 132,248;
individual-year observations after dropping missing marital status: 132,242. Individual-
year observations satisfying potential experience criterion: 37,759; individual-year obser-
vations remaining after dropping data on missing occupations, farm related occupations,
and private household workers: 30,006; individual-year observations remaining after drop-
ping missing income: 29,676; individual-year observations remaining after dropping military
occupations: 28,683; individual-year observations remaining after dropping jumps in data:
26,087; individual-year observations satisfying potential experience criterion after previous
droppings: 25,152; individual-year observations of people who never worked: 47. After drop-
1Relevant data on income and occupation is only collected for household heads.
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ping observations of individuals who lack data on relevant variables except wealth, data set
contains 2,057 individuals and 25,105 individual-year observations. With this data set the
first stage of the estimation procedure is undertaken. For the second stage, an extra dropping
criterion is added to exclude those individuals with less than three data points of wealth.
The final data set for estimation of the second stage contains 1,506 individuals and 21,334
individual-year observations.
A.1.2 Bond Price Data
Following Gayle and Miller (2009) the price of a bond is computed as the present value (in
real terms) of a security (T-bill) which pays $1 annually. Denote rit the marginal annuitized
yield from lengthening the bond one period by extending the maturity date from t + i to
t + i + 1. Data comes from the Federal Reserve’s Economic Research Data Base and is
based on Treasury bills with maturities 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 10, 20, and 30. Assume the marginal
annuitized yield rate for any bond maturing over 30 years is the same as the 30-year rate.
This yields bt defined as
bt ≡
∞∑
s=1
s∏
i=1
(1 + rit)
−1
=
30∑
s=1
s∏
i=1
(1 + rit)
−1 +
30∏
i=1
(1 + rit)
−1
∞∑
s=31
(1 + r30,t)
s−30
=
30∑
s=1
s∏
i=1
(1 + rit)
−1 +
1
r30,t
30∏
i=1
(1 + rit)
−1 (A.1)
Then, for each date t, impute a yield curve using the data on newly issued bonds for various
maturities. Then use a cubic spline for each date-maturity combination in the data to obtain
imputations rˆit for each date t and for all i ∈ {1, . . . , 30}.
Step 1:
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Use the annual compounding interest rate r˜st (from the interpolated yield curve) to obtain
bt as
bt =
30∑
s=1
(
1
1 + r˜st
)s
+
1
r30,t
(
1
1 + r˜30,t
)30
(A.2)
Step 2:
Given that rit and r˜it are nominal interest rates, bt is adjusted by the deflator based on
base year 2000. To reflect inflation let
b˜t =
bt
deflator2000
(A.3)
The series of b˜t is the one used in estimation. Given the sample, the earliest bond price
needed is for year 1968 and the last bond price needed is for year 2033. The last yield curve
available is for year 2015. Hence in-sample bond prices can be obtained up to 2015. Given
the bond prices in sample b˜t for t = 1954, . . . , 2015, a regression is run for b˜t+1 on b˜t and in
order to obtain out-of-sample prices bˆt for t = 2016, . . . , 2033.
A.2 Model Appendix
A.2.1 Claim about belief variance.
Claim: For any t > ti0 the prior variance Vit is a deterministic function of the parameters
of the population distribution variance matrix ∆ and the experience vector xit.
Proof : wlog let ti0 = 1 and drop the i index. First, let ∆˜ = ∆−1 with characteristic
component δ˜k,k′ . For t = 2, after choosing occupation j ∈ {1, . . . , 4}, from the updating rule
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in equation (2.7) we know that
V−12 = ∆−1 + Σ1 (A.4)
where Σt is defined in (2.5). The off-diagonal components of V−12 are simply δ˜k,k′ . The
diagonal components can be written as δ˜k,k + dk1/σ2ηk = δ˜k,k + xk2/σ
2
ηk
characteristic com-
ponents. Now suppose it is also true that the off-diagonal components of V−1t are δ˜k,k′ and
the diagonal components are δ˜k,k + xkt/σ2ηk . Then, using the updating rule in equation (2.7)
again we obtain that
V−1t+1 = V−1t + Σt (A.5)
From the previous equation it is clear that the diagonal and off-diagonal components of V−1t+1
can also be written as deterministic functions of the components of ∆−1 and the vector of
experience, xit+1. An induction argument finishes the proof. Q.E.D.
A.2.2 Proof of proposition 2.1
Proof : The proof works by backwards induction. Consider the set up of his problem in the
last period of his labor market career, T , in present value terms. Suppose that he has chosen
alternative k at period T . His consumption and savings choice maximizes
− αTk(hT )βT exp{−ρcT − εTk} − ET
[
λτ(T+1)bτ(T+1)vkT+1 exp
(−(ρξT+1 + aτ(T+1))
bτ(T+1)
)∣∣∣∣ET , hT]
s.t. ET [λτ(T+1)ξT+1|dTk, hT ,ET ] + λτ(T )cT = λτ(T )ξT (A.6)
His budget constraints shows the relation between the value of his wealth today, his con-
sumption choice, and the expected value of his wealth tomorrow. If he works in occupation
k he obtains income L¯kykt+1 at the beginning of his retirement age which is simply added
to his wealth in equation (2.9). Following a similar procedure as in Margiotta and Miller
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(2000, p. 680) the conditional value function of choosing alternative k is obtained as
VkT (hT ,ET , ξT , aτ(T ), bτ(T ), εkT ) =
−λτ(T )bτ(T )αkT (hT )1/bτ(T )e−εkT /bτ(T )ET [vkT+1|ET ]1−1/bτ(T ) exp
(−(ρξT + aτ(T ))
bτ(T )
)
(A.7)
Integrating over εT and averaging over the 5 choices using the conditional choice proba-
bilities yields
VT (hT ,ET , ξT , aτ(T ), bτ(T )) =
−
4∑
k=0
pkT (hT ,ET )λτ(T )bτ(T )αkT (hT )1/bτ(T )Eε[e−ε
∗
kT /bτ(T ) ]ET [vkT+1|ET ]1−1/bτ(T )
× exp
(−(ρξT + aτ(T ))
bτ(T )
)
= −λτ(T )bτ(T ) exp
(−(ρξT + aτ(T ))
bτ(T )
)
AT (hT ,ET ) (A.8)
where
Eε[e
−ε∗kT /bτ(T ) ] ≡ Eε[e−εkT /bτ(T )|dkT = 1]
and AT (hT ,ET ) is defined as in equation (2.11) with AT+1(hT+1,ET+1) ≡ 1.
To finish the proof suppose that equations (2.10) and (2.11) hold for t+ 1. Then, at age
t an individual who has chosen alternative k selects consumption and savings to maximize
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− αkt(ht)βt exp{−ρct − εkt}
− Et
[
λτ(t+1)bτ(t+1)At+1(ht+1,Et+1)vkt+1 exp
(−(ρξt+1 + aτ(t+1))
bτ(t+1)
)∣∣∣∣Et, ht, dkt = 1]
s.t. Et[λτ(t+1)ξt+1|dkt, ht,Et] + λτ(t)ct = λτ(t)ξt
Which yields an equation similar to equation (A.7):
Vkt(ht,Et, ξt, aτ(t), bτ(t), εkt) =
−λτ(t)bτ(t)αkt(ht)1/bτ(t)e−εkt/bτ(t)Et[At+1(H¯kt+1(ht),Ekt+1)vkt+1|Et, ht]1−1/bτ(t)
× exp
(−(ρξt + aτ(t))
bτ(t)
)
(A.9)
The proof is finished by integrating over εt and averaging over the 5 choices using the con-
ditional choices probabilities. Q.E.D.
A.2.3 Proof of Proposition 2.2
Proof : Assuming that the taste shocks are distributed Extreme Value Type-I renders the
expression in equation (2.12) as a standard logit. Hence, the odds ratio can be written as
p0t(ht,Et)
pkt(ht,Et)
= αkt(ht)Et
[
At+1(H¯kt+1(ht),Ekt+1)
At+1(ht,Et)
vkt+1
∣∣∣∣Et, ht]bτ(t)−1 (A.10)
Equation (A.10) describes the likelihood ratio of any choice relative to the choice of not
working. The reason why the arguments of the index in the denominator are subscripted
with t is that neither the individual’s human capital vector nor his beliefs change if he decides
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not to work. Use equation (A.10) to write
Et
[
At+1(H¯kt+1(ht),Ekt+1)vkt+1
∣∣Et, ht]1−1/bτ(t) = αkt(ht)−1/bτ(t)At+1(ht,Et)1−1/bτ(t) (pkt(ht,Et)
p0t(ht,Et)
)−1/bτ(t)
(A.11)
From page 3 in the online appendix of Gayle et al. (2015):
Eε[e
−ε∗kt/bτ(t) ] = pkt(ht,Et)1/bτ(t)Γ
(
bτ(t) + 1
bτ(t)
)
(A.12)
where Γ(·) denotes the complete gamma function. Substitute equations (A.11) and (A.12)
in equation (2.11) to obtain
At(ht,Et) = p0t(ht,Et)1/bτ(t)Γ
(
bτ(t) + 1
bτ(t)
)
At+1(ht,Et)1−1/bτ(t) (A.13)
Using equation (A.13) we can write the ratio of human capital and beliefs indexes as
At+1(H¯kt+1(ht),Ekt+1)
At+1(ht,Et)
=
p0t+1(h
(1)
kt ,E
(1)
kt )
1/bτ(t)+1
At+2(h
(1)
kt ,E
(1)
kt )
1−1/bτ(t)+1
p0t+1(h
(1)
0t ,E
(1)
0t )
1/bτ(t)+1
At+2(h
(1)
0t ,E
(1)
0t )
1−1/bτ(t)+1 (A.14)
where h(1)kt and E
(1)
kt indicate the value of the state variables at future age t+ 1, conditional
on the decision path described by making dkt = 1. In general, define h
(s)
kt and E
(s)
kt as the
value of the state variables at future age t+ s, conditional on the decision path described by
making d = 1 for all d ∈ {dkt, d0t+1, . . . , d0T} and define
φt(s) =
1
bτ(t)+s
s−1∏
r=1
(1− 1/bτ(t)+r) (A.15)
Iterative substitution of equation (A.13) in (A.14) up to retirement age yields
At+1(H¯kt+1(ht),Ekt+1)
At+1(ht,Et)
=
T−t∏
s=1
(
p0t+s(h
(s)
kt ,E
(s)
kt )
p0t+s(h
(s)
0t ,E
(s)
0t )
)φt(s)
(A.16)
Plugging equation (A.16) into equation (A.10) and applying logarithms finishes the proof.
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Q.E.D.
A.3 Estimation Appendix
A.3.1 First Stage Detailed
The first stage uses an Expectation-Maximization algorithm. The EM algorithm is an iter-
ative method that yields maximum likelihood estimates when a portion of the relevant data
is unobserved. In the model, the unobserved part of the data isMi. In order to implement
the EM algorithm assumeMi is observed for all i. Hence, the log likelihood of the data for
individual i is
lnLi =
Ti∑
t=ti0
4∑
k=0
dkit ln Pr [dkit = 1|hit,Eit; Λ,Θ]
+
Ti∑
t=ti0
4∑
j=0
djit ln Pr [yjit+1|hit, µj; Θ]
≡ lnLPi + lnLyi (A.17)
Since lnLi is additively separable, lnLyi is used to consistently estimate Θ and ∆s using the
EM algorithm. Implementation of the EM algorithm iterates over two steps to obtain max-
imum likelihood estimates. The expectation step at the mth iteration requires computation
of the expectation of lnLyi conditional on the observed data and the parameters at the mth
iteration. The maximization step finds the new iterated value of the vector of parameters
by maximizing the expression obtained in the expectation step.
Expectation Step. Using Bayes’ rule (see Ch. 9 in DeGroot (1970) and James (2011)), the
conditional distribution ofMi for an individual with education level s at the mth iteration,
161
based on the observed data, is N (Emi ,Vmi ) where
Emi =
(
(∆ms )
−1 + Ψi
)−1
Wi (A.18)
Vmi =
(
(∆ms )
−1 + Ψi
)−1
(A.19)
where the kth component of the Wi vector is
Wi{k} =
∑T
t=1 dkit (ykit − h′itθk)
σ2,mk
and the diagonal components of the square matrix Ψi are
Ψi{k,k} =
∑T
t=1 dkit
σ2,mk
The off-diagonal terms of Ψi are all zeros. Given µki and the distribution of ηkit
log Pr [yit|hit, µk; Θ] = log
(
1√
2piσ2k
exp
{
− (ykit − h′itθk − µki)2
2σ2k
})
= −1
2
log
(
2piσ2k
)− 1
2σ2k
(ykit − h′itθk − µki)2
Therefore, the expectation step of the EM algorithm yields
Em [logLyi ] = −
T∑
t=1
4∑
k=1
dkit · Em
[
1
2
log
(
2piσ2k
)
+
1
2σ2k
(
ykit − h′itθk − µki
)2]
= −
T∑
t=1
4∑
k=1
dkit
[
1
2
log
(
2piσ2k
)
+
1
2σ2k
(
Vmi{k,k} +
(
ykit − h′itθk − Emi{k}
)2)]
(A.20)
where Em [·] stands for the expectation overMi using the distribution characterized by the
parameters of the mth iteration conditional on the observed data.
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Maximization Step. Following the expectation step, the maximization step entails maxi-
mizing (A.20) in order to obtain Θm+1. In fact, each θm+1k is given by
θm+1k = arg min
θk
N∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
dkit
(
yit − h′itθk − Emi{k}
)2 (A.21)
which yields
θm+1k = (H
′WkH)−1H ′WkYk
where H is the [NT ×# (θk)] matrix that stacks together all values of h′it, Yj is the [NT × 1]
matrix that stacks together all values of yit − Emi{k}, and Wk is the [NT ×NT ] diagonal
matrix with dkit in its diagonal. Using the FOCs from (A.20) and the estimated values of
θm+1j , σ
2,m+1
k has the closed form solution
σ2,m+1k =
N∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
dkit
(
Vmi{k,k} +
(
yit − h′itθm+1k − Emi{k}
)2)
N∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
dkit
(A.22)
A summary of the EM algorithm is
• Step 1: Given mth iteration values {θmk , σ2,mk }k∈{1,...,4} and {∆ms }s∈{1,...,4}, solve for Emi
and Vmi using (A.18) and (A.19).
• Step 2: Update population parameter ∆m+1s for education level s as
∆m+1s =
1
Ns
N∑
i=1
4∑
s=1
δis (Vmi + Emi Em′i ) (A.23)
where δis is an indicator of individual i having education level s and Ns =
∑
i δis.
Equation (A.23) follows from maximization of the expected value of the log likelihood
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ofMi, Em [log f(Mi)].2
• Step 3: For each occupation k > 0, new iteration values θm+1k are obtained using
equation (A.21) and new iteration values σ2,m+1k are obtained using equation (A.22).
The algorithm is initialized with arbitrary values and the steps are repeated until convergence
under the criterion ∥∥∥∥∥
N∑
i=1
log L˜y,m+1i −
N∑
i=1
log L˜y,mi
∥∥∥∥∥ < 
where
L˜y,mi =
∫
M˜
{
Ti∏
t=ti0
4∏
j=1
Pr [yjit+1|hit, µ˜j; Θm]djit
}
dF
(
M˜; ∆ms
)
(A.24)
is computed using Monte Carlo integration.  is set to be 1× 10−4
A.3.2 Second Stage Detailed
The second stage of the estimation procedure is initialized with flexible parametric versions
of the future conditional choice probabilities estimated from the data, where the beliefs,
estimated in the first stage, are also treated as data. In the model, individuals have perfect
foresight about their marital status. However, their entire marital status vector up to period
T is not always observed. Hence, their marital status histories are completed using a single
marital status path constructed using the median age of first marriage at 1970 from the U.S.
Census Bureau, Current Population Survey and the median marriage duration presented in
Kreider and Ellis (2011).3 Effectively it amounts to individuals getting married at age 23
and remaining married until age 50.
2See Anderson and Olkin (1985).
3For the median age at first marriage visit: http://www.census.gov/hhes/families/data/marital.html.
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Maximization Step
At any iteration of the second stage, for a given set of estimated ccps, utility parameters are
obtained from maximization of the log likelihood
1
NT
∑
i
∑
t
4∑
k=0
dkit ln pkit(ht,Et) (A.25)
The expectation in the expression for Vk(ht,Et) in equation (2.17) can be written as
Et
vkit+1 T−t∏
s=1
(
p0it+s(h
(s)
kit,E
(s)
kit)
p0it+s(h
(s)
0it,E
(s)
0it)
)φ(s)∣∣∣∣∣∣Eit, hit

=
∫
ζk
exp
(−ρL¯kykit+1(hit)
bτ(t+1)
) T−t∏
s=1
(
p0it+s(h
(s)
kit,E
(1)
kit(ζk))
p0it+s(h
(s)
0it,Eit)
)φ(s) dF (ζk|Eit, hit)
=
∫
ζk
exp
(−ρL¯k(fk(hit, ωi; θk) + ζk)
bτ(t+1)
) T−t∏
s=1
(
p0it+s(h
(s)
kit,E
(1)
kit(ζk))
p0it+s(h
(s)
0it,Eit)
)φ(s) dF (ζk|Eit, hit)
(A.26)
I compute the value of (A.26) using Monte Carlo integration.
Given a value for ρ the model becomes a simple logit in the α parameters and the Monte
Carlo integral is4
Bkit(ρ) =
1
S
∑
s
{
exp
(−ρL¯k(fk(hit; θk) + ζsk)
bτ(t+1)
)
Akit(ζ
s
k)
}
(A.27)
where
Akit(ζ
s
k) =
T−t∏
s=1
(
p0it+s(h
(s)
kit,E
(1)
kit(ζ
s
k))
p0it+s(h
(s)
0it,Eit)
)φ(s)
is a value which varies across signals, ζsk, drawn for integration. The draws come from the
4Recall that the scale of parameters Θ, ∆s, and ρ depends on the units in which income and consumption
are measured. I express hourly income in $10 units and consumption in $1,000 units. Therefore, in estimation,
instead of L¯k I write L¯k/100.
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distribution of the signal conditional on beliefs ζsk = µki + ηkit ∼ N
(
E{k}it,V{k,k}it + σ2ηk
)
.
Using the definition of αkt(ht) in equation (2.3), equation (2.17) can be rewritten as
Vk(ht,Et) = −h′itαk − Ckit(ρ) (A.28)
where
Ckit(ρ) = (bτ(t) − 1) lnBkit(ρ)
Equation (A.28) is then substituted into (2.16). In estimation, the log likelihood is maxi-
mized conditional on a value of ρ. Search over values for ρ is then undertaken an the value
that maximizes the log likelihood is selected. This procedure is faster that searching over all
the parameter space at once because it avoids computing the Monte Carlo integral in (A.26)
more than once for each value of ρ.
CCP Step
For a given value of utility parameters the model is solved backwards and new model-
generated ccps are obtained. This new ccps are fed into the maximization step and new
utility parameters are obtained. Given that each iteration is computationally intensive, the
iterative process is stopped after 5 iterations because the minimum log likelihood is achieved
in iteration 4. The Euclidean distance between the parameter vectors in iteration 4 and 5 is
9.4. Future version of the model may entail more iterations to ensure that the solution is not
a local minimum. The relatively small distance between the parameter vectors and the fact
that the first search was initialized from 10 different initial points suggests that the solution
may not be local. Notice that the estimated parameters at each iteration are consistent since
the ccps that initialize the process are themselves consistent.
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A.4 Results Appendix
A.4.1 Solving the Model
As mentioned in the Estimation section, solution of the model is needed in order to provide
new estimates of the conditional choice probabilities. The model is solved using the same
representation obtained in Proposition 2.2 and summarized in equation (2.17). Notice that
this representation is obtained as a function of the probability of not working in the future
conditional on specific choice paths. Consistent, with this representation, for a given vector
of estimated parameters, the value function is solved with the following recursive algorithm
starting at t = T :
• Step 1. Obtain the value of the mapping Vk(hit,Eit) for a grid spanning the relevant
state space using equation (2.17) and the future choice paths described in Proposition
2.2.5
• Step 2. Obtain relevant ccps for period t using equation (2.16).
• Step 3. Obtain parametric versions of the ccps for period t, Ωt. Noting that only the
not working ccps are needed, the parametric version is obtained using a non linear
regression that minimizes the distance between the model ccps, p0it(hit,Eit), from Step
2 and a parameterization given by exp(X ′itΩt)/(1 + exp(X ′itΩt)). Xit includes multiple
interactions of components of the state.
• Step 4. If t = t0, stop. Otherwise, set t = t − 1 and go back to Step 1 using the
collection of parametric ccps obtained so far for the representation.
As a final product from the previous algorithm, a collection of future ccps, {Ωt}Tt=t0 ,
characterizing the value function at any period t is obtained.
5Notice that at period T there is no future value of human capital and beliefs. Only the value of income
to be received at T + 1. Hence, no future ccps are needed as the occupational choice becomes static.
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A.4.2 Model Fit
In order to assess goodness of fit, an initial state is generated and the model is simulated
forward using the collection of future ccps implied by the model, {Ωt}Tt=t0 , that characterize
the value function. For comparison against the data initial states are obtained drawing
from the data under certain restrictions. First, a collection of initial states is drawn from
the initial states observed in the data (race, education, entry age, year of entry, permanent
wealth). To avoid the high volatility of bond prices before 1980, only years after 1980 are
considered for the comparison. Second, only one marital status path is allowed: the one
constructed in the Estimation Appendix. Third, ability for each individual drawn from the
data is set to be the mean beliefs conditional on all the information available for him. Using
Bayes’ rule, this is equal to his beliefs in the last period the individual is observed. In order
to increase precision, only individuals that are observed for at least ten years are used in the
comparison against the data.
An initial measure of model fit is presented in Figure A.3. It shows that the estimated
model replicates the choices well given the observed state. Table A.3 compares the tran-
sition matrices. In the model, occupations are less absorbing than in the data. However,
consistent with the data, entrepreneurial occupations are on average less sticky than salaried
occupations. Notably, the not working alternative is much less absorbing in the model, which
suggests that there are barriers to exit unemployment that are not captured in the model.
In terms of switching behavior, the model successfully captures the fact that most switch-
ing from salaried occupations happens within the salaried group. It also captures the fact
that, whereas unincorporated individuals tend to switch in similar percentages into either
salaried occupation, incorporated entrepreneurs tend to overwhelmingly switch into white
collar work. Table A.4 compares descriptive statistics of occupational spells. Although,
consistent with transition results, the model under-predict spell durations, it performs well
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in terms of the distribution of occupational spells across-occupations. At the beginning of
their careers, the model over predicts the number of individuals starting as unemployed or
blue collar workers, and under predicts the number starting as white collar workers.
Table A.3: Transition Patterns: Observed and Simulated
Data
blue collar white collar unincorporated incorporated not working
blue collar 0.87 0.08 0.02 0.00 0.02
white collar 0.07 0.89 0.02 0.01 0.01
unincorporated 0.11 0.10 0.73 0.04 0.01
incorporated 0.03 0.15 0.06 0.75 0.01
not working 0.37 0.15 0.03 0.00 0.44
Model
blue collar white collar unincorporated incorporated not working
blue collar 0.74 0.18 0.04 0.01 0.03
white collar 0.22 0.71 0.05 0.02 0.01
unincorporated 0.23 0.21 0.53 0.02 0.01
incorporated 0.08 0.17 0.03 0.72 0.00
not working 0.62 0.25 0.05 0.01 0.07
Notes: Matrix entry i, j represents the proportion of people in occupation in row i who move into occupation in column j
between t and t+ 1.
Table A.4: Spells: Observed and Simulated
Data
all blue collar white collar unincorporated incorporated not working
Total 4294 1707 1652 453 194 288
Percent 39.75 38.47 10.55 4.52 6.71
Duration 4.97 5.21 6.03 3.10 3.10 1.63
First 52.06 42.56 2.19 0.27 2.92
Tried 68.73 69.92 20.05 9.03 14.54
Model
all blue collar white collar unincorporated incorporated not working
Total 282999 114681 104919 34842 11183 17374
Percent 40.52 37.07 12.31 3.95 6.14
Duration 3.03 3.54 3.13 2.02 3.02 1.07
First 56.84 29.02 3.46 0.74 9.94
Tried 77.06 76.74 32.04 16.44 39.99
Notes: Duration is the average duration of spells in years. First is the percentage of first spells that belong to a particular
occupation. Tried is the percentage of individuals who tried the occupation during their observed careers.
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Figure A.3: Model Fit by Age
Notes: Actual and simulated choices by age.
Table A.5 shows the mean and variance of hourly income across all individuals who partic-
ipate in each of the four occupations. With the exception of incorporated entrepreneurship,
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the model captures well the first two moments of the income distribution. For incorporated
entrepreneurs, the model over predicts mean and variance. Notwithstanding this over pre-
diction, the model respects the relative order in terms of which occupations generate higher
income variance and which ones offer higher average income. Additionally, the model is able
to capture the trend in the relation between the probability of switching into entrepreneur-
ship from salaried occupations and the current income signal (see Figure 2.2). Figure A.4
shows that better signals in salaried occupations are negatively associated with the proba-
bility of switching into unincorporated entrepreneurship. The model captures the relative
flatness of the relation between the signal and the probability of switching into incorpo-
rated entrepreneurship from blue collar work. Moreover, the increase in the probability of
switching into incorporated entrepreneurship from white collar, for those receiving the best
signals, is also captured by the model. Consistent with the excess switching shown in the
simulated transition matrix, the model is unable to capture the level of the relations found
in the data. Highlighting the role of correlated learning, Figure A.5 shows that a model that
does not allow for correlated learning is unable to capture neither the level not the trend of
this relation.
Table A.5: Income: Observed and Simulated
Data
blue collar white collar unincorporated incorporated
mean income 14.14 21.17 21.00 37.48
variance income 7.94 14.25 22.77 51.17
Model
blue collar white collar unincorporated incorporated
mean income 15.21 22.35 23.88 51.04
variance income 5.83 13.04 27.47 89.57
Notes: Quantities in dollars of 2000.
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Figure A.4: Switching into Entrepreneurial Occupations (Correlated Learning)
Notes: Probability of switching into entrepreneurial occupations in t+ 1 by decile of residual income in t. Residual income is
computed from occupation-specific regressions of hourly income on occupation-specific experience, general experience squared,
race, education and marital status.
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Figure A.5: Switching into Entrepreneurial Occupations (Uncorrelated Learning)
Notes: Probability of switching into entrepreneurial occupations in t+ 1 by decile of residual income in t under the
counterfactual that learning about ability is uncorrelated. Residual income is computed from occupation-specific regressions of
hourly income on occupation-specific experience, general experience squared, race, education and marital status.
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A.4.3 Certainty Equivalent
Static
In order to get a sense of the magnitude of the estimated risk aversion parameter consider
a static individual with beliefs Bt = {Et,Vt}. His expected annual income from working in
occupation k at age t is
y¯kt+1 = fk(hit; θk) + Et{k}
and he considers the variance of his hourly income to be
σ2kt = Vt{k,k} + σ2ηk
Therefore, his certainty equivalent at occupation k, yck, solves
− exp{−ρL¯kyck} = − exp{−ρL¯ky¯kt+1 + ρ2L¯2k2 σ2kt
}
which yields
yck = y¯kt+1 −
ρL¯k
2
σ2kt (A.29)
In estimation L¯k is substituted with L¯k/100.
Dynamic
In order to obtain the dynamic version of the certainty equivalent use equation (A.9) to find
the quantity yck such that
Et
[
At+1(H¯kt+1(ht),Ekt+1) exp
(
−ρL¯kykt+1(ht)
bτ(t+1)
)
|Et, ht
]1−1/bτ(t)
= Et
[
At+1(H¯kt+1(ht),Et) exp
(
−ρL¯kyck
bτ(t+1)
)
|Et, ht
]1−1/bτ(t)
173
As opposed to the static case, the future value of human capital and beliefs also determine
the certainty equivalent:
yck = −
(
bτ(t+1)
ρL¯k
)
ln
(
Et
[
At+1(H¯kt+1(ht),Ekt+1)vkt+1|Et, ht
]
At+1(H¯kt+1(ht),Et)
)
(A.30)
A.4.4 Monetary Value of Entry Costs
The monetary value of entry costs is obtained using equation (A.9). From equation (2.3)
one can separate the non-pecuniary costs in two factors, one corresponding to the entry
costs, αekt(ht) and the other corresponding to all other non-pecuniary costs. Hence, let
αkt(ht) = α
o
kt(ht)× αekt(ht). Next, use equation (2.3) to figure out the quantity that should
be taken out of annual income in the budget constraint in order to equalize the conditional
value functions. In other words, find the quantity ψ that must be given to the individual to
leave him indifferent between (a) receiving ψ and facing entry costs and (b) not receiving ψ
but facing no entry costs. It solves:
αekt(ht)
1/bτ(t)Et
[
At+1(H¯kt+1(ht),Ekt+1) exp
(−ρL¯kykt+1(ht)
bτ(t+1)
)
|Et, ht
]1−1/bτ(t)
= Et
[
At+1(H¯kt+1(ht),Ekt+1) exp
(−ρ(L¯kykt+1(ht)− ψ)
bτ(t+1)
)
|Et, ht
]1−1/bτ(t)
which yields
ψ =
lnαekt(ht)
ρ
bτ(t+1)
bτ(t) − 1 (A.31)
Since the quantity L¯kykt+1 was written in thousands of dollars in estimation, the value of ψ
is in thousands of dollars.
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A.4.5 Alternative Regimes
In order to increase precision and facilitate comparison across options, in this section ability
is not approximated from the data. Instead, individuals’ ability vectors are drawn from the
estimated distributions in Table 2.7. Rather than being replicated from the data, individ-
uals are simulated using the empirical joint distribution of initial states. Simulations are
undertaken using a fictional economy in which there is no aggregate variation in bond prices.
In this stationary environment the bond price is set to remain constant at the 1990 level.6
Marital status paths follow the same restriction specified in the Estimation Appendix. The
initial state and bond price sequence used in the decomposition is also used for the policy
counterfactuals.
These counterfactual regimes are described below:
• C1: No Learning-by-doing. In this counterfactual, individuals receive a fix hourly
return regardless of how much experience in the occupation they have accumulated.
The fixed hourly return provided to individuals is constructed as an approximation of
the average returns from experience in the occupation. It is computed as the average
of the returns to experience, computed during the first 20 years in the labor market,
of an individual that works exclusively in the occupation. Let Rk(x) be the returns to
experience in occupation k for somebody that has worked x years in occupation k and
zero years in any other occupation (see Figure 2.4). Then, the fixed hourly return to
individuals in occupation k under this counterfactual is
y¯k =
20∑
x=0
Rk(x)
This exercise yields the following values:
6An alternative way of dealing with the aggregate variation is to undertake a partial equilibrium analysis
that fixes the sequence of bond prices observed in the data across counterfactual regimes.
175
Table A.6: Average Income for Counterfactual: No Learning-by-doing
blue collar white collar unincorporated incorporated
y¯k 0.378 0.879 0.725 1.234
Notes: Computed using the profiles in Table 2.6.
Individuals under this counterfactual still have differential returns based on their edu-
cation, race, marital status, and ability.
• C2: Isolated full information about ability. In this counterfactual, individuals have full
information about their ability. In order to isolate the effect of sorting on ability, the
value of the idiosyncratic income variance of their income is set to equal its original
value (see Table 2.8) plus the value of the ability variance (see Table 2.7). In terms of
equation (2.4), this amounts to changing the value of the idiosyncratic income variance
in occupation k from just σηk to σηk + V{k,k}.
• C3: No Cross-occupation Returns. In this counterfactual, the returns in occupation k
from experience accumulated in occupation k′ 6= k (see Figure 2.5) are set to be zero.
• C4: Uncorrelated Learning. In this counterfactual, individuals use an alternative
variance-covariance matrix in order to update their beliefs. This variance-covariance is
formed setting at zero the off-diagonal terms of the variance-covariance matrix of the
distribution of ability.
• C5: No Uncertainty. In this counterfactual, individuals have full information about
their ability and they face no extra uncertainty coming from the idiosyncratic variance.
In other words, this is the same as counterfactual C2 plus setting the idiosyncratic
variance to zero.
• C6: Uniform Entry Costs. In this counterfactual, individuals of all ages pay the same
entry cost, provided they have the same permanent wealth. This cost equals the one
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faced by a 35 year old individual with their education level (see Table 2.9).
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Table A.7: Comparison of Counterfactual Regimes
Unincorporated
Baseline C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6
Ever tried 0.31 0.38 0.34 0.28 0.32 0.35 0.54
Ever tried in first 5 years 0.08 0.08 0.11 0.06 0.08 0.12 0.31
PVI if ever tried 518 510 663 493 481 666 618
Spell duration 2.17 2.16 2.81 2.37 2.07 2.89 3.10
Participation rate at age 40 0.10 0.13 0.14 0.10 0.10 0.15 0.26
At first entry
Ability (10$ per hour) 0.05 0.05 0.59 0.09 -0.09 0.57 0.03
Belief (10$ per hour) 0.04 0.04 - 0.07 0.00 - 0.01
Age 34.07 34.88 32.80 34.91 33.99 32.53 28.04
expbc 6.76 8.37 6.01 9.76 6.47 5.90 0.85
expwc 4.77 3.86 4.25 2.55 5.09 4.04 3.88
Overall
Ability (10$ per hour) 0.37 0.39 1.16 0.45 0.21 1.12 0.23
College or more 0.55 0.58 0.65 0.63 0.49 0.65 0.44
Incorporated
Baseline C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6
Ever tried 0.15 0.33 0.20 0.14 0.13 0.26 0.26
Ever tried in first 5 years 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.07 0.12
PVI if ever tried 757 624 1115 622 576 1115 840
Spell duration 2.88 2.98 5.11 2.91 2.62 5.57 3.39
Participation rate at age 40 0.04 0.09 0.10 0.04 0.03 0.14 0.13
At first entry
Ability (10$ per hour) 0.55 0.43 1.73 0.50 -0.25 1.52 0.20
Belief (10$ per hour) 0.64 0.49 - 0.54 0.00 - 0.26
Age 38.62 40.52 36.06 40.59 38.74 35.43 29.19
expbc 6.95 11.43 5.98 13.50 7.03 6.07 0.45
expwc 8.14 5.68 6.52 3.97 8.09 5.85 5.18
Overall
Ability (10$ per hour) 1.18 0.92 2.70 1.12 0.24 2.37 0.42
College or more 0.70 0.62 0.66 0.64 0.61 0.63 0.37
Notes: Average of several summary statistics across alternative regimes. Rows: PVI stands for the present value of income in
thousands of dollars. This average is computed only over those who tried the occupation. At first entry indicates that
quantities are computed at first entry. Ability contains the ability of those entering the occupation. Belief contains the
mean of the belief regarding ability. Both ability and the mean of the belief are in 10$ per hour. expbc and expwc stand for
blue and white collar experience. Overall indicates that quantities are computed across all observations of individuals
participating in the occupation. Columns: Baseline is the model specification used in Chapter 2. Columns C4 to C7
correspond to the solution and simulation of the model under alternative regimes. C1 shuts down accumulation of human
capital through experience. All individuals going into occupation k receive the equivalent of the average return from
experience of somebody who always works in occupation k. The average is computed over the first 20 years of his labor
market career. C2 is a full information model where the overall level of initial uncertainty is maintained in order to isolate the
effect of sorting on ability from risk aversion. In this counterfactual, the idiosyncratic variance is set to be σηk + V{k,k}. C3
sets the cross-occupation returns to experience to be zero. C4 shuts down correlated learning. C5 is the full information
model without uncertainty. In this counterfactual, the idiosyncratic variance σηk is set to be zero. C6 keeps the entry costs
constant relative to age. Entry costs are always those of a 35 years old person. However, entry costs still vary with permanent
wealth. The same simulated individuals, including their ability vector, is keep constant across counterfactual regimes.
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Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 3
B.1 Data Appendix
Beginning in 1984, the Multi-Center AIDS Cohort Study (MACS) started gathering infor-
mation regarding natural and treated histories of HIV infection in homosexual and bisexual
men. The study is conducted in Baltimore, Chicago, Pittsburgh and Los Angeles. At each
semi-annual visit, data are collected on: demographics, psychosocial characteristics, sexual
behavior, and specially important for our purposes, antiretroviral (AV henceforth) drugs
consumption and trial participation. In addition, blood tests are administered to measure
health status and serostatus (whether the individual is HIV+). Data collection started with
4,954 men enrolled. Two more enrollments have taken place: one in 1987-1991 (668 addi-
tional men) and another in 2001-2003 (1,350 additional men). We only use data from the
first two enrollments.
B.1.1 Main Variables
Health (hit−1): At every visit individuals go through a physical examination in which several
health measurements are taken. As our measure of underlying health status, we use the
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CD4 count obtained from a blood sample. “CD4 is a glycoprotein found on the surface of
immune cells [...]. If CD4 cells become depleted, for example in untreated HIV infection, or
following immune suppression prior to a transplant, the body is left vulnerable to a wide
range of infections that it would otherwise have been able to fight. [...] Normal blood values
are usually expressed as the number of cells per microliter (or cubic millimeter, mm3) of
blood, with normal values for CD4 cells being 500-1200 cells/mm” (Wikipedia). We denote
as hit−1 the CD4 count at of the individual at the start of period t.
Labor supply (lit−1): Whether the individual was working full time (35 hours or more) in
visit t.
Income (mjit): Starting at visit 14, individuals answer the following question: “Which of
the following categories describes your annual individual gross income before taxes”? For
visit 14, categories are: less than 10000, 10000-19999, 20000-29999, 30000-39999, 40000-
49999, 50000-59999, 60000-69999, 70000 or more, Doesn’t wish to answer. For visits 15 to
35, categories are: less than 10000, 10000-19999, 20000-29999, 30000-39999, 40000-49999,
50000 or more, Doesn’t wish to answer. For visits 36 to 41, categories are: less than 10000,
10000-19999, 20000-29999, 30000-39999, 40000-49999, 50000-99999, 60000 or more, Doesn’t
wish to answer.
We censor all periods at 50000 or more to obtain a uniform question over time. Then
we assign the middle point to individuals in the bracket. For the highest bracket we assign
the upper limit (50000). In our model gross income is divided by two since the survey
asks about annual income. Gross income as well as out-of-pocket payments (below) are in
constant dollars of 2000.
Out-of-pocket payments (ojit): Starting from visit 14, individuals are given the following
direction “Please estimate the TOTAL out-of-pocket expenses that you or other personal
sources (your lover, family or friends) paid for prescription medications since your last visit.”1
1Wording changes slightly in visits 14 and 15.
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As opposed to the gross income question, this question is open so values are not categorized.
Ailments (xjit): Starting from at visit 4, individuals are asked about physical symptoms.
Even though other ailments are recorded, we focus on unusual bruises lasting at least two
weeks, unintentional weight loss of at least 10 pounds, fatigue, diarrhea, fever, night sweats,
and tender/enlarged glands. The last 5 ailments must be felt for at least 3 days.
Even though individuals are asked explicitly about side effects starting from visit 13, we
choose not to use such data because it is less consistent and, more importantly, because we do
not think individuals are able to differentiate correctly between side effects and symptoms.
Therefore, in our model xit takes the value of 1 if individual reports having any of the
problems mentioned above.
Race (bi): Individuals in the sample are either white, black or hispanic.
Age (ait): Age of the individual at the beginning of period t.
B.1.2 Products and Product Components
At every visit after visit 6, individuals are asked whether they took any medication to
fight AIDS. Starting from visit 13, as the number of medications becoming available for
HIV exploded, separate surveys were administered for antiretroviral drugs (ARVs) and non
antiretroviral drugs (NARVs). We focus on ARVs since these are the drugs used to treat HIV
infection. Further, since our analysis includes estimating the health and ailments of people
using different drugs, we focus on observations where individuals have reported a treatment
along with hit, hit−1, and xit.
Individuals are asked to name specifically which drugs they took as well as whether or not
they took the drug as part of a research study (the exact wording of the question regarding
research studies changes slightly over time). Some of the reported drugs are themselves
coded as trials; we regard these instances as individuals participating in trials (see Table
B.1). If at individual i at period t is consuming one of his drugs as part of a trial we regard
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individual i as consuming a trial product at period t.
Table B.1: Trial Components
Name Observations
AZT/ddI Blinded Trial 91
AZT/ddC Blinded Trial 69
ddI/ddC Blinded Trial 6
AZT/ddI/ddC Blinded Trial 31
AZT/d4T trial 4
AZT/3-TC Blinded Trial 23
AZT/ddI/protease inhibitor Blinded Trial 1
AZT/protease inhibitor Blinded Trial 2
d4T/protease inhibitor Blinded Trial 1
AZT/3-TC/protease inhibitor Blinded Trial 1
Combivir/Trizivir Blinded Trial 5
Trizivir + Sustiva/Combivir + Sustiva Blinded Trial 3
Generic AIDS Vaccine Trial 1
Next, we define market products as treatments with no components consumed in trial.
Given that the sum of effects of individual drugs is not equal to the effect of a treatment
formed by the sum of the drugs, the relevant market products consumed in our data corre-
spond to combinations of components. For instance a product is AZT and another is AZT
plus 3TC plus ddI. Table B.2 describes the individual components of market products. Some
components, listed separately in Table B.3, are in fact fixed-dose combinations of other com-
ponents. In our sample, if individual i is consuming the fixed-dose combination (A + B)
and individual i′ is consuming components A and B, we assign consumers i and i′ to the
same treatment. One of the coded components in the data corresponds to “other ARVs”. We
add all uncoded components (96 instances) to “other ARVs” which results in 158 instances
of “other ARVs”. Finally, we treat α and β Interferons (177 instances and 33 instances,
respectively) as one single component.
Our definition of market products, as combinations of drug components, generates 1835
different market treatments. We reduce the number of market products using the following
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algorithm:
1. We select our core market products as those treatments that overall have more than
40 instances.2 We acknowledge that our definition of core treatments is biased against
treatments appearing near the end of the time period studied. We address this issue by
excluding the last 4 periods of data. Our core treatments are listed in Table B.4 which
shows that there are 70 core products overall and they have at most five components.
Out of 20142 subject-visit observations of consumers taking market products, 13767
are covered by core treatments and 6375 correspond to non-core treatments.
2. Second, we assign non-core treatments to core treatments in the following fashion.
Each step is used sequentially to assign remaining non core treatments that were not
assigned in previous steps.
(a) Assignment of Non-core: Non core treatment A is assigned to core treatment B if
B is the core treatment with the highest number of components that is contained
by A. This procedure yields both non-unique assignments or null assignments.
Of the remaining 6375 subject-visit observations of non core treatments, 2963 are
assigned uniquely in this step. This means that we are left with 3412 subject-visit
observations with non core treatments, 1647 that are assigned to multiple core
treatments and 1765 that are not assigned to any core treatment.
(b) Assignment of Multiple Assignments:
i. First, we use the past history of the individual. If at period t individual i is
consuming non core treatment W that was assigned to both core treatments
A and B in previous steps, and he was observed consuming core treatment A
in period t− 1, then his treatment at t is assigned uniquely as A. We repeat
2We can change this to a different number and main results remain robust.
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this procedure until no further gains are obtained. Out of the remaining 1647
subject-visit observations of non core treatments with multiple assignments,
428 are assigned uniquely in this step.
ii. Second, we use the future history of the individual. If at period t individual i
is consuming non core treatmentW that was assigned to both core treatments
A and B in previous steps, and he was observed consuming core treatment B
in period t+ 1, then his treatment at t is assigned uniquely as B. We repeat
this procedure until no further gains are obtained. Out of the remaining 1219
subject-visit observations of non core treatments with multiple assignments,
274 are assigned uniquely in this step.
iii. Third, we assign the reaming 945 subject-visit observations of non core treat-
ments with multiple assignments using the core treatment with the highest
share at t: if at period t individual i is consuming non core treatment W
that was assigned to both core treatments A and B in previous steps, and
treatment A’s market share at t is greater than B’s, his treatment at t is
assigned uniquely as A. This final step assigns uniquely the remaining 945
observations.
(c) Next, we regard all 1765 not assigned treatment observations as “fringe” treat-
ments since they do not contain any core treatment. We aggregate them in the
following fashion. We aggregate all fringe treatments that appear at period t and
assign to this “cohort” fringe treatment, all users consuming this product over
time. Similarly as we do with core treatments, we only consider fringe cohort
treatments that have at least 40 users. This reduces the number of observations
by 345 (which represents 1.6% of the number of observations of treatment con-
sumers). This aggregations leads to 17 fringe cohort treatments that we will treat
in the same way we treat core treatments: as innovations from the trials distribu-
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tion. This amounts to a total of 87 treatments over all. From this point on fringe
treatments are included in the denomination of core treatments.
3. We have specified that a treatment gets withdrawn from the market if it has zero share
for X = 2 consecutive periods. However, in the data, a treatment may have zero share
for Y > X periods and then reappear again. 78 out of 87 core treatments have unique
spells; we regard the remaining treatments with multiple spells as measurement error
and follow the next procedure to ensure that treatments have one single spell from
entry to exit. Consider a core treatment with multiple spells B.
(a) We identify all spells that treatment B has in the data.
(b) Among treatment B’s spells, we select the spell that contains the period in which
treatment B’s share was the highest. We drop all observations of market con-
sumers of treatment B that are not in this spell.
(c) We follow the same steps for all 9 core treatments with multiple spells. Out
of 19797 (20142 − 345) subject-visit observations of consumers taking market
products, this smoothing procedure drops 42 observations leaving 19755 subject-
visit observations of consumers taking market products.
As evidence of the relevance of the spells selected by this procedure we compute the
difference between the maximum share in the selected spell and the maximum share in each
of the other spells, as a percentage of the maximum share in the other spell. The mean
value of this measure is 2401, which suggests that the maximum share in the selected spell
is on average about 24 times larger that the maximum share in other spells. We also try
the following criteria: (i) selecting the spell with the highest average share and (ii) selecting
the spell with the highest sum of shares. All criteria result in closely similar entry and exit
dates so we stick to the maximum-share criteria.
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Table B.2: Chemical Formulae of Product Components
Component Chemical Formula Observations
Isoprinosine C52H78N10O17 87
Ribavirin C8H12N4O5 62
Interferons (α and β) 210
Foscarnet CH3O5P 92
AZT C10H13N5O4 7436
ddC C9H13N3O3 1123
AL-721 egg lecithin 147
Dextran-Sulfate H(C6H10O5)xOH 65
Acyclovir C8H11N5O3 2550
ddI C10H12N4O3 3069
d4T C10H12N2O4 3807
Nevirapine C15H14N4O 2210
Delavirdine C22H28N6O3S 176
3TC C8H11N3O3S 5250
Saquinavir C38H50N6O5 1279
Ritonavir C37H48N6O5S2 3230
Indinavir C36H47N5O4 2255
Nelfinavir C32H45N3O4S 1278
Kaletra C37H48N4O5 1883
Abacavir C14H18N6O 1549
Agenerase C25H35N3O6S 372
Efavirenz C14H9CIF3NO2 3362
Adefovir C8H12N5O4P 44
Enfuvirtide (T-20) C204H301N51O64 160
Tenofovir C9H14N5O4P 2488
Emtricitabine C8H10FN3O3S 263
Atazanavir C38H52N6O7 1583
Lexiva C25H36N3O9PS 418
Etravirine C20H15BrN6O 155
Darunavir C27H37N3O7S 315
Raltegravir C20H21FN6O5 384
Ampligen Double-stranded RNA compound 25
Peptide T C35H55N9O16 30
DTC C5H10NS2Na 10
CD4 2
Other protease 31
Vistide (cidofovir) C8H14N3O6P 2
Tipranavir (PNU-140690) C5H10NS2Na 30
Other Avs 158
Notes: Source: Wikipedia (November, 2014)
186
Table B.3: Combination Components
Name Combination Instances
Combivir AZT + 3TC 2673
Trizivir AZT + 3TC + Abacavir 778
Truvada Emtricitabine + Tenofovir 1933
Epzicom Abacavir + 3TC 724
Atripla Efavirenz + Emtricitabine + Tenofovir 968
187
Table B.4: Products in the Market, Entry and Exit
Treatment Id Treatment Haart Entry (visit) Exit (visit)
3 AZT 0 6 -
13 Interferons (α and/or β), AZT 0 7 23
9 AL-721 egg lecithin 0 7 15
34 AZT, Acyclovir 0 11 32
33 Acyclovir 0 11 32
47 AZT, Acyclovir, ddI 0 12 26
51 Acyclovir, ddI 0 12 32
14 AZT, ddC 0 12 35
39 AZT, ddI 0 12 41
46 ddI 0 12 -
69 AZT, ddC, Acyclovir, ddI 0 14 26
65 AZT, ddC, Acyclovir 0 14 31
67 AZT, ddC, ddI 0 14 23
63 ddC, Acyclovir 0 14 27
64 ddC 0 14 30
85 d4T 0 18 -
117 AZT, Acyclovir, 3TC 0 21 32
124 AZT, 3TC 0 22 -
146 Acyclovir, d4T, 3TC 0 23 32
161 AZT, 3TC, Saquinavir 1 24 42
157 d4T, 3TC 0 24 -
185 AZT, 3TC, Saquinavir, Ritonavir 1 25 -
164 AZT, Acyclovir, 3TC, Indinavir 1 25 32
171 Acyclovir, d4T, 3TC, Indinavir 1 25 32
169 AZT, 3TC, Ritonavir, Indinavir 1 25 45
214 d4T, 3TC, Ritonavir, Indinavir 1 25 45
254 d4T, 3TC, Saquinavir, Ritonavir 1 25 41
202 ddI , d4T, Indinavir 1 25 41
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175 d4T, 3TC, Indinavir 1 25 48
165 AZT, 3TC, Indinavir 1 25 -
242 d4T, Nevirapine, 3TC 1 26 -
236 AZT, Nevirapine, 3TC 1 26 -
268 AZT, 3TC, Nelfinavir 1 26 -
377 ddI , d4T, Nelfinavir 1 26 43
292 d4T, 3TC, Nelfinavir 1 27 -
349 ddI , d4T, Nevirapine 1 27 -
311 ddI , 3TC, Nelfinavir 1 27 -
615 ddI , d4T, Efavirenz 1 29 48
644 3TC, Abacavir, Efavirenz 1 29 -
573 AZT, Nevirapine, 3TC, Abacavir 1 30 -
720 AZT, 3TC, Abacavir, Efavirenz 1 30 -
548 AZT, 3TC, Efavirenz 1 30 -
701 AZT, 3TC, Abacavir 0 30 -
532 d4T, 3TC, Efavirenz 1 30 44
581 Nevirapine, 3TC, Abacavir 1 31 -
782 d4T, 3TC, Kaletra 1 34 44
940 3TC, Kaletra, Abacavir 1 35 -
869 AZT, 3TC, Kaletra 1 35 -
987 AZT, 3TC, Kaletra, Abacavir 1 36 -
963 3TC, Abacavir, Efavirenz, Tenofovir 1 36 -
921 AZT, 3TC, Abacavir, Tenofovir 1 36 -
909 AZT, 3TC, Kaletra, Tenofovir 1 36 -
923 Nevirapine, 3TC, Tenofovir 1 36 46
949 3TC, Kaletra, Tenofovir 1 36 -
919 Kaletra, Efavirenz, Tenofovir 0 36 -
926 3TC, Efavirenz, Tenofovir 1 36 -
1010 AZT, 3TC, Kaletra, Abacavir, Tenofovir 1 37 -
1020 ddI , Kaletra, Tenofovir 1 37 -
976 ddI , Efavirenz, Tenofovir 1 37 -
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1011 Abacavir, Efavirenz, Tenofovir 1 37 -
994 Kaletra, Abacavir, Tenofovir 1 37 -
1230 3TC, Ritonavir, Abacavir, Atazanavir 1 39 -
1071 Efavirenz, Tenofovir, Emtricitabine 1 39 -
1227 Ritonavir, Efavirenz, Tenofovir, Emtricitabine, Atazanavir 1 40 -
1245 3TC, Ritonavir, Abacavir, Tenofovir, Atazanavir 1 40 -
1303 ddI , Ritonavir, Tenofovir, Atazanavir 1 40 -
1222 Ritonavir, Tenofovir, Emtricitabine, Atazanavir 1 40 -
1128 Nevirapine, Tenofovir, Emtricitabine 1 40 -
1253 Kaletra, Tenofovir, Emtricitabine 1 41 -
1342 Ritonavir, Tenofovir, Emtricitabine, Lexiva 1 42 -
10006 0 6 16
10026 0 26 46
10027 0 27 45
10028 0 28 45
10030 1 30 43
10031 0 31 -
10035 0 35 49
10037 1 37 -
10038 0 38 -
10040 0 40 -
10041 1 41 -
10042 1 42 -
10043 1 43 -
10046 1 46 -
10048 1 48 -
10049 1 49 -
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B.2 Estimation Appendix
B.2.1 k-means Clustering Algorithm
We implement the following version of the k-means algorithm. At every period t:
1. We select the products that have not yet being applied the exit switching rule. In other
words, we select products that are still available for people to swith into at period t.
Denote this set of products available for clustering at t, At.
2. We re-scale the characteristics of all products available for clustering at t. In order to
do this we compute
θ˜r =
θr
maxδ∈At |δr|
, for r = h, x
Therefore, by construction θ˜r ∈ [−1, 1].
3. We choose the first k centroids using k initial θ˜’s in At randomly selected.
4. We allocate all remaining points in At sequentially. At each step the point selected is
the one that is closest to one of the existing clusters. This point is then allocated to
the correspondent cluster and the centroid of the cluster is updated. This process is
repeated until all points are allocated to a cluster.
5. We undertake a reallocation step in which, taken the centroids as given, all points are
allocated to their closest centroid.
6. We calculate the value of (3.8) for the current allocation.
7. We repeat the process 200 times using different random initial θ˜’s in At. The allocation
with the lowest value of (3.8) is chosen. When simulating clusters in estimation we
only repeat the process 50 times to speed up the process.
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B.2.2 Product Characteristics
We estimate product characteristics using data on individual treatment usage and subsequent
reports of health and ailments. Our estimation equations mimic equations (3.19) and (3.20),
which individuals use to form expectations over their health and ailments conditional on
their choice. The key difference between equations (3.19) and (3.20) and our estimation
equations is that here our aim is to obtain characteristics of each individual treatment.
Let δrit be an indicator that treatment r was used by individual i at time t. The charac-
teristics of treatment r are denoted
θr =
{
θxr , θ
h
r
} ∈ R2 (B.1)
The components of θr are estimated as the coefficients of δrit in the health and no-ailments
regressions
hit =
5∑
m=0
αhmh
m
it−1 +
∑
r
θhr δrit + it (B.2)
Pr [xit = 1|·] =
exp
(∑5
m=0 α
x
mh
m
it−1 +
∑
r θ
x
r δrit
)
1 + exp (·) (B.3)
B.2.3 GMM Estimation Algorithm
Using the fact that we observe the underlying stochastic process that generates the stochastic
process of cluster characteristics we can write the moment condition in equation (3.25) can
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be written as
E

w (zit)⊗

...
ln
(
poit(zit)
pjit(zit)
)
+ EP [yjit]− EP [yoit]
+
∑T∗
s=1 β
sP
o(s−1)
j (zit)
EP
[
Dit+s (zit+s)
∑
k∈Ct+s
pkit (zit+s) [ykit+s (zit+s) + ψkit+s (zit+s)]
∣∣∣∣∣ ·, j,Pt
]
−∑T∗s=1 βsP o(s−1)o (zit)
EP
[
Dit+s (zit+s)
∑
k∈Ct+s
pkit (zit+s) [ykit+s (zit+s) + ψkit+s (zit+s)]
∣∣∣∣∣ ·, o,Pt
]
...


= 0
(B.4)
Equation (B.4) is crucial for our simulation estimation method explained below. The key
fact is that we observe the characteristics of the underlying process of product evolution and
we are then able to use it to generate the stochastic evolution of clusters. We undertake
simulation in order to obtain the value of
∑T∗
s=1 β
sP
o(s−1)
j (zit)×
Ez
[
Dit+s (zit+s)
∑
k∈Ct+s
pkit+s (zit+s) [ykit+s (zit+s) + ψkit+s (zit+s)]
∣∣∣∣∣ zit, djit = 1, S(s−1)it = 1, doi ,Pt
]
(B.5)
for each individual i and choice j at every period t. Let NS denote the number of simulated
technology paths for each individual at every period and let the superscript ns indicate that
a quantity has being simulated. For individual i and decision j at period t we write the
simulated counterpart of equation (B.5) as
1
NS
∑
ns
T ∗∑
s=1
βsP
o(s−1),ns
j (zit)Dit+s
(
zns,jit+s
) ∑
k∈Cns,jt+s
dns,jkit+s
(
zns,jit+s
) [
ykit+s
(
zns,jit+s
)
+ ψkit+s
(
zns,jit+s
)]
=
1
NS
∑
ns
T ∗∑
s=1
βs
(
s∏
τ=1
Dit+τ
(
zns,jit+τ
)) ∑
k∈Cns,jt+s
dns,jkit+s
(
zns,jit+s
) [
ykit+s
(
zns,jit+s
)
+ ψkit+s
(
zns,jit+s
)]
(B.6)
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For a given vector of parameters of the utility function, the above simulation must be under-
taken NS times for each individual i available at period t, and for all t, and for J−1 choices
as well as for choice o, which means it must be repeated at least NS × T ×N × J . Further,
notice that within each individual simulation we must simulate N optimal paths, one for
every person, in order to obtain the aggregate behavior. In other words, even though we
simulate only NS×T ×N×J technology paths, we simulate NS×T ×N×J×N individual
paths. Given our numbers we will be simulating at most NS×33×1669×6 = NS×330, 462
technology paths of length T ∗ and NS× 33× 1669× 6× 1669 = NS× 551, 541, 078 individ-
ual paths of length T ∗. Relying on Hotz et al. (1994) we could set NS = 1 and still obtain
consistency. We set NS = 10 after trying different values of NS for robustness.
The sample moment conditions will then be
1∑
i
∑
t δit
N∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
δitw (zit)⊗

...
ln
(
poit(zit)
pjit(zit)
)
+ yjit − yoit
+ 1NS
∑
ns
∑T∗
s=1 β
s
(
s∏
τ=1
Dit+τ
(
zns,jit+τ
))
×∑
k∈Cns,jt+s
dns,jkit+s
(
zns,jit+s
) [
ykit+s
(
zns,jit+s
)
+ ψkit+s
(
zns,jit+s
)]
− 1NS
∑
ns
∑T∗
s=1 β
s
(
s∏
τ=1
Dit+τ
(
zns,oit+τ
))×∑
k∈Cns,jt+s
dns,okit+s
(
zns,oit+s
) [
ykit+s
(
zns,oit+s
)
+ ψkit+s
(
zns,oit+s
)]
...

= 0 (B.7)
where δit is an indicator of availability of individual i at period t. Estimation follows the
simulation strategy described below. Simulation will be undertaken in order to obtain
T∗∑
s=1
βsP
o(s−1)
j (zit)Ez
Dit+s (zit+s) ∑
k∈Ct+s
pikt+s (zit+s) [yikt+s (zit+s) + ψikt+s (zit+s)]
∣∣∣∣∣∣ zit, djit = 1, S(s−1)it = 1, doi

(B.8)
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and
T∗∑
s=1
βsP o(s−1)o (zit)Ez
Dit+s (zit+s) ∑
k∈Ct+s
pikt+s (zit+s) [yikt+s (zit+s) + ψikt+s (zit+s)]
∣∣∣∣∣∣ zit, diot = 1, S(s−1)it = 1, doi

(B.9)
for each individual i at every period t. Let the superscript ns indicate that a quantity has
been simulated. Also let subscript j denote the decision made at time t to be compared
against the base choice o.
For individual i at period t who chose j, the simulation algorithm to obtain (B.8) entails
the following steps for each simulated path ns (again, we set the number of simulated paths
for every data point (i, t) at NS = 1):
1. Number of new products. If s = 1, define Qnst+s−1 ≡ Qt. Using Qnst+s−1 we draw
number of new products, Newnst+s, using a negative binomial process. First we draw
µ∗t+s ∼ Gamma (1/α, αµt+s)
where
µt+s = β
N
0 + β
N
1 Qt+s−1
Then we draw
Newnst+s
∣∣
µ∗ ∼ Poisson
(
µ∗t+s
)
(
α, βN0 , β
N
1
)
are parameters estimated in a first stage.
2. Characteristics of new products. If Newnst+s > 0, for each simulated new product
we obtain simulated product characteristics. Consistent with our model, new products
at t+ s are characterized by simulated realizations of the bivariate random vector
ωt+s−1 + νt+s−1 (B.10)
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where ωt+s−1 is the centroid at t + s − 1, νt+s−1 ∼ Fν and Fν is our innovations
distribution which is estimated non parametrically.
As a by-product of steps 1 and 2 we obtain Qnst+s using equation (3.5).
3. Exit.
• Overall exit rule. If the ratio of people consuming product k (either by staying
or switching) relative to the number of people consuming a market product falls
bellow σ˜2 during the last 2 consecutive periods (i.e. t+s−1, t+s−2), the product
is withdrawn from the market and cannot be consumed at any τ ≥ t + s. σ˜2 is
chosen as the minimum conditional share observed in the data.
• Switching exit rule. If the product satisfies the overall exit rule or if the ratio of
people switching and being assigned product k relative to the number of people
switching falls bellow σ˜1 during the last 3 consecutive periods (i.e. t + s− 1, t +
s − 2, t + s − 3), the product is no longer available for switchers and therefore
cannot be used to form clusters at any τ ≥ t + s. σ˜1 is chosen as the minimum
conditional share observed in the data. These products may still be used by
“staying” individuals who consumed the product last period.
Old products minus exits plus simulated new products yields the simulated set of
products in period t+ s, Pnst+s.
4. Clusters. From the simulated set of products Pnst+s, we select those products that
can be used for clustering and along with the grouping algorithm we obtain simulated
clusters Gnst+s. We then compute characteristics for the simulated clusters, W nst+s.
5. Centroid. If s = 1 define Pnst+s−1 ≡ Pt. Using the characteristics of products in Pnst+s−1,
unconditional choice probabilities (Ei [pjit+s−1 (zit)]), within-cluster product weights at
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t + s − 1, and t + s − 1 shares of products conditional on staying, we compute the
simulated centroid ωnst+s using equation (3.1).
Steps 1 through 5 provide the aggregate part of the simulated state, zP,nst+s . Denote the
future choice set induced by the simulated evolution of products as Cnst+s.
6. Future state for i. (i) If s = 1, define hnsjit+s−1as the observed hjit+s−1. If s > 1,
draw h,nsit+s−1 from the non parametric distribution of h; then, using dnsit+s−1, and when
necessary, the realization of the within cluster treatment assigned at t + s − 1, we
compute simulated health at the beginning of period t + s, hnsjit+s−1, using equation
(B.2). If dnsit+s−1 involves the trial alternative, trial-product characteristics for comput-
ing equation (B.2) are drawn from the trial distribution at t+ s− 1, Fθ|ωt+s−1 ; which is
equivalent to using equation (B.10) and the innovations distribution, Fν . (ii) We draw
a simulated out-of-pocket payment shock o,nsit+s ∼ N (0, σ2o). (iii) We draw a simulated
labor state lnsit+s using equation (3.17). (iv) We compute deterministic state variables
for i.
7. Future state for all i′ 6= i. (i) If s = 1, define hnsi′t+s−1as the observed hi′t+s−1. If
1 < s < T ∗, draw h,nsi′t+s−1 from the non parametric distribution of 
h. Then, using
dnsi′t+s−1, and when necessary, the realization of the within cluster treatment assigned
at t + s − 1, we compute simulated health at the beginning of period t + s, hnsi′t+s−1,
using equation (B.2). If dnsi′t+s−1 involves the trial alternative, trial-product character-
istics for computing equation (B.2) are drawn from the trial distribution at t + s− 1,
Fθ|ωt+s−1 . We have deliberately written hnsi′t+s−1 instead of hnsi′jt+s−1 as it is explained
below. (ii) We draw a simulated labor state lnsi′t+s using equation (3.17). (iii) We
compute deterministic state variables for i′.
Steps 6 and 7 provide the relevant pieces of the individual-specific part of the simulated
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state, zo,nsjit+s for i and z
o,ns
i′t+s for all i
′ 6= i.
8. Probability of Survival up to t+ s− 1. If s = 1, by definition, P o(s−1)j (zit) = 1 for
all i available at t. If s > 1, using zo,nsjit+s−1, and P
o(s−2),ns
j (zit) we obtain P
o(s−1),ns
j (zit)
using
P
o(s−1),ns
j (zit) =
s−1∏
τ=1
Dit+τ
(
znsit+τ
)
= Dit+s−1
(
znsjit+s−1
)
P
o(s−2),ns
j (zit) (B.11)
9. CCPs and simulated choice for i. Using zP,nst+s , z
o,ns
jit+s, and equations (B.14), (B.16),
and (B.15), we compute simulated t + s ccps, pnsikt+s
(
znsjit+s
)
, for every alternative k ∈
Cnst+s. Then, using the simulated ccps we draw a decision dnsit+s
(
znsjit+s
)
for i.
10. CCPs and simulated choice for all i′ 6= i. Using zP,nst+s , zo,nsi′t+s for all i′ 6= i, and
equations (B.14), (B.16), and (B.15), we compute simulated t+ s ccps, pnsi′kt+s
(
znsi′t+s
)
,
for every alternative k ∈ Cnst+s. Then, using the simulated ccps we draw a decision
dnsi′t+s
(
znsi′t+s
)
for all i′ 6= i.
11. Static payoff for i. (i) We compute m¯sit+s = X
m,ns
it+s θ
m + νmi using equation (3.15).
Even though individuals know their idiosyncratic shocks in the income equation, mit , we
do not need to simulate these as they are iid and have mean zero an enter linearly in the
flow utility, which will result in them averaging out to zero in the moment condition.
(ii) Using the simulated choice dnsit+s
(
znsjit+s
)
we compute expected simulated out-of-
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pocket payments using
oit+s
(
dnsit+s
)
=
 o
∗,ns
it+s if o
∗,ns
it+s > 0
0 if o∗,nsit+s ≤ 0
where
o∗,nsit+s
(
dnsit+s
)
= Xo,nsit+s
(
dnsit+s
)
θo + o,nsit+s
and Xo,nsit+s
(
dnsit+s
)
are given in equation (3.16). Hence
E
[
oit+s
(
dnsit+s
)∣∣ dnsit+s] = Φ (Xo,nsit+s (dnsit+s) θo/σo)Xo,nsit+s (dnsit+s) θo+σoφ (Xo,nsit+s (dnsit+s) θo/σo)
(iii) We compute the expected probability of no-ailments as
E
[
xit+s| dnsit+s
]
using equation (3.19) and the relevant distribution: cluster, trial, or degenerate. Notice
that here we exploit again the fact that we observe the underlying stochastic process.
Whenever the choice is a cluster, we use the within cluster weights. (iv) Using above
components and i’s simulated decision we compute flow payoffs ynsit+s
(
znsit+s, d
ns
it+s
)
using
equation (3.13). (v) We compute the probability of survival from t + s − 1 into
t+s, Dit+s
(
znsit+s
)
, using equation (3.21) and the term ψit+s
(
znsit+s, d
ns
it+s
)
using equation
(3.27).
12. Repeat all steps above until s = T ∗.
In order to obtain all other simulated counterparts of (B.8) for individual i at period t we
do not repeat all the steps above. Instead, we use the same simulated aggregate evolution
of the market and repeat only those steps involving individual i’s path conditional on choice
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j′ 6= j at t; this is the reason why we deliberately write hnsi′t+s−1 instead of hnsi′jt+s−1 for all
i 6= i′, as their simulated individual paths do not depend on i’s decision at period t. We
abstain from generating a path of product innovation following counterfactual choice k by
individual i as the impact of his decision at period t on the overall aggregate evolution of
the market is negligible.
When simulating the path following counterfactual choice j′ we need counterfactual
health when s = 1, hnsij′t+s−1; for this we need to compute the realized residuals of the
health equation at t
ˆhit = hit −
5∑
m=0
αhmh
m
it−1 −
∑
r
θhr δit−1r
Then, using the realized residual ˆhit and equation (B.2) we obtain hnsij′t. When individual
i is in a trial in period t we do not observe the characteristics of the trial ex post; hence,
we draw a health shock as well as trial characteristics and compute future simulated health,
hnsij′ .
Current period payoffs. On the one hand, in order to obtain yjit we need Ej [xjit+s].
Here, when j corresponds to a cluster alternative, we exploit again the fact that we observe
the underlying stochastic process and use the within cluster weights. On the other hand,
in order to obtain counterfactual yikt we need the realized error term of the out-of-pocket
payment equation at t given by
ˆoit = o
∗
jit −Xojitθo
However, we only observe o∗jit if o∗jit > 0. Hence, if o∗jit ≤ 0, we need to draw a simulated
error o,nsit from a truncated normal conditional on
o,nsit ≤ −Xojitθo
The sample simulated counterpart of (B.8) is
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1NS
∑
ns
T∗∑
s=1
βsP
o(s−1),ns
j (zit)Dit+s
(
zns,jit+s
) ∑
k∈Cns,jt+s
dns,jikt+s
(
zns,jit+s
) [
yikt+s
(
zns,jit+s
)
+ ψikt+s
(
zns,jit+s
)]
(B.12)
One potential issue with our simulation algorithm is that in reality individuals die and
others become potential consumers. This two phenomena are likely to affect the aggregate
joint distribution of individual characteristics and therefore the ccps and the evolution of
the market. In order to control for death when computing i’s continuation value we could
simulate death conditional on optimal behavior for all i′ 6= i, i.e. some people will leave
the sample in the simulated paths. However, we would also need to create people to be
introduced into the market. We decide to simulate neither people into the absorbing state
nor the stream of people into the sample. Instead, we condition on the aggregate distribution
of characteristics at any period t in order to simulate ahead and on optimal future behavior.
Also, a related issue is that our sample is refreshed at least once as new subjects are
surveyed. Figures not shown here present no special effect of this refreshing in terms of
the aggregate ccps suggesting that the aggregate distribution of characteristics of the new
surveyed people matches that of the surveyed individuals at the time.
B.2.4 Estimator
We use a GMM estimator to obtain our structural parameters. DefineB as theK−dimensional
vector of parameters.Following Hotz et al. (1994) we want to obtain the parameter vector
that solves
(
(NT )−1
N∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
δitw (zit)⊗ v¯it(zit, B)
)′
Wn
(
(NT )−1
N∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
δitw (zit)⊗ v¯it(zit, B)
)
(B.13)
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where
v¯it(zit, B) =

...
ln
(
poit(zit)
pjit(zit)
)
+ yjit − yoit
+ 1NS
∑
ns
∑T ∗
s=1 β
s
(
s∏
τ=1
Dit+τ
(
zns,jit+τ
))
×∑
k∈Cns,jt+s
dns,jkit+s
(
zns,jit+s
) [
ykit+s
(
zns,jit+s
)
+ ψkit+s
(
zns,jit+s
)]
− 1NS
∑
ns
∑T ∗
s=1 β
s
(
s∏
τ=1
Dit+τ
(
zns,oit+τ
))×∑
k∈Cns,jt+s
dns,okit+s
(
zns,oit+s
) [
ykit+s
(
zns,oit+s
)
+ ψkit+s
(
zns,oit+s
)]
...

and Wn is a square weighting matrix. Using the linear structure of our utility function we
collect and factor terms in order to write the jth component of the vector v¯it(zit, B) as the
linear form
y˜jit − x˜′jitB
Define Y as the [(J − 1)NT × 1]−dimensional vector that stacks all y˜jit, X the matrix of
dimensions [(J − 1)NT ×K] that stacks all x˜jit. Define Z as the [NT ×R]−dimensional
matrix the columns of which contain the R instruments orthogonal to the difference in
alternative representations—which renders Wn as a (J − 1)R−dimensional square matrix.
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Finally, let I[J−1] be a (J − 1)−dimensional identity matrix
Y =

y˜1,1,1
y˜1,1,2
...
y˜1,N,T−1
y˜1,N,T
...
y˜J−1,1,1
y˜J−1,1,2
...
y˜J−1,N,T−1
y˜J−1,N,T

, X =

x˜1,1,1,1 . . . x˜1,1,1,K
x˜1,1,2,1 . . . x˜1,1,2,K
...
...
x˜1,N,T−1,1 . . . x˜1,N,T−1,K
x˜1,N,T,1 . . . x˜1,N,T,K
...
...
x˜J−1,1,1,1 . . . x˜J−1,1,1,K
x˜J−1,1,2,1 . . . x˜J−1,1,2,K
...
...
x˜J−1,N,T−1,1 . . . x˜J−1,N,T−1,K
x˜J−1,N,T,1 . . . x˜J−1,N,T,K

, Z =

w (z11)1 . . . w (z11)R
w (z12)1 . . . w (z12)R
...
...
w (zNT )1 . . . w (zNT )R

And define
Z˜ = I[J−1] ⊗ Z
Then we can write the objective function in (B.13) as
(
(NT )−1 Z˜ ′ (Y −XB)
)′
Wn
(
(NT )−1 Z˜ ′ (Y −XB)
)
From where we can obtain a close form solution for Bˆ as the optimal GMM estimator. It
entails a first stage estimator given by
Bˆ1S =
(
X ′Z˜Z˜ ′X
)−1 (
X ′Z˜Z˜ ′Y
)
and a second stage estimator given by
Bˆ2S =
(
X ′Z˜Sˆ−1Z˜ ′X
)−1 (
X ′Z˜Sˆ−1Z˜ ′Y
)
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where
Sˆ =
1
N∗
Z˜ ′DZ˜
and D is the N (J − 1) ×N (J − 1) diagonal matrix with elements uˆ2jit =
(
yjit − x′jitBˆ1S
)2
in its diagonal. The variance-covariance matrix of the second stage estimator is
Vˆ 2S = N∗
(
X ′Z˜Sˆ−1Z˜ ′X
)−1
and
N∗ =
N∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
J−1∑
j=1
1 {Decision j available for i at t}
which accounts for the fact that some individuals cannot stay in their lagged treatments at
some periods (for instance, if lagged decision was no treatment or trial treatment).
B.2.5 CCP Estimation and Fit
The probability that an individual chooses one of the options depends on the elements of his
state. As such, the CCPs needed to simulate choices in our estimation method are functions
of individual-specific variables as well as market-level variables.
Individuals decide between one of G clusters, yesterday’s product (if any), a trial product,
and no product. Let Wjit be the characteristics describing alternative j for individual i at
period t: mean health, mean ailments, and the variance matrix. LetWjitWjit denote a vector
of interactions between the elements of Wjit. Let x˜it and z˜it be subsets of the individual-
specific components of the state.3 Let ωtWjit denote a vector of interactions between the
centroid and the elements of Wjit. Similarly, let Wjitz˜it be a vector of interactions between
the components of Wjit and individual-specific state components and let ωtWjitz˜it be defined
in a similar fashion. Finally, let F˜t denote a set of non parametric moments describing the
3z˜it includes hit−1, ait−1, bi, lit while x˜it includes a constant, ait−1, bi.
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joint distribution of aggregate characteristics, Ft.4
For each of the options, the CCPs are expressed as follows:
Cluster ccps (j = 1, . . . ,G)
pjit =
exp
(
γ0x˜it + β0Wjit + β1WjitWjit + β2ωtWjit + β3Wjitz˜it + β4ωtWjitz˜it + β5WjitF˜t
)
1 +
∑G+2
k=1 exp (·)
(B.14)
γ0 is constant across clusters and over time. For a given cluster j and period t, Wjit is in
fact constant across individuals so Wjit = Wjt.
Trial ccps (j = G + 1)
pjit =
exp
(
γj x˜it + β0Wjit + β1WjitWjit + β3Wjitz˜it + β5WjitF˜t
)
1 +
∑G+2
k=1 exp (·)
(B.15)
For the trial alternative, Wjit is constant across individuals so WG+1it = WG+1t. In fact, two
of the components ofWjt are ωt−1 +µν , where µν is the mean of the innovations distribution.
Therefore, to avoid collinearity we do not include terms ωtWjt and ωtWjtz˜it in the trials ccps.
Staying ccps (j = G + 2)
pjit =
exp
(
γj x˜it + β0Wjit + β1WjitWjit + β2ωtWjit + β3Wjitz˜it + β4ωtWjitz˜it + β5WjitF˜t
)
1 +
∑G+2
k=1 exp (·)
(B.16)
When individuals choose to stick to their previous productWG+1it becomes heterogeneous—
individuals may have consumed different products last period.
No product ccps (j = 0)
pjit = 1−
G+2∑
k=1
pkit (B.17)
4We specify these moments as shares of people with different sets of characteristics.
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Even though the characteristics of the choice set are non stationary, by interacting our
time-varying regressors z˜it with the characteristics of the choice for individual i, Wjit, we are
able to control for the state of the world inside the ccps. As a consequence of this we do
not have to run period-specific logits and we can have ccps for any simulated world as long
as our observed worlds cover the space of possible worlds reasonably well. We also include
parameters that are invariant to the state of the technology, γ, which capture stationary
taste differences between staying in current choice, trying a new market product, going to a
trial, or not consuming anything. Also, since all clusters correspond to the action of “trying
a market product” we impose γj = γj′ = γ0 for any j, j′ = 1, . . . ,G.
Figures B.1, B.2, and B.3 display the mean predicted conditional choice probability using
equations (B.14), (B.16), (B.15) and (B.17) over time against the correspondent share of the
population who chose the alternative. Our ccps map the choices in the data relatively well.
In fact, we further explore the fit of our ccp estimates comparing the relatives shares that
clusters received in reality against our the predictions from our estimated ccps. We do this
by ranking the three clusters at every period by the share they received and comparing this
ranking with the ranking obtained from our estimated ccps. A cross tabulation of these
rankings—not shown here—suggests that the predicted ranks match the real ranks in more
than 79 percent of the periods. In fact, the lowest-ranking cluster matches the predicted
lowest-ranking cluster 88 percent of the times.
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Figure B.1: CCPs Goodness of fit: Stayers
Notes: Figure shows the average estimated conditional choice probability against the share of people choosing the alternative.
Dashed lines represent 95 percent confidence intervals around the predicted CCPs. Figure highlights three periods that are of
special relevance in the period we study. It depicts periods during which enrollment into the sample was undertaken and more
importantly, it displays the period in which products belonging to the HAART family were introduced.
Figure B.2: CCPs Goodness of fit: Trial
Notes: Figure shows the average estimated conditional choice probability against the share of people choosing the alternative.
Dashed lines represent 95 percent confidence intervals around the predicted CCPs. Figure highlights three periods that are of
special relevance in the period we study. It depicts periods during which enrollment into the sample was undertaken and more
importantly, it displays the period in which products belonging to the HAART family were introduced.
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Figure B.3: CCPs Goodness of fit: No Product
Notes: Figure shows the average estimated conditional choice probability against the share of people choosing the alternative.
Dashed lines represent 95 percent confidence intervals around the predicted CCPs. Figure highlights three periods that are of
special relevance in the period we study. It depicts periods during which enrollment into the sample was undertaken and more
importantly, it displays the period in which products belonging to the HAART family were introduced.
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B.2.6 Proof of Proposition 3.1
vjit(zit) = yjit + βE [V (zit+1, εit+1) |zit, j]
= yjit + βE
Dit+1 (zit+1)Eε
 ∑
k∈Ct+1
doikt+1 (zit+s) [yikt+s (zit+s) + εikt+1]
 |zit, j

+β2E [Dit+1 (zit+1)V (zit+2, εit+2) |zit, j, doi ]
= yjit + βE
Dit+1 (zit+1)Eε
 ∑
k∈Ct+1
Eε
[
doikt+1 (zit+s) [yikt+s (zit+s) + εikt+1]
∣∣ doikt+1 (zit+s) = 1]
 |zit, j

+β2E [Dit+1 (zit+1)V (zit+2, εit+2) |zit, j, doi ]
= yjit + βE
Dit+1 (zit+1)Eε
 ∑
k∈Ct+1
doikt+1 (zit+s)
[
yikt+s (zit+s) + Eε
[
εikt+1| doikt+1 (zit+s) = 1
]] |zit, j

+β2E [Dit+1 (zit+1)V (zit+2, εit+2) |zit, j, doi ]
= yjit + βE
Dit+1 (zit+1)Eε
 ∑
k∈Ct+1
doikt+1 (zit+s) [yikt+s (zit+s) + ψikt+s (zit+s)]
 |zit, j

+β2E [Dit+1 (zit+1)V (zit+2, εit+2) |zit, j, doi ]
= yjit + βE
Dit+1 (zit+1)Eε
 ∑
k∈Ct+1
doikt+1 (zit+1) [yikt+1 (zit+1) + ψikt+1 (zit+1)]
 |zit, j

+β2P
o(2−1)
j (zit)E [V (zit+2, εit+2) |zit, j, Sit+2−1 = 1, doi ]
= yjit
+
T∗∑
s=1
βsP
o(s−1)
j (zit)Ez
Dit+s (zit+s) ∑
k∈Ct+s
pikt+s (zit+s) [yikt+s (zit+s) + ψikt+s (zit+s)]
∣∣∣∣∣∣ zit, j, Sit+s−1 = 1, doi

+βT
∗+1P
o(T∗)
j (zit)Ez [Dit+T∗+1 (zit+T∗+1)V (zit+T∗+1, εit+T∗+1)| zit, j, Sit+T∗ = 1, doi ]
That
ψkit (zit) = γ − ln (pkit (zit)) (B.18)
follows from the joint distribution of the taste shifter εit, which is Extreme Value Type-I.
Q.E.D.
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B.3 Additional Tables and Figures
Table B.5: Health Characteristics of Treatments
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES cd4 cd4 cd4 cd4 cd4 cd4
CD4t−1 0.834*** 1.064*** 1.009*** 1.021*** 1.152*** 1.136***
(0.006) (0.013) (0.014) (0.026) (0.032) (0.051)
CD42t−1/10
3 -0.174*** -0.097*** -0.121** -0.519*** -0.456**
(0.012) (0.018) (0.059) (0.098) (0.212)
CD43t−1/10
7 -0.274*** -0.112 4.375*** 3.363
(0.060) (0.430) (1.123) (3.518)
CD44t−1/10
10 -0.031 -2.016*** -1.288
(0.080) (0.502) (2.598)
CD45t−1/10
14 2.803*** 0.482
(0.718) (8.325)
CD46t−1/10
18 2.623
(9.398)
DT3 -21.583*** -11.174*** -11.950*** -11.909*** -12.004*** -11.983***
(2.840) (2.707) (2.700) (2.699) (2.697) (2.697)
DT9 -20.319* -19.561* -19.089 -19.165 -19.655* -19.623*
(11.743) (11.879) (11.865) (11.865) (11.861) (11.860)
DT13 -72.170*** -53.988*** -55.512*** -55.437*** -55.796*** -55.726***
(11.798) (12.504) (12.348) (12.364) (12.455) (12.455)
DT14 -15.506** -4.315 -5.164 -5.115 -5.155 -5.140
(6.241) (6.105) (6.100) (6.098) (6.094) (6.094)
DT33 -21.629** 0.985 -2.034 -1.689 -0.017 -0.112
(9.038) (9.161) (9.112) (9.123) (9.108) (9.113)
DT34 -21.810*** -12.450*** -13.310*** -13.219*** -12.752*** -12.779***
(4.900) (4.755) (4.761) (4.764) (4.764) (4.765)
DT39 -31.246*** -15.492*** -17.057*** -16.924*** -16.615*** -16.607***
(5.805) (5.715) (5.691) (5.691) (5.687) (5.688)
DT46 7.741* 15.348*** 14.581*** 14.678*** 15.263*** 15.229***
(4.679) (4.566) (4.577) (4.581) (4.574) (4.573)
DT47 -34.371*** -15.583** -17.510** -17.327** -16.474** -16.521**
(7.318) (7.033) (7.027) (7.028) (7.040) (7.037)
DT51 -22.630*** -3.664 -6.022 -5.740 -4.159 -4.252
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(7.962) (7.693) (7.690) (7.693) (7.669) (7.670)
DT63 -16.743 2.384 -0.183 0.162 2.415 2.275
(14.637) (13.594) (13.649) (13.659) (13.746) (13.735)
DT64 -37.988*** -17.449* -19.583** -19.387** -18.630** -18.656**
(8.900) (9.076) (8.991) (8.996) (9.035) (9.032)
DT65 -27.913*** -12.409* -13.823** -13.704* -13.186* -13.220*
(7.203) (7.007) (7.006) (7.006) (6.993) (6.994)
DT67 -50.755*** -31.179** -33.087** -32.938** -32.700** -32.673**
(15.300) (14.998) (14.986) (14.990) (15.052) (15.044)
DT69 -26.741* -11.827 -13.331 -13.215 -13.351 -13.275
(14.379) (13.908) (13.950) (13.945) (13.973) (13.973)
DT85 34.619*** 40.457*** 39.721*** 39.790*** 39.776*** 39.792***
(6.424) (6.319) (6.311) (6.308) (6.299) (6.299)
DT117 33.323*** 42.736*** 41.910*** 41.991*** 42.267*** 42.277***
(12.098) (11.819) (11.837) (11.834) (11.819) (11.818)
DT124 33.711*** 33.910*** 33.804*** 33.864*** 34.398*** 34.364***
(6.284) (6.229) (6.234) (6.235) (6.227) (6.228)
DT146 27.752* 34.323** 33.694** 33.761** 33.792** 33.831**
(14.796) (14.611) (14.644) (14.639) (14.625) (14.625)
DT157 34.353*** 37.455*** 37.258*** 37.282*** 37.173*** 37.208***
(6.945) (6.861) (6.862) (6.862) (6.856) (6.857)
DT161 33.496** 38.559*** 38.364*** 38.340*** 38.283*** 38.259***
(13.411) (13.215) (13.201) (13.205) (13.193) (13.198)
DT164 55.089** 64.825** 64.314** 64.302** 63.734** 63.798**
(27.560) (27.365) (27.365) (27.370) (27.414) (27.419)
DT165 60.168*** 64.722*** 65.220*** 65.337*** 65.041*** 65.045***
(7.077) (6.246) (6.215) (6.225) (6.220) (6.222)
DT169 33.129** 34.545** 34.182** 34.289** 35.032** 35.012**
(16.388) (16.316) (16.316) (16.317) (16.339) (16.334)
DT171 73.104*** 78.825*** 78.453*** 78.478*** 78.559*** 78.548***
(17.682) (18.040) (18.017) (18.010) (17.950) (17.943)
DT175 44.728*** 52.470*** 52.730*** 52.619*** 53.128*** 53.153***
(8.770) (8.233) (8.202) (8.198) (8.176) (8.172)
DT185 50.899*** 58.842*** 57.833*** 57.922*** 57.776*** 57.825***
(12.661) (12.659) (12.642) (12.638) (12.608) (12.608)
DT202 32.648** 32.522** 33.226** 33.107** 32.286** 32.338**
(14.544) (14.584) (14.576) (14.576) (14.573) (14.574)
DT214 33.330*** 33.541*** 34.154*** 34.057*** 33.510*** 33.535***
(12.245) (12.162) (12.166) (12.164) (12.163) (12.161)
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DT236 48.886*** 46.186*** 46.239*** 46.267*** 46.275*** 46.281***
(7.172) (7.130) (7.121) (7.123) (7.123) (7.124)
DT242 47.980*** 46.484*** 46.110*** 46.240*** 46.846*** 46.863***
(9.266) (9.144) (9.154) (9.160) (9.161) (9.162)
DT254 42.775*** 42.587*** 42.568*** 42.601*** 42.631*** 42.656***
(13.502) (13.436) (13.444) (13.443) (13.446) (13.445)
DT268 47.316*** 52.474*** 51.249*** 51.353*** 50.776*** 50.855***
(10.457) (10.436) (10.415) (10.407) (10.417) (10.415)
DT292 42.030*** 48.796*** 48.057*** 48.109*** 48.018*** 48.069***
(10.638) (10.242) (10.225) (10.230) (10.212) (10.215)
DT311 39.770* 50.740** 49.168** 49.215** 47.816** 47.922**
(23.206) (22.720) (22.698) (22.709) (22.774) (22.780)
DT349 50.575*** 42.467** 43.413** 43.408** 44.240*** 44.156***
(16.958) (17.083) (17.108) (17.098) (17.046) (17.046)
DT377 56.809*** 57.778*** 57.727*** 57.716*** 57.227*** 57.259***
(19.614) (19.566) (19.530) (19.538) (19.552) (19.555)
DT532 49.321*** 47.631*** 47.537*** 47.614*** 47.978*** 47.990***
(10.952) (10.886) (10.899) (10.899) (10.893) (10.892)
DT548 45.842*** 43.345*** 43.281*** 43.348*** 43.526*** 43.551***
(5.368) (5.331) (5.329) (5.330) (5.327) (5.329)
DT573 40.314*** 39.595*** 39.432*** 39.485*** 39.379*** 39.426***
(10.981) (10.960) (10.901) (10.909) (10.919) (10.922)
DT581 19.612 18.387 18.413 18.417 17.866 17.935
(14.499) (14.316) (14.341) (14.341) (14.376) (14.378)
DT615 44.239*** 40.856*** 41.087*** 41.122*** 41.280*** 41.301***
(11.769) (11.592) (11.603) (11.604) (11.622) (11.622)
DT644 54.543*** 53.883*** 53.615*** 53.650*** 53.341*** 53.368***
(8.639) (8.512) (8.504) (8.505) (8.516) (8.515)
DT701 52.853*** 55.916*** 54.878*** 54.997*** 54.824*** 54.870***
(11.144) (10.997) (10.979) (10.975) (10.999) (11.003)
DT720 60.713*** 79.231*** 78.995*** 78.688*** 78.914*** 78.726***
(13.046) (14.550) (14.500) (14.464) (14.412) (14.405)
DT782 28.143* 35.924** 35.177** 35.267** 35.611** 35.633**
(15.627) (14.945) (14.959) (14.967) (15.077) (15.068)
DT869 50.005*** 50.037*** 49.904*** 49.946*** 49.838*** 49.885***
(13.110) (12.947) (12.940) (12.946) (12.997) (12.999)
DT909 27.964** 33.525*** 33.367*** 33.310*** 32.227*** 32.320***
(10.898) (10.827) (10.764) (10.781) (10.842) (10.846)
DT919 47.628*** 48.846*** 48.522*** 48.536*** 47.617*** 47.722***
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(13.308) (13.619) (13.486) (13.499) (13.453) (13.466)
DT921 15.458 18.929 19.116 19.058 19.273 19.286
(16.086) (14.468) (14.426) (14.448) (14.327) (14.341)
DT923 30.619* 26.759 26.896 26.960 27.246 27.283
(17.077) (16.964) (16.951) (16.954) (16.971) (16.973)
DT926 47.776*** 47.965*** 47.952*** 47.971*** 47.790*** 47.835***
(10.277) (9.953) (9.995) (9.993) (10.024) (10.021)
DT940 54.575*** 50.873*** 50.705*** 50.821*** 51.570*** 51.537***
(15.098) (15.196) (15.198) (15.195) (15.164) (15.163)
DT949 53.752*** 50.921*** 51.203*** 51.236*** 51.672*** 51.661***
(11.818) (11.668) (11.706) (11.701) (11.705) (11.701)
DT963 37.095*** 30.953** 31.641** 31.628** 31.845** 31.829**
(12.997) (13.013) (13.021) (13.019) (13.014) (13.015)
DT976 -7.655 2.510 2.487 2.349 2.381 2.436
(20.271) (17.213) (16.922) (16.980) (16.471) (16.507)
DT987 4.115 10.199 9.583 9.654 9.855 9.870
(14.474) (14.526) (14.496) (14.498) (14.503) (14.500)
DT994 10.625 15.088 15.225 15.171 14.891 14.893
(17.109) (17.416) (17.404) (17.396) (17.282) (17.291)
DT1010 12.409 20.292** 19.891** 19.906** 19.980** 19.966**
(9.769) (9.701) (9.687) (9.686) (9.676) (9.676)
DT1011 43.817* 39.067* 38.498* 38.691* 39.457* 39.484*
(22.599) (22.024) (22.150) (22.142) (22.163) (22.157)
DT1020 20.973 17.603 18.253 18.220 18.396 18.375
(13.204) (13.121) (13.141) (13.135) (13.111) (13.111)
DT1071 58.721*** 53.880*** 54.012*** 54.094*** 54.798*** 54.796***
(4.578) (4.475) (4.469) (4.478) (4.453) (4.453)
DT1128 40.782*** 37.265*** 37.397*** 37.415*** 37.227*** 37.246***
(9.919) (9.662) (9.682) (9.683) (9.722) (9.720)
DT1222 53.239*** 52.943*** 52.719*** 52.793*** 53.028*** 53.050***
(5.409) (5.301) (5.306) (5.307) (5.309) (5.310)
DT1227 83.132*** 85.565*** 84.437*** 84.556*** 83.823*** 83.917***
(20.468) (21.138) (21.037) (21.031) (20.842) (20.859)
DT1230 25.312** 27.037** 27.504** 27.416** 26.850** 26.886**
(12.040) (12.112) (12.093) (12.093) (12.079) (12.081)
DT1245 37.822*** 38.379*** 38.357*** 38.374*** 38.313*** 38.336***
(13.418) (13.334) (13.326) (13.328) (13.347) (13.347)
DT1253 46.066*** 46.654*** 46.213*** 46.319*** 46.723*** 46.735***
(7.946) (7.735) (7.745) (7.747) (7.767) (7.765)
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DT1303 51.942*** 46.893*** 47.631*** 47.602*** 47.800*** 47.786***
(16.434) (16.225) (16.276) (16.269) (16.284) (16.279)
DT1342 32.840** 29.637** 30.481** 30.395** 30.226** 30.204**
(14.069) (14.124) (14.137) (14.132) (14.115) (14.116)
DT10006 -29.515 -21.709 -22.258 -22.209 -21.950 -21.961
(19.930) (20.278) (20.256) (20.251) (20.191) (20.194)
DT10026 64.425*** 66.829*** 65.194*** 65.444*** 65.353*** 65.496***
(24.136) (22.649) (22.765) (22.778) (23.021) (23.023)
DT10027 0.210 7.741 7.165 7.179 6.457 6.562
(14.742) (14.802) (14.701) (14.715) (14.739) (14.748)
DT10028 26.450 32.481 31.616 31.629 30.293 30.414
(19.796) (20.521) (20.367) (20.371) (20.276) (20.282)
DT10030 20.031 19.261 19.703 19.654 19.278 19.315
(17.621) (17.572) (17.592) (17.586) (17.546) (17.548)
DT10031 34.205** 29.830** 30.781** 30.712** 31.044** 30.969**
(15.053) (14.878) (14.911) (14.901) (14.838) (14.843)
DT10035 44.294*** 43.738*** 43.648*** 43.682*** 43.495*** 43.550***
(15.320) (15.368) (15.337) (15.340) (15.357) (15.356)
DT10037 28.525*** 28.144*** 28.115*** 28.134*** 27.893** 27.931**
(11.035) (10.856) (10.855) (10.857) (10.893) (10.892)
DT10038 48.755*** 44.792*** 44.735*** 44.855*** 45.683*** 45.679***
(13.769) (13.693) (13.692) (13.695) (13.673) (13.674)
DT10040 26.314*** 28.505*** 28.742*** 28.692*** 28.440*** 28.431***
(8.531) (8.329) (8.333) (8.335) (8.334) (8.337)
DT10041 43.028*** 41.990*** 42.154*** 42.158*** 42.050*** 42.074***
(12.657) (12.467) (12.470) (12.470) (12.474) (12.473)
DT10042 30.254** 32.127** 31.743** 31.779** 31.824** 31.811**
(12.900) (13.008) (13.007) (12.996) (12.924) (12.922)
DT10043 28.589** 26.499** 26.919** 26.894** 26.678** 26.715**
(12.874) (12.711) (12.704) (12.707) (12.739) (12.739)
DT10046 36.196*** 32.318** 32.455** 32.517** 32.865** 32.884**
(13.618) (13.720) (13.651) (13.662) (13.672) (13.678)
DT10048 33.017** 33.618** 33.783** 33.756** 33.352** 33.394**
(15.278) (14.856) (14.884) (14.888) (14.943) (14.943)
DT10049 49.474*** 47.695*** 48.034*** 48.005*** 47.736*** 47.760***
(11.002) (10.687) (10.698) (10.703) (10.757) (10.753)
DT10050 38.954** 38.166** 38.394** 38.415** 38.933** 38.887**
(17.897) (18.043) (18.036) (18.037) (18.096) (18.090)
Constant 56.819*** -2.797 6.623** 5.233 -5.874* -4.898
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(3.161) (3.411) (3.018) (3.432) (3.313) (3.681)
Observations 33,258 33,258 33,258 33,258 33,258 33,258
R-squared 0.728 0.736 0.736 0.736 0.736 0.736
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table B.6: No Ailments Characteristics of Treatments
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES NoSfx NoSfx NoSfx NoSfx NoSfx NoSfx
CD4t−1 0.001*** 0.003*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.008*** 0.009***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
CD42t−1/10
3 -0.001*** -0.005*** -0.007*** -0.013*** -0.017***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
CD43t−1/10
7 0.013*** 0.033*** 0.109*** 0.166***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.019) (0.040)
CD44t−1/10
10 -0.005*** -0.040*** -0.084***
(0.001) (0.010) (0.028)
CD45t−1/10
14 0.054*** 0.203**
(0.016) (0.092)
CD46t−1/10
18 -0.186*
(0.106)
DT3 -0.576*** -0.515*** -0.500*** -0.498*** -0.500*** -0.501***
(0.040) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041)
DT9 -0.402* -0.404* -0.421** -0.427** -0.433** -0.434**
(0.208) (0.212) (0.213) (0.213) (0.212) (0.212)
DT13 -0.738*** -0.627** -0.594** -0.593** -0.600** -0.603**
(0.260) (0.259) (0.260) (0.260) (0.260) (0.260)
DT14 -0.523*** -0.457*** -0.439*** -0.437*** -0.439*** -0.439***
(0.099) (0.100) (0.100) (0.101) (0.101) (0.101)
DT33 -1.039*** -0.900*** -0.819*** -0.799*** -0.783*** -0.781***
(0.127) (0.128) (0.130) (0.130) (0.131) (0.132)
DT34 -0.622*** -0.569*** -0.549*** -0.544*** -0.539*** -0.538***
(0.079) (0.079) (0.080) (0.080) (0.080) (0.081)
DT39 -0.713*** -0.618*** -0.580*** -0.573*** -0.571*** -0.571***
(0.105) (0.106) (0.107) (0.108) (0.108) (0.108)
DT46 -0.457*** -0.411*** -0.390*** -0.383*** -0.375*** -0.374***
(0.069) (0.070) (0.070) (0.071) (0.071) (0.071)
DT47 -1.016*** -0.907*** -0.866*** -0.858*** -0.851*** -0.850***
(0.157) (0.159) (0.162) (0.162) (0.163) (0.163)
DT51 -0.577*** -0.456*** -0.388** -0.369** -0.348** -0.344**
(0.161) (0.164) (0.166) (0.167) (0.168) (0.168)
DT63 -0.567** -0.445 -0.367 -0.341 -0.310 -0.304
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(0.269) (0.274) (0.280) (0.282) (0.284) (0.285)
DT64 -0.566*** -0.436** -0.379* -0.367* -0.358 -0.357
(0.210) (0.213) (0.218) (0.220) (0.222) (0.222)
DT65 -0.650*** -0.557*** -0.525*** -0.519*** -0.514*** -0.512***
(0.133) (0.133) (0.135) (0.135) (0.136) (0.137)
DT67 -1.582*** -1.473*** -1.439*** -1.436*** -1.440*** -1.442***
(0.306) (0.303) (0.305) (0.306) (0.307) (0.307)
DT69 -0.916*** -0.827*** -0.790*** -0.785*** -0.789*** -0.793***
(0.261) (0.261) (0.262) (0.263) (0.263) (0.264)
DT85 -0.772*** -0.737*** -0.718*** -0.715*** -0.717*** -0.718***
(0.091) (0.091) (0.091) (0.092) (0.092) (0.092)
DT117 -0.609*** -0.555*** -0.535** -0.530** -0.527** -0.528**
(0.205) (0.208) (0.210) (0.211) (0.212) (0.212)
DT124 0.036 0.040 0.050 0.055 0.064 0.065
(0.093) (0.094) (0.094) (0.094) (0.094) (0.094)
DT146 -0.568** -0.530** -0.513** -0.509** -0.509** -0.511**
(0.223) (0.226) (0.227) (0.227) (0.227) (0.227)
DT157 -0.132 -0.111 -0.103 -0.102 -0.104 -0.105
(0.112) (0.113) (0.114) (0.114) (0.114) (0.114)
DT161 -0.302* -0.270 -0.270 -0.272 -0.271 -0.270
(0.180) (0.182) (0.182) (0.182) (0.182) (0.182)
DT164 -0.532*** -0.475** -0.468** -0.471** -0.479** -0.482**
(0.184) (0.185) (0.186) (0.187) (0.187) (0.187)
DT165 -0.106 -0.084 -0.078 -0.073 -0.075 -0.076
(0.080) (0.081) (0.081) (0.081) (0.081) (0.081)
DT169 -0.604** -0.600** -0.585** -0.577** -0.567** -0.566**
(0.244) (0.246) (0.248) (0.249) (0.250) (0.250)
DT171 -0.342* -0.308 -0.299 -0.297 -0.295 -0.295
(0.190) (0.195) (0.197) (0.198) (0.199) (0.199)
DT175 -0.424*** -0.377*** -0.399*** -0.402*** -0.395*** -0.397***
(0.099) (0.100) (0.100) (0.100) (0.100) (0.100)
DT185 -0.671*** -0.621*** -0.592*** -0.588*** -0.591*** -0.594***
(0.174) (0.175) (0.176) (0.176) (0.177) (0.177)
DT202 0.003 -0.002 -0.027 -0.036 -0.048 -0.050
(0.226) (0.227) (0.228) (0.228) (0.229) (0.229)
DT214 -0.720*** -0.730*** -0.754*** -0.761*** -0.767*** -0.768***
(0.267) (0.268) (0.269) (0.269) (0.269) (0.268)
DT236 0.125 0.107 0.109 0.110 0.109 0.109
(0.112) (0.112) (0.112) (0.111) (0.111) (0.111)
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DT242 -0.415*** -0.425*** -0.403*** -0.393*** -0.386*** -0.387***
(0.121) (0.120) (0.121) (0.120) (0.121) (0.121)
DT254 -0.446*** -0.450*** -0.447*** -0.444*** -0.444*** -0.445***
(0.160) (0.159) (0.159) (0.159) (0.160) (0.160)
DT268 -0.508*** -0.466*** -0.426*** -0.423*** -0.432*** -0.436***
(0.122) (0.122) (0.122) (0.122) (0.122) (0.122)
DT292 -0.941*** -0.900*** -0.882*** -0.879*** -0.881*** -0.883***
(0.128) (0.130) (0.130) (0.130) (0.130) (0.130)
DT311 -0.913*** -0.830*** -0.785*** -0.788*** -0.810*** -0.813***
(0.214) (0.213) (0.214) (0.213) (0.213) (0.213)
DT349 0.809** 0.756** 0.736** 0.740** 0.753** 0.757**
(0.332) (0.327) (0.325) (0.324) (0.324) (0.325)
DT377 -1.043*** -1.040*** -1.039*** -1.041*** -1.049*** -1.050***
(0.219) (0.220) (0.219) (0.220) (0.220) (0.220)
DT532 -0.353** -0.366** -0.356** -0.350** -0.346** -0.346**
(0.146) (0.148) (0.149) (0.149) (0.149) (0.149)
DT548 0.340*** 0.327*** 0.337*** 0.341*** 0.342*** 0.341***
(0.084) (0.085) (0.085) (0.085) (0.085) (0.085)
DT573 0.031 0.027 0.038 0.040 0.038 0.036
(0.233) (0.231) (0.232) (0.233) (0.235) (0.235)
DT581 -0.454** -0.463** -0.460** -0.462** -0.470*** -0.473***
(0.181) (0.180) (0.180) (0.180) (0.180) (0.179)
DT615 -0.605*** -0.631*** -0.632*** -0.628*** -0.626*** -0.627***
(0.163) (0.164) (0.164) (0.164) (0.163) (0.163)
DT644 0.106 0.102 0.113 0.113 0.108 0.107
(0.128) (0.126) (0.125) (0.125) (0.125) (0.125)
DT701 -0.508*** -0.481*** -0.444*** -0.438*** -0.442*** -0.444***
(0.127) (0.128) (0.128) (0.128) (0.128) (0.128)
DT720 0.263 0.387** 0.349* 0.337* 0.348* 0.355*
(0.190) (0.181) (0.186) (0.188) (0.186) (0.185)
DT782 -0.393 -0.345 -0.321 -0.315 -0.310 -0.311
(0.262) (0.265) (0.269) (0.270) (0.271) (0.271)
DT869 -0.661*** -0.664*** -0.656*** -0.653*** -0.655*** -0.657***
(0.183) (0.183) (0.182) (0.181) (0.180) (0.180)
DT909 -0.560*** -0.528*** -0.530*** -0.537*** -0.552*** -0.556***
(0.197) (0.196) (0.194) (0.193) (0.193) (0.193)
DT919 -0.974*** -0.966*** -0.951*** -0.952*** -0.966*** -0.971***
(0.274) (0.268) (0.261) (0.260) (0.261) (0.262)
DT921 -0.659*** -0.641*** -0.656*** -0.657*** -0.652*** -0.653***
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(0.204) (0.207) (0.206) (0.206) (0.205) (0.205)
DT923 -0.244 -0.270 -0.266 -0.261 -0.258 -0.260
(0.212) (0.213) (0.214) (0.214) (0.214) (0.214)
DT926 -0.015 -0.013 -0.009 -0.008 -0.011 -0.013
(0.153) (0.153) (0.153) (0.153) (0.154) (0.154)
DT940 -0.940*** -0.967*** -0.952*** -0.943*** -0.934*** -0.933***
(0.207) (0.206) (0.207) (0.208) (0.208) (0.208)
DT949 -0.081 -0.100 -0.102 -0.098 -0.092 -0.092
(0.171) (0.173) (0.174) (0.174) (0.174) (0.174)
DT963 -0.251 -0.296* -0.311* -0.311* -0.308* -0.307*
(0.178) (0.179) (0.179) (0.179) (0.178) (0.178)
DT976 -0.463* -0.396 -0.418 -0.422* -0.420* -0.424*
(0.253) (0.259) (0.255) (0.254) (0.253) (0.253)
DT987 0.214 0.262 0.287 0.294 0.298 0.297
(0.260) (0.266) (0.271) (0.272) (0.274) (0.275)
DT994 -0.814*** -0.798*** -0.813*** -0.817*** -0.820*** -0.820***
(0.244) (0.246) (0.248) (0.248) (0.249) (0.249)
DT1010 -0.778*** -0.739*** -0.738*** -0.739*** -0.738*** -0.738***
(0.209) (0.212) (0.214) (0.215) (0.215) (0.215)
DT1011 -0.793*** -0.820*** -0.785*** -0.770*** -0.762*** -0.763***
(0.279) (0.279) (0.276) (0.275) (0.275) (0.275)
DT1020 -0.234 -0.261 -0.278 -0.279 -0.276 -0.275
(0.240) (0.237) (0.238) (0.238) (0.239) (0.239)
DT1071 0.129* 0.098 0.102 0.110 0.118* 0.118*
(0.066) (0.067) (0.067) (0.067) (0.067) (0.067)
DT1128 -0.178 -0.203 -0.202 -0.202 -0.205 -0.205
(0.134) (0.134) (0.133) (0.133) (0.132) (0.132)
DT1222 0.114 0.116 0.130 0.135 0.138 0.137
(0.088) (0.089) (0.090) (0.090) (0.090) (0.090)
DT1227 0.254 0.275 0.315 0.318 0.306 0.303
(0.310) (0.311) (0.310) (0.309) (0.309) (0.310)
DT1230 -0.040 -0.032 -0.048 -0.054 -0.061 -0.063
(0.209) (0.211) (0.211) (0.211) (0.210) (0.210)
DT1245 -0.406** -0.405** -0.403* -0.402* -0.403* -0.404*
(0.204) (0.205) (0.206) (0.207) (0.208) (0.208)
DT1253 -0.223* -0.217 -0.196 -0.189 -0.183 -0.184
(0.133) (0.134) (0.134) (0.134) (0.135) (0.135)
DT1303 0.101 0.065 0.047 0.046 0.049 0.049
(0.251) (0.255) (0.255) (0.254) (0.252) (0.251)
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DT1342 -0.310 -0.339* -0.366* -0.371* -0.372* -0.371*
(0.194) (0.197) (0.199) (0.199) (0.199) (0.199)
DT10006 -1.059*** -1.025*** -1.020*** -1.019*** -1.017*** -1.017***
(0.260) (0.266) (0.269) (0.269) (0.269) (0.269)
DT10026 -0.153 -0.126 -0.062 -0.048 -0.054 -0.061
(0.332) (0.330) (0.324) (0.323) (0.325) (0.326)
DT10027 0.010 0.063 0.080 0.079 0.068 0.063
(0.291) (0.288) (0.285) (0.285) (0.285) (0.285)
DT10028 -0.735*** -0.690*** -0.665** -0.669** -0.689*** -0.694***
(0.268) (0.267) (0.264) (0.263) (0.261) (0.262)
DT10030 -1.082*** -1.099*** -1.114*** -1.117*** -1.121*** -1.123***
(0.276) (0.277) (0.278) (0.279) (0.279) (0.279)
DT10031 -0.631** -0.671** -0.701** -0.704** -0.697** -0.693**
(0.291) (0.300) (0.303) (0.303) (0.302) (0.301)
DT10035 -0.411* -0.416* -0.409* -0.407* -0.410* -0.413*
(0.242) (0.242) (0.243) (0.243) (0.243) (0.243)
DT10037 -0.462*** -0.467*** -0.463*** -0.463*** -0.467*** -0.468***
(0.170) (0.172) (0.173) (0.173) (0.173) (0.172)
DT10038 -1.266*** -1.301*** -1.287*** -1.277*** -1.265*** -1.266***
(0.231) (0.233) (0.232) (0.231) (0.230) (0.230)
DT10040 -0.452*** -0.445*** -0.458*** -0.462*** -0.465*** -0.465***
(0.164) (0.165) (0.166) (0.166) (0.167) (0.167)
DT10041 -0.597*** -0.609*** -0.611*** -0.611*** -0.612*** -0.613***
(0.228) (0.229) (0.229) (0.229) (0.229) (0.229)
DT10042 -0.694*** -0.681*** -0.668*** -0.666*** -0.665*** -0.664***
(0.190) (0.193) (0.193) (0.192) (0.191) (0.191)
DT10043 -0.178 -0.194 -0.205 -0.206 -0.210 -0.212
(0.225) (0.226) (0.226) (0.226) (0.226) (0.226)
DT10046 0.084 0.060 0.064 0.068 0.072 0.071
(0.327) (0.328) (0.327) (0.326) (0.325) (0.324)
DT10048 0.042 0.046 0.042 0.039 0.032 0.030
(0.233) (0.234) (0.234) (0.234) (0.234) (0.234)
DT10049 -0.191 -0.206 -0.215 -0.217 -0.221 -0.222
(0.167) (0.168) (0.168) (0.167) (0.167) (0.167)
DT10050 -0.375 -0.386 -0.390* -0.387 -0.379 -0.377
(0.231) (0.235) (0.236) (0.236) (0.236) (0.236)
Constant 0.091*** -0.320*** -0.638*** -0.754*** -0.929*** -0.981***
(0.031) (0.045) (0.065) (0.057) (0.067) (0.073)
220
Observations 33,258 33,258 33,258 33,258 33,258 33,258
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
221
